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LIQUIDATOR'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
03tfl '66>n 
Case No: 0 4 ^ t i ^ 6 « -
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Plaintiffs Wasatch Crest Insurance Company, in Liquidation and Wasatch Crest 
Mutual Insurance Company, in Liquidation, by and through Merwin U. Stewart, the 
0 5 . K H I 0 ; , , ! : ; 
Utah Insurance Commissioner, in his capacity as the court-appointed liquidator 
("Liquidator") of Wasatch Crest Insurance Company, in Liquidation and Wasatch Crest 
Mutual Insurance Company, in Liquidation, by and through counsel of record, hereby 
respectfully submit this Memorandum in Support of the Liquidator's Motion for 
Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Utah Insurance Code gives the Liquidator the power to retrieve monies paid 
by an insolvent insurance company to any of its affiliates during the five years prior to 
the filing of the liquidation petition. Affiliate transactions are so susceptible to 
manipulation and abuse that the Liquidator is statutorily empowered by § 31A-27-322 
to recoup those paid monies regardless of any defense asserted by the original 
recipient/affiliate. The Liquidator moves this Court to enter summary judgment 
regarding the payments received by Defendants LWP Claims Administrators, Corp. and 
LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. as affiliates of Plaintiffs Wasatch Crest Insurance Company 
and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company. 
II. MATERIAL FACTS FOR WHICH NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS 
1. Plaintiff Wasatch Crest Insurance Company was an insurance company 
domiciled in the State of Utah ("WCIC" or "Wasatch Crest Insurance"). Wasatch Crest 
Insurance was placed into liquidation by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 31, 2003. See Complaint at ^ 1 and 
Answer at ^ 1, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto respectively as 
Exhibits "A" and "B". 
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2. Plaintiff Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company was an insurance 
company domiciled in the State of Utah ("WCMIC" or "Wasatch Crest Mutual"). 
Wasatch Crest Mutual was placed into Liquidation by the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 31, 2003. See Complaint, 
Ex. "A" at U 2 and Answer, Ex. "B" at ^ 2. 
3. Plaintiff Merwin U. Stewart, Utah Insurance Commissioner, was 
appointed by the Third Judicial District Court as the liquidator of WCIC and WCMIC 
on July 31, 2003 (the "Liquidator"). The Liquidator has the authority and standing to 
bring this action pursuant to § 31A-27-310, Utah Code Ann. The Liquidator is vested 
by operation of law with the title to all the property, contracts, and rights of actions of 
the insurance company being liquidated, wherever located, as of the date of the filing of 
the petition for Liquidation. Pursuant to § 31A-27-314, Utah Code Ann., the Liquidator 
may continue to prosecute and institute in the name of the insurer or in the Liquidator's 
own name, any suits or other legal proceedings in this state or elsewhere. See 
Liquidation Order, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". 
4. Defendant LWP Claims Administrators, Corp. was a California 
corporation. The name "LWP Claims Administrators, Corp" was changed to LWP 
Claims Solutions, Inc. See Complaint, Ex. "A" at K 4 and Answer, Ex. "B" at ^ 4. 
5. Defendant LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. is a California corporation. See 
Utah Department of Commerce print out, attached hereto as Exhibit "D". LWP Claims 
Administrators, Corp. and LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. are collectively referred to as 
"LWP". Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. was the parent corporation of WCIC. LWP was 
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sold to John A. Igoe, the former Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief 
Executive Officer of WCIC and LWP. Mr. Igoe was also the Chairman of the Board, 
President and Chief Executive Officer of Wasatch Crest Group, Inc., the parent 
corporation of WCIC and LWP. LWP was an affiliate of Wasatch Crest Group, Inc., 
WCIC, and WCMIC. See Complaint, Ex. "A" at If 5; see also Wasatch Crest Group, 
Inc. Form B1, dated April 16, 2001 at p. 5, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "E". 
Corporate History of Wasatch Crest Mutual and Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Acquisition of FCL 
6. Wasatch Crest Mutual was a mutual insurance company controlled by its 
policyholders who annually elected a Board of Directors. Effective April 15, 1994, 
Wasatch Crest Mutual purchased all of the issued and outstanding common stock of 
First Continental Life & Accident Insurance Company, a Utah domiciled insurance 
company ("FCL"). See Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Co. Form B, dated July 15, 
1998, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "F"; see also Form 
B dated April 16, 2001, Ex. "E". 
1
 Form B is a standard form used by all state insurance departments. Form B is a report 
to the state regulators as to the transactions and interrelationship of the insurance 
company and its affiliates which must be filed annually or whenever a material 
transaction or change has occurred. All Form B's referenced in this Memorandum were 
filed with the Utah Department of Insurance. 
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Creation of Wasatch Crest Insurance Company 
and Merger with Wasatch Crest Casualty 
7. Effective October 31, 1998, Wasatch Crest Group (the parent company of 
WCIC) purchased all of the issued and outstanding common shares of Utah Home Fire 
Insurance Company, a Utah domiciled property and casualty company, from Deseret 
Management Corporation. Wasatch Crest Group changed the name of Utah Home Fire 
Insurance to Wasatch Crest Insurance Company. Effective December 19, 2000, 
Wasatch Crest Casualty Company was merged into Wasatch Crest Insurance with 
Wasatch Crest Insurance as the surviving company. See Form B dated April 16, 2001, 
Ex. " E " a t p . 14. 
Corporate History of LWP 
8. On November 16, 1999, Wasatch Crest Group purchased from LWP 
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. substantially all of the assets, real and 
personal property, and business operations owned by LWP Commercial 
Claims Administrators, Inc. pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement By and Among 
Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. and LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., John A. 
Igoe and Erica L. Igoe, dated November 16, 1999. Wasatch Crest Group's purchase 
was an asset purchase, not a purchase of the stock of LWP Commercial Claims 
Administrators, Inc. LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. was a third party 
administrator of insurance claims. Concurrent with the purchase of substantially all of 
the assets of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., Wasatch Crest Group 
created a new corporate entity, (i.e., LWP Claims Administrators, Corp.) that took 
possession and title to all of the purchased assets. LWP Claims Administrators, Corp. 
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was incorporated in the State of California. The name of LWP Claims Administrators, 
Corp. was subsequently changed to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. LWP is currently a 
California corporation with offices in Sacramento, California and Salt Lake City, Utah. 
LWP is currently a third-party administrator ("TPA"), which specializes in the 
administration of worker's compensation insurance and claims associated with ski 
industry workers. See Answer, Ex. "B" at ^ 15 at; see also November 16, 1999, Asset 
Purchase Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "G" and November 16, 1999 
Administrative Services Agreement between LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, 
Inc. and LWP Claims Administrators, Corp., a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "H". 
Affiliate Transactions 
9. On or about November 16, 1999, LWP entered into an agreement with 
WCIC and WCMIC whereby LWP was paid a fixed percentage fee to administer all the 
claims throughout the entire duration of the claims. The fee paid to LWP was 
calculated as a percentage of gross written premium received by WCIC or WCMIC. In 
addition, LWP was paid a percentage of all medical fee savings generated by LWP in 
the administration of the claims. LWP's agreement with WCIC and WCMIC was not 
reduced to writing or disclosed to the Utah Department of Insurance. See May 21, 2002 
Letter from Orrin T. Colby Jr. to Judy Adlam attached hereto as Exhibit "I". 
10. Effective January 1, 2001, WCIC and LWP entered into an Administrative 
Agreement whereby LWP administered worker's compensation claims for WCIC on a 
"life of claim" basis and was paid fees as described in paragraph 19 of the 
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Administrative Agreement. See Wasatch Crest Group Form B, dated April 30, 2002 at 
p. 12, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "J"; see also 
January 2001 Administrative Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "K". 
11. LWP presented to WCMIC a proposed Administrative Agreement that was 
to be effective January 1, 2001. The terms of the agreement were identical to the 
Administrative Agreement entered into between WCIC and LWP as described above in 
paragraph 15. See Answer, Ex. "B" at K 18; see also Letter dated May 21, 2002, Ex. 
12. The agreement between LWP and WCMIC was never executed; rather, the 
arrangement between WCMIC and LWP continued under the terms of the verbal 
agreement entered into in November 1999, whereby LWP would administer worker's 
compensation claims for WCMIC on a "life of claim" basis. See Letter dated May 21, 
2002, Ex. " P . 
13. Wasatch Crest Group sold LWP back to John Igoe and Erica Igoe 
sometime in 2002. John Igoe continued in his capacity as an officer and director of 
Wasatch Crest Group after the sale of LWP to John and Erica Igoe. See Term Sheet 
attached hereto as Exhibit "L". 
14. From November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, WCIC paid 
$6,144,402.68 to LWP for claims handling services. Of the $6,144,402.68 total, 
$4,955,586.10 was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while $1,188,816.58 was in 
the form of offsets. See Affidavit of Robert Miller, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "M". 
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15. From November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, WCMIC paid 
$534,265.96 to LWP for claims handling services. Of the $534,265.96 total, 
$474,265.96 was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while $60,000.00 was in the 
form of offsets. See id. 
III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The Liquidator alleges in the First Claim for Relief of the Complaint that LWP 
has violated 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann., which states as follows: 
Recoupement from Affiliates 
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation of an insurer 
authorized to do business in this state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver 
appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf of the insurer from any 
affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount of distributions, other than stock 
dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock, made at any time during the five years 
preceding the petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery is 
subject to the limitations of Subsections (2) through (6). 
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, when paid, the 
distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did not know and could not 
reasonably have known that the distribution might adversely affect its solvency. 
(3) The maximum amount recoverable under this section is the amount needed, 
in excess of all other available assets, to pay all claims under the receivership, reduced 
for each recipient by any amount the recipient has already paid to receivers under 
similar laws of other states. 
(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time the 
distributions were paid is liable up to the amount of distributions he received. Any 
person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time the distributions were 
declared is liable up to the amount of distributions he would have received if they had 
been paid immediately. If two or more persons are liable regarding the same 
distributions, they are jointly and severally liable. 
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all affiliates that 
controlled that person at the time the dividend was declared or paid are jointly and 
severally liable for any resulting deficiency in the amount recovered from the insolvent 
affiliate. 
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(6) This section does not enlarge the personal liability of a director under 
existing law. 
(7) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after the 
earlier of: 
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator under Section 31A-
27-303 or a liquidator under Section 31A-27-310; or 
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under Subsection 31A-27-
306(2) or the liquidation is terminated under Section 31A-27-339. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322. 
A. LWP was an Affiliate of WCIC and WCMIC. 
An affiliate is defined as "any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with, another person. A corporation is an affiliate of another 
corporation, regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural persons 
manages the corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(4). As a result, LWP is an 
affiliate of WCIC and WCMIC because there is common management and ownership. 
John Igoe, the owner and former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of LWP 
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., served concurrently as the Acting Chairman, 
President and Chief Executive Officer of Wasatch Crest Group, the Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of Wasatch Crest Insurance, and the Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer of LWP Claims Administrators. In those positions, Mr. Igoe initiated, approved 
and carried out affiliate transactions between LWP, WCIC and WCMIC by entering into 
Administrative Agreements with both WCIC and WCMIC on behalf of LWP. 
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B. As an Affiliate, LWP Must Disgorge All Funds It Received from WCIC and 
WCMIC Since November 16, 1999. 
Pursuant to § 31A-27-322, the Liquidator is permitted to recover from any 
affiliate any distribution made at any time during the five years preceding the petition 
for liquidation. The petition for liquidation was filed on July 31, 2003. LWP became 
an affiliate of WCIC and WCMIC on or around November 16, 1999. Consequently, any 
payments on or after November 16, 1999 to LWP are recoverable.2 
If a person or entity qualifies as an affiliate, then any distribution to that affiliate 
made in the five years prior to the filing of the liquidation petition must be repaid. 
There are no statutory rights to setoff or other mitigating circumstances. In essence, the 
Utah statute subordinates the claims of affiliates to the claims of other creditors and 
policyholders against the remaining assets of the liquidation estate. The Utah statute 
views an affiliate as an "insider" and relegates any claim of an affiliate to that of a 
shareholder who is granted the lowest priority claim against the liquidation estate 
assets. 
Because of the inherent dangers of self-dealing and overreaching associated with 
affiliate transactions, the legislature has determined that insiders/affiliates will recover 
only to the extent that all other claimants are paid before an affiliate. This 
interpretation is supported by the language of § 31A-27-322(3), Utah Code Ann., which 
limits the amount to be recovered by the liquidator from affiliates to "the amount 
2
 The statute provides for payments going back five years (July 31, 1998), but since 
LWP did not become an affiliate until November 1999, LWP is only responsible for 
disgorging payments from November 1999 through July 31, 2003. 
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needed, in excess of all other available assets, to pay all claims under the receivership." 
In other words, the Liquidator is prevented from recovering from affiliates anything 
more than what is necessary to pay all claimants, which in effect is the total deficiency 
incurred by the liquidation estate. The pragmatic effect of the statute is to subordinate 
all affiliate payments made within five years of the liquidation order to the claims of all 
other creditors and policyholders, and thereby permitting the affiliates to recover on the 
same basis as the equity owners. Because any transaction between an insurance 
company and its affiliate is so vulnerable to abuses, the statute sweeps back into the 
liquidation estate of the insolvent insurance company any and all payments made by the 
insurance company to an affiliate within five years of the insolvency. 
Because of the overwhelming threat to the financial stability of an insurance 
company posed by affiliate transactions, the recipient of affiliated transaction monies 
must repay everything they have received during the five years prior to the filing of the 
liquidation petition. Therefore, $6,678,668.64, paid by WCIC and WCMIC to LWP for 
claims handling services must be repaid to the Liquidator. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Liquidator moves 
this Court to enter an order of summary judgment that the affiliate transactions must be 
repaid according to U.C.A. § 31A-27-322. No material facts are in dispute. The 
evidence is clear that LWP received at least $ 6,678,668.64 from WCIC and WCMIC 
from November 1999 through July 31, 2003, and that there was common management 
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and ownership between LWP, WCIC, and WCMIC. For these and all other foregoing 
reasons, this Court should grant the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 1 ^ - ^ day of January 2005. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
TcM P. Harrington ^ ' I / JnZt01 
Jennifer L. Lange 
Attorneys for Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Company, in Liquidation; Wasatch Crest 
Mutual Insurance Company, in Liquidation; 
and Merwin U. Stewart 
J. Ray Barrios 
Liquidation Office General Counsel 
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LWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS 
CORP., a California corporation, and 
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a 
California corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND OPPOSITION TO LIQUIDATOR'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030915527 
Judge Hanson 
Defendants LWP Claims Administrators Corp. and LWP Claims Solutions, Inc., 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) submit this consolidated memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposition to 
the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. ("LWPCSI"), formerly LWP Claims Administrators 
Corp. ("LWPCAC") (collectively referred to as "LWP") acted as a third-party claims 
administrator for two now-insolvent insurance companies, Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Company ("WCIC") and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company ("WCMIC"), and 
received fair compensation for its services. Now, the Liquidator of the two insolvent 
Wasatch Crest companies asks the Court to order LWP to return the compensation paid 
under the authority of the recoupment provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322. 
That section allows the liquidator of insolvent insurance companies to recover 
"distributions" if such "distributions" were made to affiliates that had control over the 
insurer at the time the distributions were made. The legislative history of Section 322, 
as well as its plain language, establishes that the recoverable payments are excessive 
distributions made in the form of dividends to the parent of an insurer. The statute does 
not, and was never intended to, apply to payments made for services rendered to the 
insurer. 
The Liquidator has not even attempted to meet its statutory burden of 
demonstrating that LWP was ever in control of either WCIC or WCMIC, nor has it 
demonstrated that LWP ever received any distributions in the nature of dividends from 
the two insurers. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that payments to LWP 
were contemporaneously made in fair consideration for services provided by LWP to 
WCIC and WCMIC. The undisputed evidence also shows that, at most, (1) LWP was a 
-ii-
sister subsidiary of WCIC when some of the payments were made to LWP by WCIC, 
and (2) LWP was not an affiliate of WCMIC when payments were made to LWP by 
WCMIC. The Liquidator presents no facts demonstrating that LWP was an affiliate that 
controlled the insurers at the time LWP received payments, and undisputed facts 
confirm that LWP was not in control of the insurers. 
By bringing a complaint for recoupment under § 31A-27-322, and making a 
summary judgment motion under these undisputed facts, the Liquidator has either 
misunderstood or grossly misapplied the statute. Its motion must therefore be denied. 
For the same reasons, LWP is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and this action 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
LWP'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. WCIC was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah. See 
Memorandum in Support of Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Liquidator's 
Memorandum") at ^ 1, attached as Exhibit 1. WCIC was placed in liquidation by the 
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003. Id. 
2. WCMIC was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah. See 
Liquidator's Memorandum at % 2, Exhibit 1. WCMIC was placed in to liquidation by the 
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003 .Id. 
3. LWPCAC was a corporation organized under California law in 1999. In the 
third quarter of 2002, LWPCAC's name changed to LWPCSI. See Complaint at If 3, 
attached as Exhibit 2, and Answer at H 4 attached as Exhibit 3. 
-iii-
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4. LWPCSI is a California corporation, originally incorporated as LWPCAC. 
Its name changed to LWPCSI in the third quarter of 2002. See Exhibit 2 at U 4 and 
Exhibit 3 at 1| 4. 
History of WCIC and WCMIC 
5. WCMIC was a mutual insurance company which purchased all of the 
common stock of First Continental Life and Accident Insurance Company ("FCL") 
effective April 15, 1994. See Form B, Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Co., dated 
July 15, 1998, at p. 2, Item 1(b), attached as Exhibit 4. 
6. Effective January 1, 1997, WCMIC purchased all of the common stock of 
Transunion Casualty Company ("Transunion"). On January 1, 1998, Transunion 
purchased Wasatch Fire Insurance Company. Effective March 25, 1998, Transunion 
was renamed Wasatch Crest Casualty Insurance Company ("WCCIC"). Immediately 
thereafter, Wasatch Fire Insurance Company merged into WCCIC, with WCCIC as the 
surviving corporation. See Exhibit 4 at pp. 6-7, Item (1). 
7. On June 30, 1998, WCMIC exchanged all of the common stock of FCL 
and WCCIC for shares of the newly incorporated Wasatch Crest Group ("WCG"). In 
exchange for the stock of FCL and WCCIC, WCMIC received 1 million Class A common 
shares of WCG (100% of the Class A shares) and 5.3 million Class C common shares 
(100% of the Class C shares) of WCG. WCMIC also received 4.4 million shares of 
Class B-1 common stock, which it sold to investors. An additional 6.4 million shares of 
Class B-1 common stock and 3.9 million shares of Class B-2 common stock were also 
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purchased by the investors. After these transactions, WCG Investment Group 
("Wasatch Investment"). LP . owned 5.8 million shares of Class B-1 common stock, 
Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation ("Swiss Re") owned 3.9 million shares of Class 
B-2 common stock, and Chase Capital Partners ("Chase") owned 5.0 million shares of 
Class B-1 common stock. See Wasatch Crest Group, Form B, Insurance Holding 
Company System Registration Statement, at pp. 14-15, Item 5(1 )(e), attached as 
Exhibit 5. 
8. Effective October 31 , 1998, WCG purchased all of the common stock of 
Utah Home Fire Insurance Company and changed the latter company's name to WCIC. 
/cf.atp. 14, Item 5(1 )(d). 
9. Effective December 19, 2000, WCCIC merged into WCIC with WCIC as 
the survivor. Id. at p. 15, Item 5(1 )(f). 
10. Effective December 2000, WCG's capital was restructured pursuant to a 
Form A Application approved by the Utah Insurance Commissioner by order dated 
November 27, 2000. As part of the restructuring, WCMIC relinquished its shares in 
WCG and WCG Investment received 89% of the voting shares of WCG with the 
remaining 11% of the voting shares held by Swiss Re. Id. at p. 15, Item 5(1 )(e). See 
Exhibit 6 at If 14; Exhibit 7 at H 14. 
Acquisition of LWP Commercial Claims 
Administrators, Inc.'s Assets by WCG. 
11. On November 16, 1999, WCG purchased substantially all of the assets 
and business operations of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, lnc."(LWP 
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Commercial"), a California company which acted as a third party insurance claim 
administrator and was owned by John and Erica Igoe. See Asset Purchase Agreement, 
attached as Exhibit 8. At that time, WCG formed a new corporate entity, LWPCAC. 
The assets purchased from LWP Commercial were transferred to LWPCAC. See 
Exhibit 2 at K15 and Exhibit 3 at 1J15. 
The Relationship of LWPCAC to WCIC and WCMIC 
12. Shortly after the asset purchase and formation of LWPCAC, John Igoe 
became President and COO of WCG and its subsidiaries, WCIC and FCL. John Igoe 
was also CEO of LWPCAC, the third subsidiary of WCG. Igoe, however, was never an 
officer or director of WCMIC. See Affidavit of John Igoe, attached as Exhibit 6, at 1f 5 
and Affidavit of Dennis Larson, attached as Exhibit 7, at 1j 5. 
13. At the time of the asset purchase, an Administrative Services Agreement,, 
dated November 16, 1999 (attached as Exhibit 9) was entered into between LWP 
Commercial, the selling entity owned by John and Erica Igoe, and LWPCAC, the 
subsidiary formed by WCG to hold the assets transferred by LWP Commercial. WCIC 
and WCMIC were not parties to the agreement. The agreement provided that LWP 
Commercial continue to employ its former employees and that LWPCAC would 
compensate LWP Commercial "on a cost basis" by reimbursing LWP Commercial for all 
reasonable costs associated therewith. See Exhibit 9 at p.3. The agreement was 
intended to facilitate the transition of business operations pending the transfer of LWP 
Commercial's employees on January 1, 2000. For this reason, the agreement 
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terminated on December 31, 1999. See Exhibit 9 at p. 4, Exhibit 6 at fl 8; Exhibit 7 at 
1J8. 
14. Around June 2000, LWPCAC began providing workers compensation 
claims handling services to WCIC. Prior to that time, Employees of WCG provided 
these services. After June 2000, these employees were placed under the direction of 
LWPCAC. LWPCAC reimbursed WCG for the cost of personnel provided by WCG to 
LWPCAC. In return for providing claims services, LWPCAC received a percentage of 
the premiums earned by WCIC and a percentage of the medical cost savings realized 
by WCIC due to LWPCAC's handling of claims. From June 2000 until January 1, 2001, 
the claims handling services were provided pursuant to an oral agreement between 
LWPCAC and WCIC. See Exhibit 6 at 1f 9; Exhibit 7 at If 9. 
15. This oral agreement for claims handling services was formalized in a 
written agreement between WCIC and LWPCAC which was effective as of January 1, 
2001. The terms of the written agreement were the same as the terms of the earlier 
oral agreement. See, Administrative Agreement, attached as Exhibit 10. The terms of 
the agreement are standard commercial terms similar to the terms of agreements 
entered into by LWPCAC with other insurance companies. See Exhibit 6 at ^ 10; Exhibit 
7 at 1| 10. 
16. A similar oral agreement for claims handling services was in effect 
between WCMIC and LWPCAC. Although a written agreement was drafted to formalize 
the oral agreement, this agreement was never signed by WCMIC and the two 
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companies continued to operate under the terms of the oral agreement. See Exhibit 6 at 
fl 11; Exhibit 7 at fl 11. 
17. On April 28, 1998 WCG entered into a Managing General Agency 
Agreement with North American Specialty Insurance Company ("NAS"), a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Swiss Re ("NAS Agreement"). Under the terms of the agreement, WCG 
was granted the right to underwrite and issue policies on behalf of NAS, subject to 
certain guidelines and review procedures by NAS. The agreement also provided for 
WCG to handle all claims arising out of NAS policies written under the agreement. 
WCIC was not a party to this agreement. See Exhibit 6 at TJ12. 
18. Beginning June 2000, WCG assigned its responsibilities under the NAS 
Agreement to LWPCAC. From that time forward, LWPCAC handled claims arising out 
of the NAS policies for WCG, and received compensation from WCG for these services. 
WCIC, which was not a party to the NAS Agreement, did not provide compensation to 
LWPCAC for claims handling services under the NAS Agreement. See Exhibit 6 at ^ 13. 
19. At no time during its relationship with WCG did LWP receive any dividend 
or other distributions, whether in cash, property or other assets, from WCG, WCIC, FCL 
or WCMIC other than payments made in the ordinary course of business in accordance 
with the various service agreements, written and oral, in effect during the period. See 
Exhibit 6 at H 25; Exhibit 7 at U 17. 
20. LWP did not own, direct, or control the business or operations of WCG, 
WCIC, FCL or WCMIC. Exhibit 6 at fl 16. 
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21. On November 6, 2001, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive 
Officer of WCG, WCIC, and FCL was placed on indefinite leave of absence. At the 
same time John Igoe was appointed to serve as Acting Chairman of the Board and CEO 
of the companies pending an internal investigation by special outside counsel of the 
activities of former officers and directors. See Exhibit 6 at fl 15; Exhibit 7 at 1} 13. 
The Sale Of LWPCAC to John Igoe and Judy Adlam 
22. On May 8, 2002, John Igoe and Judy Adlam purchased the stock of 
LWPCAC from WCG for $2,000,000 in cash, an assumption of liabilities of 
approximately $1.8 million and a contingency payment (made in 2003) of $175,000. 
See Stock Purchase Agreement and Mandatory Share Redemption Agreement, 
attached as Exhibit 11. John Igoe did not represent WCG in the negotiations of the 
transaction, which was made effective as of January 1, 2002. The Board of Directors 
retained Hales and Company independently to advise them as to the fairness of the 
transaction. See Exhibit 6 at U 17; Exhibit 7 at fl 14. 
23. Pursuant to the agreement for purchase of the stock of LWPCAC by Igoe 
and Adlam, Igoe agreed to resign as an officer and director of all Wasatch Crest 
companies. See Exhibit 6 at fl 18; Exhibit 7 at ^ 15. Igoe resigned these positions on 
the day of closing, May 8, 2002. See Resignations of John Igoe, attached as Exhibit 12. 
-ix-
\otlll 
Payments to LWPCAC by Wasatch Crest Companies 
24. From June 2000 when LWPCAC first started providing claims handling 
services for WCIC and WCMIC until January 1, 2002 when the sale of LWPCAC to Igoe 
and Adlam was effective, LWPCAC received payments of $5,142,263 under the terms 
of its agreements with WCIC, WCMIC, and WCG. See Exhibit 6 at fl 20. 
25. Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC, $3,001,503 was paid as 
compensation for claims handling services provided to WCG in connection with the NAS 
Agreement. See Exhibit 6 at fl 21. 
26. Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC, $1,328,110 was paid as 
compensation for claims handling services provided to WCIC under the terms of the oral 
and written administrative agreements. See Exhibit 6 at ^ 22. 
27. Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC, $$812,650 was paid as 
compensation for claims handling services provided to WCMIC under the terms of the 
oral agreement described. See Exhibit 6 at If 23. 
LWPCSI Continues to Provide Claims Handling Services 
After Insolvency of WCIC and WCMIC 
28. After WCIC and WCMIC were placed into liquidation on July 31 , 2001, 
LWPCAC, and subsequently LWPCSI, continued to provide claims handling services to 
WCIC and WCMIC at the request of the Utah Guaranty Association ("UGA"), in 
accordance with the terms of the written Administrative Agreement (Exhibit 10) with 
WCIC and the oral agreement with WCMIC. See Exhibit 6 at ^[24; Exhibit 7 at If 16. 
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RESPONSE TO LIQUIDATOR'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. In response to paragraph 1, LWP admits that WCIC was an insurance 
company domiciled in the State of Utah and was placed in liquidation by the Third 
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003. 
2. In response to paragraph 2, LWP admits that WCMIC was an insurance 
company domiciled in the State of Utah and was placed in liquidation by the Third 
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003. 
3. In response to paragraph 3, LWP admits that Melvin U. Stewart was 
appointed by the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah as the liquidator 
of WCIC and WCMIC on July 31 , 2003. The remaining assertions in paragraph 3 are 
legal conclusions rather than material facts. 
4. In response to paragraph 4, LWP admits LWPCAC was a California 
corporation whose name was changed to LWPCSI. 
5. In response to paragraph 5, LWP admits LWPCSI is a California 
corporation whose name was changed from LWPCAC. LWP further admits that WCG 
was the parent corporation of WCIC. 
LWP disputes that it was sold to only John Igoe when, in fact, it was sold 
effective January 1, 2002, to John Igoe and Judy Adlam. See Exhibit 11. LWP also 
disputes that Igoe was the Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive 
Officer of WCIC and WCG. He became Acting Chairman of the Board of Directors and 
Chief Executive Officer of WCG and WCIC in November of 2001, but resigned from 
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those positions and all other positions with Wasatch Crest companies as of May 8, 2002, 
the date of closing of the sale of LWP by WCG to Igoe and Adlam. See Exhibit 6 at fl 17; 
Exhibit 9 at U 15. LWP admits that in approximately January 2000, Igoe became 
president of WCG, but he resigned from this position on May 8, 2002. Id. 
LWP admits (1) Igoe was the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive 
Officer of LWP, and (2) WCG was the parent of WCIC from October 1998 until 2002 
when Igoe resigned his positions with WCG and WCIC. LWP admits that it was a 
subsidiary of WCG and a sister subsidiary of WCIC from November 16,1998 through 
December 31, 2001, and could therefore be considered an affiliate of WCG and WCIC 
between those dates. LWP denies that it was an affiliate of WCG and WCIC after 
January 1, 2002, the effective date of the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam. See Exhibit 6 
at If 17; Exhibit 7 at If 14. LWP was not an affiliate of WCMIC after November 27, 2000 
when WCMIC's interest in WCG, the parent of LWP, was relinquished. Exhibit 5 at p. 14, 
Item 5(1 )(e). 
Corporate History of Wasatch Crest Mutual and Wasatch Crest 
Insurance Acquisition of FCL 
6. In response to paragraph 6, LWP admits that WCMIC was a mutual 
insurance company controlled by its shareholders and that WCMIC purchased all of the 
stock of FCL effective April 15, 1994. 
Creation of WCIC and Merger with WCCIC 
7. In response to paragraph 7, LWP admits effective October 31, 1998, WCG 
purchased all of the common stock of Utah Home Fire Insurance Company and changed 
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the latter company's name to WCIC. LWP also admits, effective December 19, 2000, 
WCCIC merged into WCIC with WCIC as the survivor. 
Corporate History of LWP 
8. In regard to Paragraph 8, LWP admits, on November 16, 1999, WCG 
purchased substantially all of the assets and business operations of LWP Commercial 
Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial"), a company which acted as a third party 
insurance claim administrator, from John and Erica Igoe. LWP also admits that WCG 
formed a new corporate entity, LWPCAC, at that time and the assets purchased from 
LWP Commercial were transferred to LWPCAC. 
LWP further admits that LWPCAC was incorporated in California and 
changed its name to LWPCSI. LWPCSI has offices in Sacramento, California and Salt 
Lake City and is a third-party administrator specializing in the administration of worker's 
compensation insurance and claims. 
Affiliate Transactions 
9. In regard to Paragraph 9, LWP disputes that (1) LWP entered into an 
agreement on about November 16, 1999 with WCIC and WCMIC providing for payment 
of a fixed percentage fee to administer all claims throughout the entire duration of the 
claims, (2) the fee paid to LWP was a percentage of gross premiums received by WCIC 
and WCMIC, and (3) LWP was paid a percentage of all medical fee savings generated 
by LWP. The Administrative Services Agreement, Exhibit 9, dated November 16, 1999 
was an agreement between LWP Commercial, the selling entity owned by John and 
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Erica Igoe, and LWPCAC, the subsidiary formed by WCG to hold the assets transferred 
by LWP Commercial. WCIC and WCMIC were not parties to the agreement. Moreover, 
the agreement did not provide for payment of a percentage of premiums or medical cost 
savings to LWP. It instead provided that LWPCAC would compensate LWP Commercial 
"on a cost basis" by reimbursing LWP Commercial for all reasonable costs. See Exhibit 
11 at p. 3. The agreement was intended to facilitate the transition of business operations 
pending the transfer of LWP Commercial's employees on January 1, 2000. For this 
reason, the agreement terminated on December 31, 1999. See Exhibit 6 at U 8. 
10. In regard to paragraph 10, LWP disputes that WCIC entered into an 
Administrative Agreement effective January 1, 2001. In June 2000, LWPCAC began 
providing workers compensation claims handling services to WCIC pursuant to an oral 
agreement. Employees of WCG provided these services under the direction of 
LWPCAC, and LWPCAC reimbursed WCG for the personnel services provided by WCG 
to LWPCAC. In return for providing these services, LWPCAC received a percentage of 
the premiums earned by WCIC and a percentage of the medical cost savings realized by 
WCG due to LWPCAC's handling of claims. See Exhibit 6 at If 9. 
This oral agreement was formalized in a written agreement between WCIC 
and LWPCAC which was effective as of January 1, 2001. The terms of the written 
agreement were the same as the terms of the earlier oral agreement. See Exhibit 10; 
Exhibit 6 at ^ 10; Exhibit 7 at Tf 10. The terms of the agreement are standard commercial 
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terms similar to the terms of agreements entered into by LWPCAC with other insurance 
companies. See Exhibit 6 at U 10. 
11. In regard to paragraph 11, LWP admits that it presented a proposed 
Administrative Agreement to WCMIC, which was to be effective January 1, 2001 and had 
the same terms as the administrative agreement between LWPCAC and WCIC. 
12. In regard to paragraph 12, LWP admits that the written agreement between 
LWP and WCMIC was never signed by WCMIC and that the two companies continued to 
operate under the oral agreement. The oral agreement, however, was not entered into 
in November 1999. The oral agreement was reached in June 2000 when LWP began 
providing claims handling services to WCMIC. See Exhibit 6 at fl 11. 
13. In regard to paragraph 13, LWP denies that WCG sold LWP back to John 
and Erica Igoe sometime in 2002. LWP was, instead, sold to Igoe and Adlam effective 
January 1, 2002. See Exhibit 11. The sale closed on May 8, 2002. Id. LWP also 
disputes that John Igoe continued in his capacity as an officer and director of WCG. At 
the time the sale was closed, Igoe resigned his positions as an officer and director of 
WCG and all other Wasatch Crest companies. See Exhibit 12. 
14. In regard to paragraph 14, LWP disputes that WCIC paid $6,144,402.68 to 
LWP for claims handling services from November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, of 
which amount $4,955,486.10 was in the form of checks or wire transfers and 
$1,188,816.58 was in the form of offsets. From June 30, 2000, when LWP first began 
providing claims handling services to WCIC, until January 1, 2002, when the sale of LWP 
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to Igoe and Adlam became effective, WCIC paid $1,338,110 to LWP for claims handling 
services. See Exhibit 6 at U 22. 
15. In regard to paragraph 15, LWP disputes that WCMIC paid $534,295.96 to 
LWP for claims handling services from November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, of 
which amount $534,265.96 was in the form of checks or wire transfers and $60,000 was 
in the form of offsets. From June 30, 2000, when LWP first began providing claims 
handling services to WCMIC, until January 1, 2002, when the sale of LWP to Igoe and 
Adlam became effective, WCMIC paid $812,650 to LWP for claims handling services. 
See Exhibit 6 at U 23. None of this amount was paid to LWP before November 27, 2000, 
the date WCMIC relinquished its interest in WCG and ceased to be a part of the WCG 
group. See Schedule prepared as exhibit to Affidavit of Robert C. Miller, filed as Exhibit 
M to Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment, attached as Exhibit 13. 
Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is intended to "expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials 
where no triable issue of fact is disclosed." Natl Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Bayour Country 
Club, 403 P.2d 26, 29 (Utah 1965). It is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (c). A Court should grant summary judgment when the undisputed 
facts are such that "there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against could 
prevail." Frisbee v. K&K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). Plaintiff has 
not met that burden, but Defendant LWP has. 
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ARGUMENT 
LWP's cross-motion for summary judgment should be granted and the 
Liquidator's motion for summary judgment be denied because (1) undisputed material 
evidence shows that payments to LWP by WCIC and WCMIC were not "distributions" 
subject to recoupment under Utah Code Ann. 31A-27-322; and (2) LWP was never an 
affiliate in control of the insurer as required for recoupment of "distributions" under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31 A-27-322. In addition, even if the payments in question could somehow 
be termed "distributions," the Liquidator is not entitled to summary jujdgment because 
there are disputed issues of material fact concerning payments to LWP. 
Chapter 27 of the Utah Insurance Code, titled "Insurers Rehabilitation and 
Liquidation Act," governs the liquidation of Utah Insurance Companies. The Liquidator of 
WCIC and WCMIC brought its complaint against LWP and its motion for summary 
judgment under Section 322 of Chapter 27 which gives the receiver of an insurer the 
right to seek recoupment of "distributions" to affiliates that control the insurer when the 
distributions are made within the five years before the date of liquidation. As the 
legislative history of Section 322 clearly demonstrates, the Liquidator, however, either 
completely misunderstands or has misapplied the provisions of Section 322 by seeking 
to recoup fair consideration paid for services rendered rather than "distributions", a term 
which, as used in Section 322, is synonymous with "dividend," from an entity which did 
not receive dividends and which never controlled the insurers. 
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1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322 and its Legislative History 
Section 322 specifically provides: 
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation of an 
insurer authorized to do business in this state is ordered under this chapter, 
the receiver appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf of 
the insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount of 
distributions, other than stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital 
stock, made at any time during the five years preceding the petition for 
liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery is subject to the 
limitations of Subsections (2) through (6). 
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, when paid, the 
distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did not know 
and could not reasonably have known that the distribution might adversely 
affect its solvency. 
(Emphasis added.) This section was enacted in 1986 as part of a complete revision of 
the Utah Insurance Code which began in 1981. For a five year period, the Insurance 
Law Revision Committee, created by the Utah State Legislature, met to redraft the 
insurance code. 
Records relating to the intent of the drafters are maintained in the Utah State 
Archives and include a March 25, 1983 draft with extensive drafters' comments.1 The 
language of Section 322, first added in this draft, provided "Recoupment from affiliates. 
A rehabilitator, liquidator, or conservator may recover on behalf of the insurer excessive 
The March 1983 draft was identified by drafter Dane Leavitt as one of the documents with the 
most probative value to the research of legislative history As Mr Leavitt noted in his transmittal letter to 
the Utah State Archives, "To the extent that the resulting provisions were not substantially changed. ., the 
drafter's comments [on the above mentioned draft] will be potentially helpful in understanding the drafter's 
(if not the legislature's) intent" See Series 25134, Insurance Law Revision Committee, Administrative 
Records, 1981-1985, attached as Exhibit 14 
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distributions paid to affiliates, pursuant to section 96-17-6.5."2 See, State of Utah Draft 
Insurance Code, March 25, 1983, § 96-45-55, attached as Exhibit 15. Section 96-17-6.5 
provides: 
(1) Right of receiver to recover dividends paid. If an order for the 
liquidation, rehabilitation or conservation of an insurer authorized to do 
business in Utah is entered..., the receiver has a right to recover on behalf 
of the insurer the amount of distributions other than stock dividends paid by 
the insurer on its capital stock at any time during the five years preceding 
the petition forjiquidation, rehabilitation or conservation, subject to the 
limitations of subsections (2) to (4). 
(2) Dividend payments recoverable. No dividend is recoverable if the 
recipient shows that when paid the distribution was lawful and reasonable, 
and that the insurer did not know and could not reasonably have known 
that the distribution might adversely affect its solvency. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
The comments to the two draft sections relating to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322 
make it clear that the section was added to remedy a potential abuse of insurance 
company holding systems: "[the section] provides the necessary power to recover 
distributions to affiliates under a holding company system." Comment to § 96-45-55, 
Exhibit 15. The recoupment from affiliates provision was intended to remedy the 
problems occurring when parent companies took large surpluses as dividends from 
cash-rich insurers and the insurers were later rendered insolvent. This provision allows 
the liquidator to recoup the excessive dividend to the controlling parent. Comment to 
§96-17-6.5. Id. 
The August 24, 1984 Draft of the liquidation and rehabilitation section of the Utah Insurance 
Code, attached as Exhibit 16, shows that Utah Code Ann. § 96-45-55 was renumbered 31A-26-322. The 
Chapter number was subsequently changed from Chapter 26 to Chapter 27. 
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Section 322 as enacted in 1986 makes it even more clear the section's application 
is limited to situations where dividends are paid to a parent company. In subsection one, 
the relevant payments to affiliates controlling the insurer are referred to as "distributions." 
In subsection two, the payments are called "dividends." The drafts of these sections and 
the comments to the draft demonstrate that the term "distribution" is used 
interchangeably with the term "dividend." Further, Section 322 as enacted by the 
legislature allows recoupment from "affiliates that control the insurer," thereby 
establishing that recoupment is limited to the situation where a parent in a holding 
company system takes funds from an insurer by dividend. The definition of distribution 
given elsewhere in the Utah Code supports the conclusion that a distribution does not 
include payment for services. In the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10a-101 etseq., for example, the term "distribution" is defined as "a direct or 
indirect transfer of money or other property...in respect of any of its shares. A 
distribution may be in the form of a declaration or payment of a dividend, a purchase, 
redemption, or other acquisition of shares, distribution of indebtedness or otherwise." 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-102(13). LWP received no such dividends or distributions. 
2. LWP was never an affiliate that controlled WCIC or WCMIC 
The Liquidator argues, incorrectly and without support, that Section 322 
recoupment applies to all affiliates of an insurer, when, in fact, it can only apply to 
affiliates that control the insurer. The point is logical - it is only those with control who 
can direct dividends. The Liquidator completely ignores the fact thai LWP was not in 
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control of WCIC or WCMIC; instead, the Liquidator asks the Court to assume that 
recoupment is appropriate merely because at certain times, John Igoe was individually 
an officer and director of LWP, WCIC, and WCG. 
Igoe's position with LWP, WCIC and WCG, however, is alone insufficient to 
establish that LWP was an affiliate of WCIC or WCMIC. First, Igoe held no management 
position with WCMIC, much less a position which could result in WCMIC being an 
affiliate of LWP. Second, the Liquidator fails to establish that Igoe's individual 
responsibilities with LWP and WCIC actually resulted in WCIC being an affiliate of LWP. 
Such status may arise where "[a] corporation is an affiliate of another corporation, 
regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural persons manages the 
corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-301(5). Here, the Liquidator has not even tried 
to show that "the same group or persons" manages LWP and WCIC, but instead 
presumes control based on Igoe's individual positions at times with the two corporations. 
The Insurance Code, however, does not allow such presumptions: "there is no 
presumption an individual holding an official position with another person controls that 
person solely by reason of the position." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(27)(a). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The undisputed facts show that LWP and WCIC were sister subsidiaries of WCG 
from November 16, 1999 until January 1, 2002 when the sale of LWP by WCG to Igoe 
and Adlam was effective. As such, LWP and WCIC may have been affiliates prior to the 
effective date of the sale of LWP, but LWP was never an affiliate that controlled the 
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insurer, WCIC. Section 322's recoupment provisions, therefore, could not apply to any 
payments from WCIC to LWP, even if the Liquidator had established that such payments 
had been dividends rather than payments for services rendered. 
The undisputed facts also establish that LWP was not an affiliate of WCMIC 
during the time period when WCMIC made payments for services to LWP. In November 
1999, when LWP Commercial's assets were acquired by LWPCAC, WCMIC owned a 
portion of the stock of WCG, which in turn owned the stock of LWPCAC. However, 
effective November 27, 2000, WCMIC relinquished all of its stock in WCG and could not 
thereafter be considered to be an affiliate of LWP under any interpretation of the term. 
The schedule submitted as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Robert C. Miller filed in support of 
the Liquidators Motion for Summary Judgment shows no payments from WCMIC to LWP 
before December 31, 2000. See Exhibit 13. Further, at no time was LWP ever an 
affiliate in control of WCMIC. 
3. Payments to LWP by WCIC and WCMIC were not distributions 
Additional undisputed facts establish that the payments to LWP from WCIC and 
WCMIC were fair consideration for services contemporaneously rendered to WCIC and 
WCMIC, not excessive dividends from an insurer to a parent. The services were 
provided pursuant to administrative agreements standard in the industry. The fairness of 
this arrangement is further confirmed by the fact that UGA engaged and continues to 
engage LWP to provide claims handling services to WCIC and WCMIC under terms and 
conditions similar to those of the contracts in effect prior to the liquidation proceedings. 
4. Disputed issues concerning payments 
Even if payments to LWP were found to be distributions to an affiliate that 
controlled the insurer, summary judgment in the Liquidator's favor should not be granted. 
There is an issue of disputed material fact concerning the source of payments to LWP 
and the relationship of the companies when the payments were made. The Liquidator 
contends WCIC paid LWP $6,144,402.68 and WCMIC paid LWP $534,295.96 prior to 
liquidation. LWP disputes this amount, reporting that LWP received a total of 
$5,142,263 from Wasatch Crest companies during the time period LWP was owned by 
WCG. After the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam effective January 1, 2002, ownership of 
LWP was totally different from the ownership of WCIC and WCMIC and after May 8, 
2002, Igoe no longer held a position WCIC. LWP could not possibly be considered an 
affiliate of WCIC or WCMIC after May 8, 2002, and payments after that date could not be 
subject to recoupment, regardless of the issue of control. In addition, after 
November 27, 1999, when WCMIC relinquished its stock in WCG, WCMIC no longer had 
even an indirect interest in LWP and could not be LWP's affiliate. 
The Liquidator also misstates, or ignores, the source of payments to LWP. The 
Affidavits presented by LWP confirm that $3,001,503 of the amount in question was paid 
to LWP for services rendered under the NAS Agreement, not as a result of services 
provided to WCIC or WCMIC. Those amounts also could not be subject to recoupment 
as payments by the insurer. 
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5. Payments Do Not Meet Test for Recovery 
Even if the payments to LWP by WCIC and WCMIC were termed distributions 
(which they are not), they would not be recoverable under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-27-322(2) which provides that" ..no dividend is recoverable if the recipient 
shows that when paid the distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did 
not know and could not reasonably have known that the distribution might adversely 
affect its solvency." Throughout the period from June 2000 until year end 2002, both 
WCIC and WCMIC met all the solvency requirements of the Utah Department of 
Insurance as evidenced by their quarterly financial filings as required under the Utah 
Insurance Code. Subsequent to the acquisition of LWP by Igoe and Adlam both entities 
were declared insolvent by the Utah Department of Insurance. This action was taken by 
the Utah Department of Insurance on July 31, 2003 over eighteen months after the 
effective date of the sale and fifteen months after the closing date of the sale. Therefore, 
there is no evidence that insurer knew or should reasonably have know that the 
distributions, if made"...might adversely affect its solvency." Furthermore, as amply 
demonstrated, the payments were made for services rendered in accordance with 
standard commercial terms and were therefore "...lawful and reasonable." Even if the 
distributions were deemed to be "dividends" within the meaning of the Insurance Code, 
they do not meet the test for recovery under Section 322. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted, finding in LWP's favor on the Liquidator's claims and dismissing such claims 
with prejudice. On the same grounds, the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment 
should be denied. 
Dated this 17th day of February 2005. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
CHARLES R. BROWN 
JENNIFER A. JAMES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN IGOE 
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:ss 
STATE OF UTAH } 
:s 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
I, John Igoe, having first been duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. lama resident of the State of California, am over the age of eighteen and 
am competent to make this affidavit. 
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2. On September 1, 1998, my wife, Erica Igoe, and I purchased the assets of 
a company providing third-party claims handling and other administrative services from 
Acordia Corporation. These assets were transferred to a California corporation, LWP 
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial"), owned by my wife and 
me. 
3. On November 16, 1999, substantially all of the assets and business 
operations of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial"), were 
purchased by Wasatch Crest Group ("WCG"), a Utah corporation. See Asset Purchase 
Agreement, attached as Exhibit A. At that time, WCG formed a new corporate entity, 
LWP Claims Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC") as a wholly owned subsidiary and 
transferred the assets purchased from LWP Commercial to LWPCAC. 
4. As consideration for substantially all the assets of LWP Commercial, my 
wife and I received $325,000 in cash and $700,000 in promissory notes. See Exhibit A 
at pp. 7-8, Art. 3.1. We were supposed to be issued 800,000 shares of Class B 
common stock of WCG on the third anniversary of the asset sale, but these shares 
were never issued. Id. at Art. 3.2. 
5. Shortly after the asset purchase and formation of LWPCAC, I became 
President and Chief Operations Officer of WCG and its subsidiaries, Wasatch Crest 
Insurance Company ("WCIC") and First Continental Life and Accident Insurance 
Company ("FCL"). I also became CEO of LWPCAC. 
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6. I have never been an officer or director of Wasatch Crest Mutual 
Insurance Company ("WCMIC"), a Utah insurance company which held a significant 
portion of the shares of WCG from June 30, 1998 until November 27, 2000. 
7. I have never controlled WCG, WCMIC, FCL, or WCIC. I have never held 
any stock of those corporations. I was one of at least five directors of WCG at certain 
times, but I did not control the board, which was under the control of an investor group. 
At no time did LWP ever control WCG, WCMIC, FCL or WCIC. 
8. To facilitate the transfer of the business operations of LWP Commercial to 
LWPCAC in November 1999, the former corporation agreed to continue to employ its 
former employees and supervise their work under the terms of an administrative 
services agreement from November 16, 1999 through December 31, 1999 when LWP 
Commercial's employees were to become employees of WCG. See Administrative 
Services Agreement, effective November 16, 1999, attached as Exhibit B. In return for 
providing these services, LWPCAC paid LWP Commercial for the costs of rendering 
the services. Id. at p. 3. The Administrative Services Agreement expired on December 
31, 1999. Id, at p. 4. 
9. Around June 2000, LWPCAC began providing workers compensation 
claims handling services to WCIC. Employees of WCG provided these services under 
the direction of LWPCAC, and LWPCAC reimbursed WCG for the personnel services 
provided by WCG to LWPCAC. In return for providing these services, LWPCAC 
received a percentage of the premiums earned by WCIC and a percentage of the 
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medical cost savings realized by WCIC due to LWPCAC's handling of claims. From 
June 2000 until January 1, 2001, the claims handling services were provided pursuant 
to an oral agreement between LWPCAC and WCIC. 
10. This oral agreement was formalized in a written agreement between 
WCIC and LWPCAC effective as of January 1, 2001. The terms of the written 
agreement were the same as the terms of the earlier oral agreement. See, 
Administrative Agreement, attached as Exhibit C. The terms of the agreement are 
standard commercial terms similar to the terms of agreements entered into by 
LWPCAC with other insurance companies. 
11. A similar oral agreement for claims handling services was in effect 
between WCMIC and LWPCAC. Although a written agreement was drafted to formalize 
the oral agreement, this agreement was never signed by WCMIC and the two 
companies continued to operate under the terms of the oral agreement. 
12. On April 1, 1998, prior to formation of LWPCAC, WCG entered into a 
Managing General Agency Agreement with North American Specialty Insurance 
Company ("NAS"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Swiss Reinsurance America 
Corporation ("Swiss Re") (the "NAS Agreement"). Under the terms of the agreement, 
WCG was granted the right to underwrite and issue policies on behalf of NAS, subject 
to certain guidelines and review procedures by NAS. The agreement also provided for 
WCG to handle all claims arising out of NAS policies written under the agreement. 
WCIC was not a party to this agreement. 
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13. Beginning June 2000, LWPCAC handled claims arising out of the NAS 
policies for WCG, and received compensation from WCG or these services. WCIC, 
which was not a party to the NAS agreement, did not provide compensation to 
LWPCAC for claims handling services under the NAS agreement. 
14. Effective December 2000, WCG's capital was restructured pursuant to a 
Form A Application approved by the Utah Insurance Commissioner by order dated 
November 27, 2000. As part of the restructuring, WCMIC relinquished its shares in 
WCG, and WCG Investment received 89% of the voting shares of WCG, with the 
remaining 11 % of the voting shares held by Swiss Re. 
15. On November 6, 2001, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive 
Officer of WCG, WCIC, and FCL was placed on indefinite leave of absence. At the 
same time I was appointed to serve as Acting Chairman of the Board and CEO of the 
companies pending an internal investigation by special outside counsel of the activities 
of former officers and directors. My service in these positions was an accommodation 
to the investor group which controlled WCG, but did not give me control of WCG, 
WCIC, or FCL. 
16. LWP did not own, direct, or control the business or operations of WCG, 
WCIC, FCL or WCMIC. 
17. On May 8, 2002, Judy Adlam and I purchased the stock of LWPCAC from 
WCG for $2,000,000 in cash, assumption of liabilities of approximately $1.8 million and 
a contingency payment (made in 2003) of $175,000. I did not represent WCG in the 
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negotiations leading up to that transaction, which was made effective as of January 1, 
2002. The Board of Directors of WCG retained Hales and Company to advise them as 
to the fairness of the transaction. 
18. Pursuant to the agreement for purchase of the stock of LWPCAC from 
WCG, I agreed to resign as an officer and director of all Wasatch Crest companies. See 
Stock Purchase Agreement and Mandatory Share Redemption Agreement, attached as 
Exhibit D. I resigned those positions as of the day of closing, May 8, 2002. See 
Resignations, attached as Exhibit E. 
19. In the third quarter of 2002, the name of LWPCAC was changed to LWP 
Claims Solutions, Inc. ("LWPCSI"). 
20. I have carefully examined the books and records of LWPCAC, including 
its financial records. The books and records show that, from June 2000, when 
LWPCAC first started providing claims handling services for WCIC and WCMIC, until 
January 1, 2002, when the sale of LWPCAC by WCG was effective, LWPCAC 
received payments of $5,142,263 for services performed under the terms of its 
agreements with WCIC, WCMIC, NAS and WCG. 
21 . Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC for services, $3,001,503 was 
paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCG in connection with 
the NAS agreement described in ffi[ 12 & 13, above. 
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22. Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC for services, $1,328,110 was 
paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCIC under the terms 
of the oral and written administrative agreements described in ffij 9 & 10, above. 
23. Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC for services, $812,650 was paid 
as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCMIC under the terms of 
the oral agreement described in 1} 11, above. 
24. After WCIC and WCMIC were placed into liquidation on July 31, 2003, 
LWPCSI continued to provide claims handling services to WCIC and WCMIC at the 
specific request of the Utah Property and Casualty Guaranty Association ("UGA"), in 
accordance with the terms of the written Administrative Agreement (Exhibit C) with 
WCIC and the oral agreement with WCMIC. 
25. At no time during its relationship with WCG did LWP receive any dividend 
or other distributions, whether in cash, property or other assets, from WCG, WCIC, FCL 
or WCMIC other than payments made in the ordinary course of business in accordance 
with the various service agreements, written and oral, in effect during the period. 
Dated this/vfra-day of February 2005. 
)HN IpOE 
/ 
Subscribed and sworn to before mei :h is /^^dav of February 2005. 
NOfABY PUBLIC 
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i 
Plaintiffs Wasatch Crest Insurance Company, in Liquidation ("Insurance Co."), 
and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company ("Mutual"), in Liquidation, and D. Kent 
Michie, Liquidator (the "Liquidator"), by and through counsel, submit this opposition to 
Defendants LWP Claims Administrators, Corp. and LWP Claims Solutions, Inc.'s 
(collectively "LWP") Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, the Liquidator 
submits his Reply Memorandum in Support of Insurance Co. and Mutual's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant LWP advances two arguments in opposition to the Liquidator's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of LWP's own Motion for Summary 
Judgment: (1) the approximate $6 million payments made by WCIC and WCMIC to 
LWP were not "dividends", and therefore were not subject to the Recoupment from 
Affiliates statute (Sec. 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann.); and (2) LWP was never an 
affiliate in control of WCIC and/or WCMIC. See LWP's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Liquidator's Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("LWP Memo.") already on file with Court at p. 1. Both arguments are based 
on misinterpretations of the pertinent statutes and erroneous conclusions based on a 
faulty and incomplete reading of the legislative history. Affiliate transactions are so 
susceptible to manipulation and abuse that the Liquidator is statutorily empowered by § 
31A-27-322 to recoup those paid monies regardless of any defense asserted by the 
original recipient/affiliate. 
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In addition, LWP makes three secondary arguments: (1) the payments were for 
contemporaneously rendered services; (2) the source of the payments to LWP was not 
always Insurance Co. and Mutual; and (3) dividends are not recoverable if LWP can 
show that the dividend was lawful and reasonable, and Insurance Co. and Mutual did 
not know that the dividends would adversely affect the solvency of Insurance Co. and 
Mutual. The three secondary arguments are, quite simply, irrelevant and immaterial to 
whether the Liquidator can recoup distributions made to affiliates by an insurance 
company. 
II. LIQUIDATOR'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE LIQUIDATOR'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] 
memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim 
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted." LWP failed to 
follow this procedural rule governing summary judgment motions resulting in confusion 
as to what facts LWP admits or denies. First, LWP did not restate each of the 
Liquidator's facts with which LWP disagrees. Second, LWP included a response to all 
of the Liquidator's separately numbered facts, regardless of whether they admitted or 
denied the fact. Thirdly, in certain instances, it is difficult to determine if LWP is truly 
disputing a fact asserted by the Liquidator or whether they are making some kind of 
inconsequential distinction. LWP's failure to follow the procedural rules has made the 
Liquidator's task much more difficult in extrapolating what is disputed. Therefore, the 
Liquidator sets forth here (1) a verbatim restatement of the Liquidator's original 
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undisputed fact; (2) a verbatim restatement of LWP's response; and (3) an attempt to 
discern whether LWP admitted or denied the Liquidator's statement of fact, and if 
denied, a response to that denial. Inasmuch as LWP failed to comply with Rule 7 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Liquidator's statements are deemed admitted. 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 1: Plaintiff Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Company was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah. Wasatch Crest 
Insurance was placed into liquidation by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 31, 2003. See Complaint at ^ 1 and 
Answer at f 1, true and correct copies of which are attached to the Liquidator's 
Memorandum in Support of it Motion for Summary Judgment ("Liquidator's Memo.") 
respectively as Exhibits "A" and "B". 
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 1, LWP admits that WCIC was an 
insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah and was placed in liquidation by the 
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003. 
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's first 
statement. 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 2: Plaintiff Wasatch Crest Mutual 
Insurance Company was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah. Wasatch 
Crest Mutual was placed into Liquidation by the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 31, 2003. See Complaint, Ex. "A" 
at K 2 and Answer, Ex. UB" at U 2. 
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LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 2, LWP admits that WCMIC was an 
insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah and was placed in liquidation by the 
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003. 
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's 
second statement. 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 3: Plaintiff Merwin U. Stewart, Utah 
Insurance Commissioner, was appointed by the Third Judicial District Court as the 
liquidator of Insurance Co. and Mutual on July 31, 2003 (the "Liquidator"). The 
Liquidator has the authority and standing to bring this action pursuant to § 31A-27-310, 
Utah Code Ann. The Liquidator is vested by operation of law with the title to all the 
property, contracts, and rights of actions of the insurance company being liquidated, 
wherever located, as of the date of the filing of the petition for Liquidation. Pursuant to 
§ 31A-27-314, Utah Code Ann., the Liquidator may continue to prosecute and institute 
in the name of the insurer or in the Liquidator's own name, any suits or other legal 
proceedings in this state or elsewhere. See Liquidation Order, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "C". 
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 3, LWP admits that Melvin [sic] U. 
Stewart was appointed by the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah as 
the liquidator of WCIC and WCMIC on July 31, 2003. The remaining assertions in 
paragraph 3 are legal conclusions rather than material facts. 
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits only certain portions of this statement. The 
Liquidator asserts that the Utah Insurance Code speaks for itself and that the Liquidator 
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has the authority and standing to bring this action, that the Liquidator is vested by 
operation of law with the title to all the property, contracts, and rights of actions of the 
insurance company being liquidated, and that the Liquidator may prosecute and institute 
in the name of the insurer or in the Liquidator's own name any suits or other legal 
proceedings in this state or elsewhere. 
Liquidators Statement of Fact No. 4: Defendant LWP Claims Administrators, 
Corp. was a California corporation. The name "LWP Claims Administrators, Corp" was 
changed to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. See Complaint, Ex. "A" at | 4 and Answer, Ex. 
"B" at K 4. 
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 4, LWP admits LWPCAC was a 
California corporation whose name was changed to LWPCSI. 
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's fourth 
statement. 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 5: Defendant LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. 
is a California corporation. See Utah Department of Commerce print out, attached to 
the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "D". LWP Claims Administrators, Corp. and LWP 
Claims Solutions, Inc. are collectively referred to as "LWP". Wasatch Crest Group, 
Inc. was the parent corporation of WCIC. LWP was sold to John A. Igoe, the former 
Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of Insurance Co. and 
LWP. Mr. Igoe was also the Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive 
Officer of Wasatch Crest Group, Inc., the parent corporation of Insurance Co. and LWP. 
LWP was an affiliate of Wasatch Crest Group, Inc., Insurance Co., and Mutual. See 
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Complaint, Ex. "A" at ^ 5; see also Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. Form B1, dated April 16, 
2001 at p. 5, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as 
Exhibit "E". 
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 5, LWP admits LWPCSI is a 
California corporation whose name was changed from LWPCAC. LWP further admits 
that WCG was the parent corporation of WCIC. 
LWP disputes that it was sold to only John Igoe when, in fact, it was sold 
effective January 1, 2002, to John Igoe and Judy Adlam. See Exhibit 11 to LWP's 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. LWP also disputes that 
Igoe was the Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of WCIC 
and WCG. He became Acting Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive 
Officer of WCG and WCIC in November of 2001, but resigned from those positions and 
all other positions with Wasatch Crest companies as of May 8, 2002, the date of closing 
of the sale of LWP by WCG to Igoe and Adlam. See Ex. 6 at U 17; Ex. 9 at f 15. LWP 
admits that in approximately January 2000, Igoe became president of WCG, but he 
resigned from this position on May 8,2002. Id. 
LWP admits (1) Igoe was the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer 
of LWP, and (2) WCG was the parent of WCIC from October 1998 until 2002 when 
Igoe resigned his positions with WCG and WCIC. LWP admits that it was a subsidiary 
1
 Form B is a standard form used by all state insurance departments. Form B is a sworn 
statement to the state regulators as to the transactions and interrelationship of the 
insurance company and its affiliates which must be filed annually or whenever a 
material transaction or change has occurred. All Form B's referenced in this 
Memorandum were filed with the Utah Department of Insurance. 
6 
of WCG and a sister subsidiary of WCIC from November 16, 1998 through December 
31, 2001, and could therefore be considered an affiliate of WCG and WCIC between 
those dates. LWP denies that it was an affiliate of WCG and WCIC after January 1, 
2002, the effective date of the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam. See Ex. 6 at \\1\ Ex. 7 
at 1(14. LWP was not an affiliate of WCMIC after November 27, 2000 when WCMIC's 
interest in WCG, the parent of LWP, was relinquished. Exhibit 5 at p. 14, Item 5(1 )(e). 
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits certain portions of this statement. LWP 
disputes to whom LWP was sold in 2002, which is completely irrelevant to the issues in 
this motion. However, the Liquidator does not dispute that LWP was sold to John Igoe 
and Judy Adlam. The Liquidator does, however dispute the date of the sale. LWP 
states that the sale was effective as of January 1, 2002. This is simply not true. LWP 
was sold to John A. Igoe and Judy Adlam on May 8, 2002. See Ex. 11 of LWP's Memo. 
(Stock Purchase Agreement, dated May 8, 2002).2 The Liquidator disputes, therefore, 
LWP's contention that LWP could be considered an affiliate of Group and Insurance 
Co. from November 16, 1998 through only December 31, 2001. The date on the Stock 
Purchase Agreement is May 8, 2002. LWP, therefore, was an affiliate from November 
16, 1999 through May 8, 2002. The issue of when John Igoe resigned his positions is 
irrelevant, and the Liquidator contends that the documents speak for themselves. The 
Liquidator also disputes LWP's assertion that it was not an affiliate of Mutual after 
2
 The LWP Administrative Services Agreement that was executed at the closing of the 
Stock Purchase Agreement was effective as of May 8, 2002, it was not backdated to 
January 1, 2002. This agreement, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B", was between 
Group and LWP. It outlined LWP's continued involvement with claims administration 
even though WCG was divesting itself of its interest in LWP as of May 8, 2002. 
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November 27, 2000. The Liquidator contends that LWP was an affiliate of Mutual until 
at least the spring of 2002. See id. at f 16. 
Corporate History of Wasatch Crest Mutual and Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Acquisition of FCL 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 6: Wasatch Crest Mutual was a mutual 
insurance company controlled by its policyholders who annually elected a Board of 
Directors. Effective April 15, 1994, Wasatch Crest Mutual purchased all of the issued 
and outstanding common stock of First Continental Life & Accident Insurance 
Company, a Utah domiciled insurance company ("FCL"). See Wasatch Crest Mutual 
Insurance Co. Form B, dated July 15, 1998, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "F"; see also Form B dated April 16, 2001, Ex. 
"E". 
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 6, LWP admits that WCMIC was a 
mutual insurance company controlled by its shareholders and that WCMIC purchased 
all of the stock of FCL effective April 15, 1994. 
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's sixth 
statement. 
Creation of Wasatch Crest Insurance Company 
and Merger with Wasatch Crest Casualty 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 7: Effective October 31, 1998, Wasatch 
Crest Group (the parent company of WCIC) purchased all of the issued and outstanding 
common shares of Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, a Utah domiciled property and 
casualty company, from Deseret Management Corporation. Wasatch Crest Group 
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changed the name of Utah Home Fire Insurance to Wasatch Crest Insurance Company. 
Effective December 19, 2000, Wasatch Crest Casualty Company was merged into 
Wasatch Crest Insurance with Wasatch Crest Insurance as the surviving company. See 
Form B dated April 16, 2001, Ex. "E" at p. 14. 
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 7, LWP admits effective October 31, 
1998, WCG purchased all of the common stock of Utah Home Fire Insurance Company 
and changed the latter company's name to WCIC. LWP also admits, effective 
December 19, 2000, WCCIC merged into WCIC with WCIC as the survivor. 
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's 
seventh statement. 
Corporate History of LWP 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 8: On November 16, 1999, Wasatch Crest 
Group purchased from LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., substantially all 
of the assets, real and personal property, and business operations owned by LWP 
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement By 
and Among Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. and LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, 
Inc., John A. Igoe and Erica L. Igoe, dated November 16, 1999. Wasatch Crest Group's 
purchase was an asset purchase, not a purchase of the stock of LWP Commercial Claims 
Administrators, Inc. LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. was a third party 
administrator of insurance claims. Concurrent with the purchase of substantially all of 
the assets of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., Wasatch Crest Group 
created a new corporate entity, (i.e., LWP Claims Administrators, Corp.) that took 
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possession and title to all of the purchased assets. LWP Claims Administrators, Corp. 
was incorporated in the State of California. The name of LWP Claims Administrators, 
Corp. was subsequently changed to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. LWP is currently a 
California corporation with offices in Sacramento, California and Salt Lake City, Utah. 
LWP is currently a third-party administrator ("TPA"), which specializes in the 
administration of worker's compensation insurance and claims associated with ski 
industry workers. See Answer, Ex. "B" at Tf 15 at; see also November 16, 1999, Asset 
Purchase Agreement attached to the Memo, in Support as Exhibit "G" and November 
16, 1999 Administrative Services Agreement between LWP Commercial Claims 
Administrators, Inc. and LWP Claims Administrators, Corp., a true and correct copy of 
which is attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "H". 
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 8, LWP admits, on November 16, 
1999, WCG purchased substantially all of the assets and business operations of LWP 
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial"), a company which acted 
as a third party insurance claim administrator, from John and Erica Igoe. LWP also 
admits that WCG formed a new corporate entity, LWPCAC, at that time and the assets 
purchased from LWP Commercial were transferred to LWPCAC. 
LWP further admits that LWPCAC was incorporated in California and changed 
its name to LWPCSI. LWPCSI has offices in Sacramento, California and Salt Lake 
City and is a third-party administrator specializing in the administration of worker's 
compensation insurance claims. 
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Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's eighth 
statement. 
Affiliate Transactions 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 9: On or about November 16, 1999, LWP 
entered into an agreement with WCIC and WCMIC whereby LWP was paid a fixed 
percentage fee to administer all the claims throughout the entire duration of the claims. 
The fee paid to LWP was calculated as a percentage of gross written premium received 
by WCIC or WCMIC. In addition, LWP was paid a percentage of all medical fee 
savings generated by LWP in the administration of the claims. LWP's agreement with 
WCIC and WCMIC was not reduced to writing or disclosed to the Utah Department of 
Insurance. See May 21, 2002 Letter from Orrin T. Colby Jr. to Judy Adlam attached to 
the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "I". 
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 9, LWP disputes that (1) LWP entered 
into an agreement on about November 16, 1999 with WCIC and WCMIC providing for 
payment of a fixed percentage fee to administer all claims throughout the entire 
duration of the claims, (2) the fee paid to LWP was a percentage of gross premiums 
received by WCIC and WCMIC, and (3) LWP was paid a percentage of all medical fee 
savings generated by LWP. The Administrative Services Agreement, Exhibit 9, dated 
November 16, 1999 was an agreement between LWP Commercial, the selling entity 
owned by John and Erica Igoe, and LWPCAC, the subsidiary formed by WCG to hold 
the assets transferred by LWP Commercial. WCIC and WCMIC were not parties to the 
agreement. Moreover, the agreement did not provide for payment of a percentage of 
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premiums or medical cost savings to LWP. It instead provided that LWPCAC would 
compensate LWP Commercial "on a cost basis" by reimbursing LWP Commercial for 
all reasonable costs. See Exhibit 11 at p. 3. The agreement was intended to facilitate 
the transition of business operations pending the transfer of LWP Commercial's 
employees on January 1, 2000. For this reason, the agreement terminated on December 
31, 1999. See Ex. 6 at U 8. 
Liquidator's Reply: The Administrative Services Agreement was an agreement 
between LWP Commercial and LWPCAC. Mutual and Insurance Co. were not parties 
to the agreement. The agreement speaks for itself, and, therefore, any additional 
statements set forth by LWP are disputed by the Liquidator to the extent they are not 
found in the agreement which is attached to LWP's Memo, as Ex. 1 I. 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 10: Effective January 1, 2001, WCIC and 
LWP entered into an Administrative Agreement whereby LWP administered worker's 
compensation claims for WCIC on a "life of claim" basis and was paid fees as described 
in paragraph 19 of the Administrative Agreement. See Wasatch Crest Group Form B, 
dated April 30, 2002 at p. 12, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the 
Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "J"; see also January 2001 Administrative Agreement 
attached to the Liquidator's Memo as Exhibit "K". 
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 10, LWP disputes that WCIC entered 
into an Administrative Agreement effective January 1, 2001. In June 2000, LWPCAC 
began providing workers compensation claims handling services to WCIC pursuant to 
an oral agreement. Employees of WCG provided these services under the direction of 
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LWPCAC and LWPCAC reimbursed WCG for the personnel services provided by WCG 
to LWPCAC. In return for providing these services, LWPCAC received a percentage of 
the premiums earned by WCIC and a percentage of the medical cost savings realized by 
WCG due to LWPCAC's handling of claims. See Ex. 6 at U 9. 
This oral agreement was formalized in a written agreement between WCIC and 
LWPCAC which was effective as of January 1, 2001. The terms of the written 
agreement were the same as the terms of the earlier oral argument. See Ex. 10; Ex. 6 at 
^ 10; Ex. 7 at f 10. The terms of the agreement are standard commercial terms similar 
to the terms of agreements entered into by LWPCAC with other insurance companies. 
See Ex. 6 at K 10. 
Liquidator's Reply: LWP disputes that Insurance Co. and LWP entered into a 
formal Administrative Agreement on January 1, 2001. The Liquidator affirmatively 
alleges that the Wasatch Crest Group Form B statement dated April 30, 2002 which is 
attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Ex. J, speaks for itself and that Insurance Co. did 
enter into a formal Administrative Agreement with LWP on January 1, 2001. Further, 
the Liquidator contends that LWPCAC began providing services pursuant to an oral 
agreement at the time of the sale of LWP Commercial to Group, November 16, 1999. 
3
 In LWP's response to the Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 9, LWP states that the 
Administrative Services Agreement terminated on December 31, 1999. In its response 
to the Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 10, LWP states that an oral agreement to 
provide services was entered in June 2000. What happened between January 1, 2000 
and June 2000? The Liquidator contends that there was more than just one "oral 
agreement". 
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The Agreement speaks for itself and, therefore, any additional statements set forth by 
LWP are disputed by the Liquidator to the extent they are not found in the Agreement. 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No 11: LWP presented to WCMIC a proposed 
Administrative Agreement that was to be effective January 1, 2001. The terms of the 
agreement were identical to the Administrative Agreement entered into between WCIC 
and LWP as described above in paragraph 15. See Answer, Ex. "B" at f 18; see also 
Letter dated May 21, 2002, Ex. "I", both of which are attached to the Liquidator's 
Memo. 
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 11, LWP admits that it presented a 
proposed Administrative Agreement to WCMIC, which was to be effective January 1, 
2001 and had the same terms as the administrative agreement between LWPCAC and 
WCIC. 
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's 
eleventh statement. 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 12: The agreement between LWP and 
WCMIC was never executed; rather, the arrangement between WCMIC and LWP 
continued under the terms of the verbal agreement entered into in November 1999, 
whereby LWP would administer worker's compensation claims for WCMIC on a "life 
of claim" basis. See Letter dated May 21, 2002, Ex. "I" to the Liquidator's Memo. 
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 12, LWP admits that the written 
agreement between LWP and WCMIC was never signed by WCMIC and that the two 
companies continued to operate under the oral agreement. The oral agreement, 
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however, was not entered into in November 1999. The oral agreement was reached in 
June 2000 when LWP began providing claims handling services to WCMIC. See Ex. 6 
to LWP's Memo, at f 11. 
Liquidator's Reply: The Liquidator asserts that the oral agreement was reached 
in November 1999 and that LWP began providing claims handling services to Mutual at 
that time. See Statement of Fact No. 13 of LWP's Memo, which states that "[a]t the 
time of the asset purchase, an Administrative Services Agreement, dated November 16, 
1999 [] was entered into between LWP Commercial . . . and LWPCAC." Although 
Mutual was not a party to that agreement, the services were billed to and paid by 
Mutual. See Aff. of Robert C. Miller attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Ex. M at f 
19. 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 13. Wasatch Crest Group sold LWP back to 
John Igoe and Erica Igoe sometime in 2002. John Igoe continued in his capacity as an 
officer and director of Wasatch Crest Group after the sale of LWP to John and Erica 
Igoe. See Term Sheet attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "L". 
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 13, LWP denies that WCG sold LWP 
back to John and Erica Igoe sometime in 2002. LWP was, instead, sold to Igoe and 
Adlam effective January 1, 2002. See Ex. 11. The sale closed on May 8, 2002. Id. 
LWP also disputes that John Igoe continued in his capacity as an officer and director of 
WCG. At the time the sale was closed, Igoe resigned his positions as an officer and 
director of WCG and all other Wasatch Crest companies. See Ex. 12 to LWP's Memo. 
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Liquidator's Reply: LWP was sold to John A. Igoe and Judy Adlam effective 
May 8, 2002, not January 1, 2002. See Ex. 11 to LWP's Memo. Whether or not John 
Igoe remained as an officer and director of Group, Insurance Co., and FCL is irrelevant. 
The Liquidator maintains that the documents speak for themselves. 
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 14: From November 16. 1999 through July 
30, 2003, WCIC paid $6,144,402.68 to LWP for claims handling services. Of the 
$6,144,402.68 total, $4,955,586.10 was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while 
$1,188,816.58 was in the form of offsets. See Aff, of Robert C. Miller, attached to the 
Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "M". 
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 14, LWP disputes that WCIC paid 
$6,144,402.68 to LWP for claims handling services from November 16, 1999 through 
July 30, 2003, of which amount $4,955,486.10 was in the form of checks or wire 
transfers and $1,188,816.58 was in the form of offsets. From June 30, 2000 when LWP 
first began providing claims handling services to WCIC, until January 1, 2002, when 
the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam became effective, WCIC paid $1,338,110 to LWP 
for claims handling services. See Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at f 22. 
Liquidator's Reply: From November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, Insurance 
Co. paid $6,144,402.68 to LWP for claims handling services, of which $4,955,586.10 
was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while $1,188,816.58 was in the form of 
offsets. See Affidavit of Robert C. Miller, attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo. 
a t ! 18. 
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Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 15: From November 16, 1999 through July 
30, 2003, WCMIC paid $534,265.96 to LWP for claims handling services. Of the 
$534,265.96 total, $474,265.96 was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while 
$60,000.00 was in the form of offsets. See id. 
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 15, LWP disputes that WCMIC paid 
$534,295.96 to LWP for claims handling services from November 16, 1999 through 
July 30, 2000, of which amount $534,265.96 was in the form of checks or wire transfers 
and $60,000 was in the form of offsets. From June 30, 2000, when LWP first began 
providing claims handling services to WCMIC, Until January 1, 2002, when the sale of 
LWP to Igoe and Adlam became effective, WCMIC paid $812,650 to LWP for claims 
handling services. See Ex. 6 at \ 23. None of this amount was paid to LWP before 
November 27, 2000, the date WCMIC relinquished its interest in WCG and ceased to be 
a part of the WCG group. See Schedule prepared as exhibit to Affidavit of Robert C. 
Miller, filed as Exhibit M to Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment, attached as 
Ex. 13 to LWP's Memo. 
Liquidator's Reply: From November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, Mutual 
paid $534,265.96 to LWP for claims handling services, of which $474,265.96 was in the 
form of a check or wire transfer, while $60,000 was in the form of offsets. See Aff. of 
Robert C. Miller attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo, at f^ 19. 
III. STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS WITH RESPECT TO LWP'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Liquidator 
asserts that the following statements of material facts made by LWP are disputed. 
17 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 7: On June 30, 1998, WCMIC exchanged all of the 
common stock of FCL and WCCIC foi shares of the newly incorporated Wasatch Crest 
Group. In exchange for the stock of FCL and WCCIC, WCMIC received 1 million 
Class A common shares of WCG (100% of the Class A shares) and 5.3 million Class C 
common shares (100% of the Class C shares) of WCG. WCMIC also received 4.4 
million shares of Class B-1 common stock, which it sold to investors. An additional 6.4 
million shares of Class B-1 common stock and 3.9 million shares of Class B-2 common 
stock were also purchased by the investors. After these transactions, WCG Investment 
Group ("Wasatch Investment") L.P. owned 5.8 million shares of Class B-1 common 
stock, Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation ("Swiss Re") owned 3.9 million shares 
of Class B-2 common stock, and Chase Capital Partners ("Chase'') owned 5.0 million 
shares of Class B-1 common stock. See Wasatch Crest Group, Form B, Insurance 
Holding Company System Registration Statement at pp. 14-15, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached to LWP's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment as Exhibit 5. 
Disputed Facts: After these transactions, Swiss Re owned 5.0 million shares of 
Class B-1 common stock and Chase owned 3.9 million shares of Class B-2 common 
stock. This appears to have been a clerical error on LWP's part. See id. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 13: At the time of the asset purchase, an 
Administrative Services Agreement dated November 16, 1999 (attached as Exhibit 9) 
was entered into between LWP Commercial, the selling entity owned by John and Erica 
Igoe, and LWPCAC, the subsidiary formed by WCG to hold the assets transferred by 
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LWP Commercial. WCIC and WCMIC were not parties to the agreement. The 
agreement provided that LWP Commercial continue to employ its former employees 
and that LWPCAC would compensate LWP Commercial "on a cost basis" by 
reimbursing LWP Commercial for all reasonable costs associated therewith. See 
Exhibit 9 at p. 3. The agreement was intended to facilitate the transition of business 
operations pending the transfer of LWP Commercial's employees on January 1, 2000. 
For this reason, the agreement terminated on December 31, 1999. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes the last full sentence of Fact No. 13 
inasmuch as the Liquidator has no knowledge regarding that fact, it appears to be 
LWP's opinion that the agreement was intended to facilitate the transition of business 
operations, etc., and, therefore, the Liquidator disputes that statement. Further, the 
Liquidator avers that the agreement speaks for itself. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 15: The oral agreement for claims handling services 
was formalized in a written agreement between WCIC and LWPCAC which was 
effective as of January 1, 2001. The terms of the written agreement were the same as 
the terms of the earlier oral agreement. See Administrative Agreement, attached as 
Exhibit 10. The terms of the agreement are standard commercial terms similar to the 
terms of agreement entered into by LWPCAC with other insurance companies. See 
Exhibit 6 at \ 10; Exhibit 7 at ^ 10. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes the last full sentence of this statement 
inasmuch as there is no evidence to prove that the terms of the agreement are standard 
commercial terms similar to the terms of agreement entered into by LWPCAC with 
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other companies. This statement contains LWP's opinion, and the Liquidator, 
therefore, disputes this statement. Further, the Liquidator avers that the agreement 
speaks for itself. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 17: On April 28, 1998 WCG entered into a 
Managing General Agency Agreement with North American Specialty Insurance 
Company ("NAS")5 a wholly owned subsidiary of SwissRe ("NAS Agreement"). Under 
the terms of the agreement, WCG was granted the right to underwrite and issue policies 
on behalf of NAS, subject to certain guidelines and review procedures by NAS. The 
agreement also provided for WCG to handle all claims arising out of NAS policies 
written under the agreement. WCIC was not a party to this agreement. See Exhibit 6 at 
112 . 
Disputed Facts: LWP did not attach the NAS Agreement to its memorandum and 
provided no basis for this statement of fact. The NAS Agreement speaks for itself, but 
without evidence of it, the Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 18: Beginning June 2000., WCG assigned its 
responsibilities under the NAS Agreement to LWPCAC. From that time forward, 
LWPCAC handled claims arising out of the NAS policies for WCG, and received 
compensation from WCG for these services. WCIC, which was not a party to the NAS 
Agreement, did not provide compensation to LWPCAC for claims handling services 
under the NAS Agreement. See Exhibit 6 at ^ 13. 
Disputed Fact: Inasmuch as LWP did not attach the NAS Agreement to its 
memorandum, there is no factual basis for this statement of fact. The Liquidator asserts 
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that the NAS Agreement speaks for itself, but without evidence of it, the Liquidator 
disputes the entire statement of fact. The Liquidator specifically disputes that 
LWPCAC received compensation under the NAS Agreement from Group. LWPCAC 
billed and received its compensation from Insurance Co. See Aff. of Robert C. Miller 
attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo, at ^ 16-18. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 19: At no time during its relationship with WCG did 
LWP receive any dividend or other distributions, whether in cash, property or other 
assets, from WCG, WCIC, FCL or WCMIC other than payments made in the ordinary 
course of business in accordance with the various service agreements, written and oral, 
in effect during the period. See Exhibit 6 to LWP's Memorandum at ^ 25 and Exhibit 7 
at 117. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact. LWP did 
receive distributions, as that term is interpreted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-
322. Pursuant to that statute, the Liquidator is permitted to recover from any affiliate 
any distribution made at any time during the five years preceding the petition for 
liquidation. If a person or entity qualifies as an affiliate (as LWP with respect to 
Group, Mutual, Insurance Co., and FCL), then any distribution to that affiliate made in 
the five years prior to the filing of the liquidation petition must be repaid. The 
$6,678,668.64 paid by Insurance Co. to LWP for claims handling services is 
unquestionably a distribution. The fact that the distributions were within the ordinary 
course of business is irrelevant to whether the distributions are recoverable by the 
Liquidator. 
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LWP Statement of Fact No. 20: LWP did not own, direct, or control the business 
or operations of WCG, WCIC, FCL, or WCMIC. Exhibit 6 to LWP's Memo, at H 16. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact. In its 
Response to Liquidator's Statement of Material Facts, responding to statement of fact 
number five, LWP admits that LWP could be considered an affiliate of Group and 
Insurance Co. from November 1998 through December 31, 2001.4 The Liquidator 
asserts that LWP is an affiliate of Group and Insurance Co. from November 16, 1999 
through at least May 8, 2002. The Liquidator agrees that LWP did not own Group, 
Insurance Co., FCL or Mutual, but that LWP was under common control and 
management such that it was an affiliate of Insurance Co., Group, Mutual, and FCL as 
those terms are defined in the Utah Insurance Code. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. 
A) at Hlf 6-18. 
Group acquired LWP Commercial in October 1999, and formed a new corporate 
entity, LWP Claims Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC"). John Igoe served as CEO of 
LWPCAC from November 1999 to the present, and served as Chairman of the Board 
from the point Orrin T. Colby Jr. was relieved of that role. LWPCAC was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Group until it was sold to John A. Igoe and Judy K. Adlam on May 
8, 2002. See id. at ^ 8. 
At all times between 1999 and July 2003, Group was the parent company of 
Insurance Co., FCL, Casualty (until merged) (collectively the "Companies"), and 
4
 See LWP's Memo, at p. xii. 
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LWPCAC, and John Igoe was the COO and President of Group.5 Although Mutual was 
never a subsidiary of Group, it was an affiliate of Group between 1999 and the spring of 
2002. See id. at f t 6 & 11. In his capacity as CEO, COO, and President of Group, and 
CEO of LWPCAC, Mr. Igoe was directly involved in drafting and/or administering a 
services agreement whereby LWPCAC provided claims services to the Companies and 
Mutual. Mr. Igoe, along with Dennis Larson, had direct input into the scope and nature 
of the services that would be performed by LWPCAC, and how much LWPCAC would 
be paid for those services. See id. at \ 12. From the time that LWPCAC was formed 
until it was sold, LWPCAC was under the common control and management of Group. 
Id. at If 13. 
Group management, which included John Igoe as President, CEO, and COO, 
made management and employee decisions for the Companies, Mutual, and LWPCAC 
because Group, Insurance Co., Mutual, FCL, Casualty, and LWPCAC were under 
common management and control from 1999 through July 2003 (with the exclusion of 
Mutual which ended its relationship with the Wasatch Crest companies in the spring of 
2002). See id. at f 14. The management, officers, and directors of Group controlled 
each of the Companies, Mutual, and LWPCAC, by virtue of their management and 
supervision of the employees, day-to-day business activities, and records keeping. See 
id. at \ 15. During the relevant time period, Group, Insurance Co., Mutual, FCL, 
Casualty, and LWPCAC were affiliates with one another. See id. at 16. 
5
 From 1999 to July 2003, John A. Igoe was the Chief Operating Officer and President 
of Group. Prior to November 2001, John Igoe was named Chairman of the Board and 
CEO of Group. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at % 6. 
23 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 21: On November 6, 2001, the Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer of WCG, WCIC, and FCL was placed on indefinite 
leave of absence. At the same time John Igoe was appointed to serve as Acting 
Chairman of the Board and CEO of the companies pending an internal investigation by 
special outside counsel of the activities of former officers and directors. 
Disputed Facts: This statement is completely irrelevant to the issues set forth in 
either the Liquidator's or LWP's Motions. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 22: On May 8, 2002, John Igoe and Judy Adlam 
purchased the stock of LWPCAC for $2,000,000 in cash, an assumption of liabilities of 
approximately $1.8 million and a contingency payment (made in 2003) of $175,000. 
See Stock Purchase Agreement and Mandatory Share Redemption Agreement, attached 
as Exhibit 11. John Igoe did not represent WCG in the negotiations of the transaction, 
which was made effective as of January 1, 2002. The Board of Directors retained Hales 
and Company independently to advise them as to the fairness of the transaction. See 
Exhibit 6 at If 17; Exhibit 7 at f 14. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator does not dispute or agree with the details of the 
agreement set forth in this statement of fact, but affirmatively alleges that the Stock 
Purchase Agreement speaks for itself. The Liquidator contends that the stock purchase 
sale took place and was effective as of May 8, 2002, not on January 1, 2002. See Stock 
Purchase Agreement attached as Ex. 11 to LWP's Memo. The Liquidator contends that 
the details of the sale, with the exception of the date, are completely irrelevant to the 
issues set forth in either LWP's Memo, or the Liquidator's Memo. 
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LWP Statement of Fact No. 23: Pursuant to the agreement for purchase of the 
stock of LWPCAC by Igoe and Adlam, Igoe agreed to resign as an officer and director 
of all Wasatch Crest companies. See Exhibit 6 at K 17; Exhibit 7 at f 14. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator does not dispute or agree with the details of the 
agreement set forth in this statement of fact, but affirmatively alleges that the Stock 
Purchase Agreement speaks for itself. With regard to the purported resignation of John 
Igoe, the Liquidator again affirmatively alleges that the agreement and addendums 
speak for themselves. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 24: From June 2000 when LWPCAC first started 
providing claims handling services for Insurance Co. and WCMIC until January 1, 
2002, when the sale of LWPCAC to Igoe and Adlam was effective, LWPCAC received 
payments of $5,142,263 under the terms of its agreements with WCIC, WCMIC, and 
WCG. See Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at f 20. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact. From 
November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, Insurance Co. paid $6,144,402.68 to LWP 
for claims handling services. Of the $6,144,402.68 total, $4,955,586.10 was in the form 
of a check or wire transfers, while $1,188,816.58 was in the form of offsets. See Aff. of 
Robert Miller attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo, at If 18. 
From November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, Mutual paid $534,265.96 to 
LWP for claims handling services. Of the $534,265.96 total, $474,265.96 was in the 
form of a check or wire transfers, while $60,000 was in the form of offsets. See id. at \ 
19. 
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LWP Statement of Fact No. 23: Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC, 
$3,001,503 was paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCG in 
connection with the NAS agreement. See Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at % 21. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator provided its proof of payment to LWP in Robert 
C. Miller's affidavit which was attached as Exhibit M to the Liquidator's Memo. LWP 
has not substantiated its figures, making it impossible for the Liquidator to verify them, 
and, therefore, the Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact. The fact that the 
claims handling services may have been provided for the benefit of Group does not take 
away from the fact that Insurance Co. paid LWPCAC. The issue of which affiliate 
received the benefit is irrelevant. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 26: Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC, 
$1,328,110 was paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCIC 
under the terms of the oral and written administrative agreements. See Ex. 6 to LWP's 
Memo, at \ 22. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator provided its proof of payment to LWP in Robert 
C. Miller's affidavit which was attached as Exhibit M to the Liquidator's Memo. LWP 
has not substantiated its figures, making it impossible for the Liquidator to verify them, 
and, therefore, the Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 27: Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC, 
$812,650 was paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCMIC 
under the terms of the oral agreement described. See Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at \ 23. 
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Disputed Facts: The Liquidator provided its proof of payment to LWP in Robert 
C. Miller's affidavit which was attached as Exhibit M to the Liquidator's Memo. LWP 
has not substantiated its figures, making it impossible for the Liquidator to verify them, 
and, therefore, the Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact. 
LWP Statement of Fact No. 28: After WCIC and WCMIC were placed into 
liquidation on July 31, 2001, LWPCAC, and subsequently LWPCSI, continued to 
provide claims handling services to WCIC and WCMIC at the request of the Utah 
Guaranty Association ("UGA"), in accordance with the terms of the written 
Administrative Agreement (Exhibit 10) with WCIC and the oral agreement with 
WCMIC. See Exhibit 6 at f 24; Exhibit 7 at If 16. 
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes that Insurance Co. and Mutual were 
placed into liquidation on July 31, 2001. Insurance Co. and Mutual were placed into 
liquidation on 31, 2003. This was most likely a clerical error on LWP's part. The 
Liquidator does not dispute or agree with the rest of the statement of fact, but contends 
that this statement of fact is completely irrelevant to the issues set forth in either LWP's 
Memo, or the Liquidator's Memo. 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The Liquidator has asked this Court to enforce the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-27-322 as written. That is, any distribution to an affiliate made five years before 
the filing of the liquidation petition must be repaid. The only exception to that edict is 
stock dividends. 
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LWP argues that the word "distribution" should be used interchangeably with 
the term "dividend". See LWP Memo, at p. 4. The reason that LWP wants a 
"distribution" to be the equivalent of a "dividend" is because the payments to LWP 
were not based on stock ownership but rather on the value of the alleged services 
provided by LWP to Companies and Mutual. Therefore, if the money received by LWP 
was not a dividend, then the Liquidator cannot recoup those monies. To do that, LWP 
embarks on a convoluted journey to transmogrify the meaning of the word 
"distribution". 
A. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INDICATES THAT THE STATUTE 
IS APPLICABLE TO ALL TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE 
COMPANIES, MUTUAL, AND THEIR AFFILIATE LWP, NOT JUST 
DIVIDENDS. 
LWP asserts that the legislative history of § 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann. 
supports its theory that the term "distribution" is interchangeable with the term 
"dividends". LWP's assertion is wrong and is based on an incomplete reading of the 
legislative history LWP cites. 
The author of the current Utah Insurance Code was Professor Spencer L. 
Kimball, a professor at the University of Utah (a copy of his biography published by the 
S. J. Quinney School of Law at the University of Utah is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C"). Professor Kimball was nationally renowned as an insurance law expert. In 
approximately 1982, Professor Kimball was commissioned by the Utah State 
Legislature to draft Utah's version of the Model Insurance Code. In conjunction with 
an advisory committee, Professor Kimball produced a document entitled "State of Utah 
Draft Insurance Code" dated March 1983. The original Title 31A, Insurance Code, was 
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based on Professor Kimball's Draft Insurance Code and was enacted during the 1985 
and 1986 legislative sessions. The instant section on the recoupment from affiliates 
was enacted in 1986. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a readable copy of the entire Chapter 96-17 
entitled "Insurance Holding Company Systems"6. In the Prefatory Comment, Professor 
Kimball states as follows: 
There is no room for argument, however, that after formation of a 
holding company system there must be serious concern with intergroup 
transactions. They are subject to abuse involving vast sums of money, the 
improper transfer of which can endanger policyholder and public interest. 
This chapter carries concern for such transactions a step farther than does 
the Model Act or previous law. See section 96-17-6.5. 
From the very beginning of this section, Professor Kimball was very concerned 
about transactions by and between an insurance company and its affiliates. 
Unquestionably, the legislative history indicates an overriding concern with affiliate 
transactions because they are prone to being abused. The drafters' unqualified 
apprehension for affiliate transactions should guide and inform the interpretation of the 
mechanics of the statute. 
Virtually all of chapter 96-17 of Professor Kimball's Draft Insurance Code was 
enacted as Chapter 16 of the current Utah Insurance Code entitled "Insurance Holding 
Companies" (§§ 31A-16-101, et seq.). Section 96-17-6.5 of the Draft Insurance Code 
One of the reasons that LWP may have misconstrued the vital concept that 
distributions cover more than just dividends is because the copy attached to the LWP 
pleading had illegible sections and pages. Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a copy of 
the legislative history included in the LWP Memo, as Exhibit 15. On page 14 of 
Exhibit 15 is the language that unequivocally shows that the word "distribution" was 
intentionally used to cover abuses over and beyond excessive dividends. 
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entitled "Liability of Affiliates", however, was transferred from the chapter on 
Insurance Holding companies and placed in the section pertaining exclusively to 
liquidations, i.e., Chapter 27 (§§ 31A-27-101, et seq.). Consequently, Section 96-17-
6.5 appears in the Utah Insurance Code as § 31A-27-322. 
Professor Kimball's comments on Section 98-17-6.5 are dispositive in 
ascertaining the intent of the legislature: 
There are other potential abuses, beside excessive dividends, in the 
holding company development. They include all of the devices for "milking" 
that have been ingeniously exploited in other contexts. They encompass the 
full range of less than arm's-length transactions that benefit affiliates at the 
expense of the insurer. They permit evasions of insurance laws and 
regulations by a parent holding company through payment to insurance agents 
and employees, for example, that could not be done by an insurance company 
alone. 
It is hard to envision a clearer or more poignant description of the abuses that the 
statute was intended to address. Not just dividends, but all payments between affiliates 
are susceptible to potential abuses. Therefore, it was necessary to use a broader or 
more inclusive term than the word "dividend" - which "distribution" certainly is. In 
construing a statute, the court is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the 
purpose the statute was meant to achieve. In Re Gonzales, 1 P.3d 1074, 1079 (Utah 
2001). Section 31A-27-322 was enacted to address not only excessive dividends, but 
also other excessive distribution between an insurance company and its affiliates. 
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Contrary to LWP's assertion, the legislative history unequivocally supports the 
Liquidator's position, not LWP's . 
B. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SEC. 31A-27-322 (RECOUPMENT 
FROM AFFILIATES) STATES THAT DISTRIBUTIONS TO 
AFFILIATES ARE TO BE REPAID AND THE RULES OF 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REQUIRE THAT THE TERM 
"DISTRIBUTIONS" BE GIVEN EFFECT. 
When interpreting a legislative enactment, the plain language of the act 
determines its meaning. Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 48 P.3d 888, 
894 (Utah 2000); City of Hindale v. Cooke, 28 P.3d 697 (Utah 2001). The plain 
language of the statute says that the liquidator may recover "the amount of 
distributions" made to affiliates. The next phrase creates an exception to that general 
rule: stock dividends are not recoverable. Therefore, "distribution" is the all-inclusive, 
7
 The Utah appellate courts have no reported cases construing § 31A-27-322, Utah Code 
Ann. However, the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake City, State of Utah 
(Judge Tyrone E. Medley) has encountered virtually identical arguments asserted by 
LWP. In the lawsuit captioned American Western Life Insurance Company in 
Liquidation et al v. Leland A. Wolf et al (Case No. 980905251) (the "American 
Western Lawsuit"), the Defendants responded to the Liquidator's Motion for Summary 
Judgment that only excessive dividends could be recovered by the Liquidator, not the 
sales proceeds paid by an insurance company to an affiliate for the purchase of used 
furniture and computer equipment from the affiliate (a less than arm's-length 
transaction that resulted in a multi-million dollar windfall to the affiliate). In the Order 
dated May 22, 2003 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "F"), Judge Medley 
ruled in Paragraphs 19 and 20 as follows: 
19. The statute [§ 31A-27-322] provides that the liquidator may recover "the 
amount of distributions" which is the broad general rule. The next phrase (i.e., 
"stock dividends are not recoverable") creates an exception to that general rule 
or a subset of the general class. 
20. The word "dividend" as used in this statute creates a special class of 
distributions which the recipient shareholder could demonstrate as fair and 
reasonable and therefore not returnable to the liquidation estate. This limitation 
on recovery only applies to the subset of dividends; it does not apply to the broad 
general category of "distributions". 
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general rule, and a subset of that general category is "stock dividends". The next 
section of the statute, Sec. 31A-27-322(2), provides that "no dividend" is recoverable 
by the liquidator if the recipient shows that the dividend was fair and reasonable. In the 
statute, the Legislature did not use the word "distribution" (the general class), but rather 
used the word "dividend" (a subset of the general class). The duty of this Court is to 
"construe a statute on the assumption that each term is used advisedly and that the 
intent of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context and structure in 
which it is placed." Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984), quoted in 
Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, et al.9 828 P.2d 507, 514 (Utah 1992). It must be 
assumed that the Legislature intended to use the word "dividend" when it used it as a 
special sub-class of distributions which the recipient shareholder could demonstrate as 
fair and reasonable and therefore not returnable to the liquidation estate. That privilege 
was not granted to distributions in general, only the specific subset of dividends. 
The rules of statutory construction cited above also serve the objective of the 
statute. If the Legislature meant for Sec. 31A-27-322 to apply only to dividends, then 
the title and text of the statutory enactment would have used that word. It did not 
because the Legislature wanted the Liquidator to have the power to recoup all 
distributions to affiliates, not just dividends. 
Dividends are a function of stock ownership. Affiliates are not necessarily 
shareholders. Therefore, the application of the statute is much broader, rather than 
strictly limited to recipients of dividends. Recipients of dividends are given an 
opportunity to prove that the dividend was fair and reasonable. The reason for this is 
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clear. There may be individual shareholders who are not control persons and who have 
innocently received dividends. In that case, non-control persons are permitted to prove 
that the dividend was fair and reasonable. But if the distribution is not a dividend, the 
statute's plain language dictates that the distribution must be returned to the Liquidator. 
The strong presumption of the statute (i.e., that the recipient's distribution was a result 
of overreaching and undue control) dictates that the distribution be returned without 
regard to the reasonableness of the transaction. 
There is also a strong equitable policy that supports the Liquidator's position. 
The objective of the recoupment statute is to draw back into the liquidation estate 
monies that will be used to pay policyholders and third party creditors. Rather than 
affiliates (which are insiders akin to shareholders) keeping the distribution, the monies 
are equitably distributed to policyholders and creditors. It should also be remembered 
that the affiliates are not without a remedy or recourse. The affiliates can file a claim 
against the liquidation estate and share in the proportionate proceeds which may be paid 
to similarly situated creditors. 
In conclusion, there is no need to look at the legislative history because the 
language of the statute is very straightforward. There is no uncertainty about the 
Liquidator's power to recover distributions to affiliates. Because affiliate transactions 
are devoid of the safeguards associated with arm's-length transactions, the Legislature 
determined that all distributions must be returned, with the only exception being fair 
and reasonable dividends. LWP's argument that "distributions" are the equivalent of 
"dividends" fails both on the face of the words used and the legislative history. 
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C. BY ITS OWN ADMISSION, AND PURSUANT TO THE UTAH 
INSURANCE CODE, LWPCAC WAS AN AFFILIATE OF 
INSURANCE CO. 
An affiliate is defined as "any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with, another person. A corporation is an affiliate of another 
corporation, regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural persons 
manages the corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(5).8 The Utah Insurance 
Code defines "control," "controlled," and "under common control" as "the direct or 
indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of Ihe management and 
policies. . ." Id. at (27)(a). In addition to LWP's own admission that it was an affiliate 
with Group and Insurance Co., there is irrefutable evidence that Insurance Co. and 
LWPCAC were affiliates with one another because "substantially the same group of 
natural persons managed" the companies. See LWP's Memo, at p. xii ("LWP admits 
that it was a subsidiary of WCG and a sister subsidiary of WCIC from November 
16,1998 through December 31, 2001, and could therefore be considered an affiliate of 
WCG and WCIC between those dates"); see also Wasatch Group, Inc. Form B, dated 
April 16, 2001 attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "E".9 LWPCAC and 
Insurance Co. were both wholly owned subsidiaries of Group. LWPCAC does not and 
cannot refute that fact. LWPCAC does not and cannot refute the fact that LWPCAC, 
8
 See also the Order dated May 22, 2003 (Ex. F) in the American Western Lawsuit at p. 
13,1|14. 
9
 The Liquidator disputes that LWP's affiliate status with Group and Insurance Co. 
ended on January 1, 2002 inasmuch as the Stock Purchase Agreement was signed on 
May 8, 2002, the affiliation, and common control and management extended at least 
until May 8, 2002, regardless of when the Stock Purchase Agreement allegedly became 
"effective." 
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Insurance Co. and Group were managed by Orrin T. Colby Jr., John A. Igoe, Lewis T. 
Stevens, Verl R. Topham, Richard A. Veed, and Mark Finkelstein. See id. at pp. 4-6; 
see also Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at f 18. The following organizational chart 
was filed with the State of Utah Insurance Department in Group's April 16, 2001 Form 
B filing as an exhibit. It shows how Group, LWPCAC, FCL, and Insurance Co. were 
organized, with Group as the parent and LWPCAC as a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Group. 
I 
LWP Claims Administrators Corp. 
a California Corporation 
Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. 
a Utah Corporation 
First Continental Life & 
Accident Insurance Company 
a Utah Insurance Company 
Wasatch Crest Insurance Company 
a Utah Insurance Company 
See Exhibit "A" to Wasatch Crest Form B, dated April 16, 2001, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "G". 
In his affidavit, John Igoe states that "LWP did not own, direct, or control the 
business or operations of WCG, WCIC, FCL, or WCMIC." See Aff. of John A. Igoe, 
attached as Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at f 16. Interestingly, Mr. Igoe does not aver the 
reverse of that statement, that Group or Insurance Co. did not own, direct, or control the 
business or operations of LWP. In fact, Mr. Igoe cannot make that statement because 
his own admissions and the Form B's on file for Group, irrefutably prove that 
LWPCAC was a wholly owned subsidiary of Group. 
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Although the Liquidator is confident that it can prove that Mutual and LWPCAC 
were affiliates, there is contradictory evidence as to control of Mutual such that for 
purposes of this Motion, the Liquidator is proceeding with Insurance Co., and leaving 
the issue of Mutual's affiliation for trial, effectively making the Liquidator's Motion 
one for partial summary judgment. 
LWP makes much of John Igoe's personal involvement or. as it alleges, lack 
thereof, to suggest that LWPCAC, Insurance Co. and Group were not affiliates. This 
argument is a red herring. Mr. Igoe's participation in the management of all three 
companies, while important, is not relevant in the big picture. Further, LWP's reliance 
on the statement from Utah Code Ann. § 31A-l-301(27)(a) that "there is no 
presumption an individual holding an official position with another person controls that 
person solely by reason of the position" is misplaced in this instance because the 
Liquidator does not rely on Mr. Igoe's positions with LWPCAC, Insurance Co. and 
Group to establish control and affiliate status. Instead, the Liquidator relies on the 
irrefutable evidence that LWPCAC, Insurance Co., FCL, Group, and Casualty (until 
merged) were controlled and managed by the same people. Although interlocking 
directorates is not enough, on its own, to establish control, "[s]haring officers between 
the parent and the subsidiary or the presence of 'interlocking directorates' are indicative 
of common corporate ownership and control." Johnson-Tanner v. First Cash Financial 
Serv, Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 34, 39 (D, D.C. 2003.)10. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
10
 See also In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F.Supp. 1006, 1009 (N.D.Ga. 1982) 
where the Court stated that "'shared' officers and directors raise a strong inference of 
domination by the parent and indicate [] 'common direction and supervision. . . '" 
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31 A-1-301(5), common management is sufficient to establish that LWPCAC, Insurance 
Co., Group, FCL, and Casualty are affiliates. 
Although John Igoe's personal involvement is not relevant to the ultimate issue 
of the affiliate status of LWPCAC, Insurance Co., FCL, Group, and Casualty, there is 
telling evidence of the interlocking management and control of these companies by 
virtue of Mr. Igoe's involvement. John and Erica Igoe were the owners of LWP 
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial") in 1999. See Aff. of 
Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at \l. Once he took his place as Chief Operating Officer, 
President, and a member of the board of directors of Group, John Igoe negotiated the 
sale of LWP Commercial to Group in 1999—working both sides of the deal.11 After 
Group acquired LWP Commercial, Group formed a new corporate entity, LWP Claims 
Administrators, Corp. ("LWPCAC"), with John Igoe as its CEO from November 1999 
to the present and, for a time, Chairman of the Board. See id. at \ 8. LWPCAC was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Group until it was sold on May 8, 2002.12 Id. In his 
capacity as CEO, COO, and President of Group, and as CEO of LWPCAC, John A. 
Igoe, along with Dennis T. Larson ("CFO"), made crucial management decisions for 
Group, Mutual, Insurance Co., FCL, and Casualty regarding claims handling services. 
Mssrs. Igoe and Larson were directly involved in drafting and/or administering a 
11
 See Aff. of John Igoe attached to LWP's Memo, at \\ 3-5. Sometime prior to 
November 2001, John A. Igoe was named Chairman of the Board and CEO of Group. 
See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at ^ 8. John Igoe was also the COO and President 
of Insurance Co., FCL, and Casualty. Id. 
12
 From the time that LWPCAC was formed and until it was sold, LWPCAC was under 
the common control and management of Group. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby (Ex. A) at f 
13. 
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services agreement whereby LWPCAC provided claims services to Group, Mutual, 
Insurance Co., Casualty, and FCL. Mssrs. Igoe and Larson had direct input into the 
scope and nature of the services that would be performed by LWPCAC, and how much 
LWPCAC would be paid for those services. Id. at \ 12. 
Additional evidence of interlocking corporate structure and management is that 
from January 1, 2000 through at least May 8, 2002, Group, FCL, Casualty, LWPCAC, 
and Insurance Co. had a common employee base, meaning the Companies and 
LWPCAC shared the same employees and management team. See Aff. of Orrin T. 
1 T 
Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at f 14. Group management, which included John A. Igoe 
(President, COO, and CEO), Orrin T. Colby Jr., Dennis T. Larson, and others, made 
management and employee decisions for Group, FCL, Insurance Co., Casualty, 
LWPCAC, and Mutual. Id. Further, the management, officers, and directors of Group 
controlled Mutual, Insurance Co., FCL, Casualty, and LWPCAC by virtue of their 
management and supervision of the employees, day-to-day business activities, and 
records keeping. Id. at If 15.14 
From January 1, 2000 through the spring of 2002, Mutual shared employees with 
Group, FCL, Insurance Co., LWPCAC, and Casualty. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. 
(Ex. A) at 1f 14. 
14
 John A. Igoe participated in the management, policymaking, and control of Group, 
FCL, Insurance Co., Casualty, LWPCAC, and Mutual. In fact, from 1999 through the 
spring of 2002, Group guided many management decisions of Mutual. For example, the 
management of reinsurance arrangements and underwriting were performed under the 
supervision of John A. Igoe. Similarly, Mr. Igoe supervised the administration of 
claims by means of his affiliated corporation, LWPCAC. In addition, Dennis T. Larson, 
the Chief Financial Officer, and other employees performing functions for Mutual, 
reported to Mr. Igoe. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at ^ 17. 
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Clearly, from 1999 to at least May 8, 2002, Group, FCL, Insurance Co., 
Casualty, and LWPCAC were managed and controlled by substantially the same group 
of persons, that is, John A. Igoe, Dennis T. Larson, Orrin T. Colby, Judy Adlam, Lewis 
T. Stevens, William J. Worsley, and members of the Board including Richard A. Veed, 
Mark Finkelstein, and Verl R. Topham. Id. at f 18.15 Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-1-301(4), LWPCAC, Group, Insurance Co., Casualty, and FCL are 
affiliates inasmuch as "substantially the same group of natural persons manage[d] the 
corporations." The Form B filings, Mr. Colby's affidavit, and LWP's own admissions 
in John Igoe's affidavit and LWP's Memo., clearly confirm that Mr. Igoe and others 
managed Group, Insurance Co., Casualty, FCL, and LWPCAC as one company, utilized 
the same employees, and entered into agreements with each other on behalf of one 
another. 
Once affiliate status is proved, the affiliate has no defenses to assert that will 
spare the affiliate from disgorging the distributions it received. As an affiliate of 
Insurance Co., LWPCAC must disgorge all funds it received from Insurance Co. since 
November 16, 1999. LWP's attempt to distance itself from Insurance Co. and its 
assertion that LWP never received payments from Insurance Co., is belied by the fact 
that LWP billed Insurance Co. for claims handling services, and Insurance Co. paid 
LWP directly for those services. This evidence is irrefutable. See Aff. of Robert C. 
Miller, attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo, at f^ [ 16-19. LWP, therefore, must 
The Liquidator firmly believes that at trial it can prove that Mutual was also managed 
and controlled by this same group of persons. 
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pay Insurance Co. at least $ 5,615,090 which is the amount that Insurance Co. paid to 
LWPCAC prior to May 8, 2002. 
D. WHETHER THE PAYMENTS TO LWP WERE FAIR 
CONSIDERATION FOR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY RENDERED 
SERVICES IS IRRELEVANT. 
LWP attempts to interject what appears to be a bankruptcy concept into the 
discussion of whether § 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann., permits the Liquidator to recover 
the payments to an affiliate. This argument is irrelevant and immaterial. LWP asserts 
that the payments they received from Insurance Co. and Mutual were for services LWP 
contemporaneously rendered to LWP's affiliates. The instant statute makes absolutely 
no mention of this alleged exception to the requirement that all payments by an 
insurance company to an affiliate within five years of the liquidation petition are to be 
paid back. 
As Professor Kimball so ably articulated in his discussion of the Recoupment 
from Affiliates statute, distributions by insurance companies to affiliates are so suspect 
that there are virtually no defenses to the repayment requirement. Only if the 
distributions qualify as dividends can the recipient accept the burden of proving that the 
dividend was fair and reasonable and the payor (the insurance company) did not know 
that the payment of the dividend would affect the solvency of the insurance company. 
Clearly, the distributions to LWP were not predicated on stock ownership and therefore 
were not dividends. The inescapable conclusion is that the distribution must be paid 
back, regardless of whether the payments were contemporaneous with the services 
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rendered by LWP. The Bankruptcy Code concept of payment of fair consideration for 
contemporaneous services is simply irrelevant and immaterial16. 
E. THE ENTITY FOR WHICH LWP RENDERED THE SERVICES IS 
IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL TO THE FACT THAT LWP 
RECEIVED DISTRIBUTIONS FROM INSURANCE CO. AND 
MUTUAL. FURTHERMORE LWP HAS OFFERED NO 
SUBSTANTIATED EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT OF MONEY 
LWP CLAIMS IT RECEIVED. 
LWP claims that the services it rendered were not for Insurance Co. or Mutual, 
but rather the services were rendered under the NAS Agreement. That alleged fact is 
wholly irrelevant and immaterial to the fact that Insurance Co. and Mutual did in fact 
pay LWP over $6 million. Insurance Co. and Mutual paid LWP and that is the only 
operative fact that should concern this Court. It may be difficult for LWP to 
comprehend that § 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann. concerns itself with only two operative 
questions: (1) were distributions made?; and (2) were the distributions made to an 
affiliate? Anything else is irrelevant. 
The quality of the evidence presented by LWP in attempting to refute the 
Liquidator's position should also be noted. In this instance, LWP fails to attach the 
agreement pursuant to which the services were rendered. Where is the NAS agreement 
that supposedly excuses LWP's repayment of the distributions? This is symptomatic of 
the refutation posed by LWP. LWP claims that only $5 million was paid by Insurance 
Co. and Mutual. Where is the accounting for that number? How did LWP come up 
16
 In the American Western case decided by Judge Medley, the recipient of the affiliate 
payments made an argument that they should be allowed to keep that part of the 
distributions that was not "excessive". After a careful review of the statute and the 
underlying policy, Judge Medley ruled that all of the distributions must be repaid, 
regardless of whether there was any fair consideration for the payment. See Exhibit F. 
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with that number? In contrast, the Liquidator has made available to LWP a detailed 
accounting of the distributions made to LWP that is subject to verification. LWP relies 
only on the unsubstantiated assertions of John Igoe and Dennis Larson. In a similar 
fashion, LWP says that the services agreement with Insurance Co. and Mutual "were 
provided pursuant to administrative agreements standard in the industry" LWP Memo. 
at p. 6. What agreements are they referring to? Why were similar agreements not 
attached? In essence, LWP asks the Court to accept unsubstantiated statements that 
should have been included. 
F. THE DISTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED BY LWP WERE NOT 
DIVIDENDS AND THEREFORE THE TEST FOR THE RECOVERY 
OF DIVIDENDS IS IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL. 
In the final section of the LWP Memo., LWP argues that the monies received by 
LWP are not recoverable by the Liquidator because the payments were not distributions. 
Apparently relying on the faulty premise that distributions are the functional equivalent 
of dividends under § 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann., LWP says that the payments to 
LWP do not qualify as recoverable dividends because the insurer (i.e., Insurance Co. 
and Mutual) did not know that and could not reasonably have known that the 
distribution might adversely affect its solvency. Again, this is irrelevant and 
immaterial. The Liquidator has never claimed that the payments were based on stock 
ownership and therefore were dividends. LWP's argument constitutes a classic straw 
man polemic: they argue that the payments are something that they are not, and then 
proceed to knock down the straw man by showing that its status as a dividend 
disqualifies it from being recovered. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Affiliate transactions are so susceptible to manipulation and abuse that the 
Liquidator is statutorily empowered by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322 to recoup money 
paid to affiliates within five years of liquidation regardless of any defense asserted by 
the original recipient/affiliate. The Liquidator has asked this Court to enforce the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322 as written. That is, any distribution to an 
affiliate made five years before the filing of the liquidation petition must be repaid. 
The only exception to this rule is stock dividends. Distributions and dividends are not 
used interchangeably here. The legislative history indicates that the statute is 
applicable to all transactions between Group, Insurance Co., FCL, Mutual, and 
LWPCAC, not just dividends. Therefore, the payments that Insurance Co. made to 
LWPCAC for claims handling services are included in the term "distributions" and must 
be disgorged. 
By its own admission, and pursuant to the Utah Insurance Code, LWPCAC was 
an affiliate of Insurance Co. LWP admits in its rendition of the facts that LWPCAC 
was an affiliate of Group and Insurance Co. The Utah Insurance Code defines an 
affiliate as "any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under common control 
with, another person. A corporation is an affiliate of another corporation, regardless of 
ownership, if substantially the same group of natural persons manages the 
corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-l-301 (5). The Liquidator has presented 
irrefutable evidence in this memorandum that Group, Insurance Co., and LWPCAC 
were managed by "substantially the same group of natural persons." LWPCAC is, 
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therefore, an affiliate of both Group and Insurance Co. As a result, LWPCAC must 
disgorge at least $ 5,615,090, which is the amount that Insurance Co. paid to LWPCAC 
from November 1999 to May 8, 2002 for claims handling services. 
Whether the payments to LWPCAC were fair consideration for 
contemporaneously rendered services is completely irrelevant. There are no defenses to 
disgorgement by affiliates pursuant to the Utah Insurance Code, simply stated, this is 
not a bankruptcy. In addition, the entity for which LWPCAC rendered the services is 
irrelevant and immaterial to the fact that LWPCAC received distributions from 
Insurance Co. and Mutual. Furthermore, LWP has offered no substantiated evidence of 
the amount of money LWPCAC claims it received. For these and all other foregoing 
reasons, the Liquidator respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion for 
Summary Judgment and deny LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment, at least with 
respect to Insurance Co. 
DATED this day of March 2005. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
John F. Harrington 
Jennifer L. Lange 
Attorneys for the Liquidator 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the LIQUIDATOR'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO LWP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LIQUIDATOR'S 
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Edwin C. Barnes 
Charles R. Brown 
Jennifer A. James 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ORRIN T. COLBY JR. 
Case No: 030915527 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH } 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
I, Orrin T. Colby Jr., having first been duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah, am over the age of majority and am 
competent to make this affidavit. 
2. The facts set forth in this affidavit are within my personal knowledge and 
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Most of this 
information is also contained in the Board of Director's minutes, Annual Meeting 
minutes, Bylaws, and other relevant documents kept in the ordinary course of business 
related to the companies discussed below. If called to testify as a witness, I would 
competently testify as follows: 
3. Prior to 1999, and from 1999 through November 6, 2001, I was a director 
and Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Board of Wasatch Crest Group Inc. ("Group"). 
During the majority of that time, I v/as Chief Executive Officer of Group, Wasatch 
Crest Insurance Company ("Insurance Co."), First Continental Life & Accident 
Insurance Company ("FCL"), and Wasatch Crest Casualty Insurance Company 
("Casualty") (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Companies"), until Casualty 
was merged into Insurance Co. in or around December 2000. 
4. Prior to 1999, and from 1999 through July 2003, I was the Chairman of 
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company, 
("Mutual"). 
5. I was removed as Vice Chairman of the Board of Group, Insurance Co., 
and FCL, in or around November 2001. I did, however, remain as Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer of Mutual until July 2003. 
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6. From 1999 to July 2003, John A. Igoe was the Chief Operating Officer 
("COO") and President of Group. Prior to November 2001, John A. Igoe was named 
Chairman of the Board and CEO of Group. In addition, John A. Igoe was a Director of 
Insurance Co., FCL, and Casualty (until it merged into Insurance Co.). 
7. John A. Igoe personally represented to me that he and his wife, Erica 
Igoe, were the owners of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP 
Commerical") in 1999. 
8. In John A. Igoe's capacity as a member of the board of directors of Group, 
he negotiated the sale of LWP Commercial to Group. Group acquired LWP 
Commercial in October 1999, and formed a new corporate entity, LWP Claims 
Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC"). John A. Igoe has served as CEO of LWPCAC 
from November 1999 to the present, and has served as Chairman of the Board from the 
point I was relieved of that role. LWPCAC was a wholly owned subsidiary of Group 
until it was sold. It is my understanding the LWPCAC was sold to John A. and Erica 
Igoe sometime in 2002. 
9. At all times relevant hereto, Dennis T. Larson was the Chief Financial 
Officer ("CFO") of the Companies, Mutual, and LWPCAC. 
10. In my capacity as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer of the Companies and Mutual, I attended board and management 
meetings during that period with John A. Igoe and Dennis T. Larson, CFO, as well as 
other members and officers of the Companies, LWPCAC, and Mutual. 
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11. At all times between 1999 and November 2001, Group was the parent 
company of Insurance Co., FCL, Casualty (until merged), and LWPCAC. It is my 
understanding that this is also true from November 2001 to July 2003. Mutual was 
never a subsidiary of Group, in that it was a mutual company (i.e., Mutual was owned 
by the policyholders, not by shareholders); however, it was an affiliate of Group 
between 1999 and the spring of 2002. 
12. In his capacity as CEO, COO, and President of Group, and CEO of 
LWPCAC, John A. Igoe, along with Dennis T. Larson, CFO, was directly involved in 
drafting and/or administering a services agreement whereby LWPCAC provided claims 
services to the Companies and Mutual. Mssrs. Igoe and Larson had direct input into the 
scope and nature of the services that would be performed by LWPCAC, and how much 
LWPCAC would be paid for those services. 
13. From the time that LWPCAC was formed and until it was sold, LWPCAC 
was under the common control and management of Group. 
14. From January 1, 2000 through at least November 2001, the Companies had 
a common employee base, meaning that LWPCAC, Group, FCL, Insurance Co., and 
Casualty (until merged), shared the same employees and management team. It is my 
understanding that this is true through July 2003. From January 1, 2000 through the 
spring of 2002, Mutual shared employees with the Companies and LWPCAC. Group 
management, which included John A. Igoe as President, CEO, and COO, made 
management and employee decisions for Group, FCL, Insurance Co., Casualty (until 
merged), LWPCAC, and Mutual. 
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15. I observed that all of the Companies and Mutual were under common 
management and control during the periods indicated. The management, officers, and 
directors of Group controlled each of the Companies, LWPCAC and Mutual by virtue of 
their management and supervision of the employees, day-to-day business activities, and 
records keeping for each of the Companies, LWPCAC and Mutual, during the periods 
indicated, subject, where appropriate, to approval of various Boards of Directors. 
16. During the relevant time period, the Companies, LWPCAC, and Mutual 
were affiliates with one another. 
17. John A. Igoe participated in the management, policymaking, and control 
of Group, FCL, Insurance Co., Casualty, LWPCAC, and Mutual, pursuant to his 
position at Group. In fact, from 1999 through the spring of 2002, when Mutual 
withdrew from its affiliation with Group, Group guided many management decisions of 
Mutual. For example, the management of reinsurance arrangements and underwriting 
were performed under the supervision of John A. Igoe. Similarly, the administration of 
claims was supervised by John A. Igoe by means of his affiliated corporation, 
LWPCAC. In addition, Dennis T. Larson, the Chief Financial Officer, and other 
employees performing functions for Mutual reported to John A. Igoe. 
18. During the relevant time period, the Companies, LWPCAC, and Mutual 
were managed and controlled by substantially the same Group of persons, that is, John 
A. Igoe, Dennis T. Larson, myself, Judy Adlam, Lewis T. Stevens, William J. Worsley 
5 
and members of the Board including Richard A. Veed, Mark Finkelstein, and Verl R. 
Topham. 
DATED this / ^ f ^ T a y of March 2005. 
Orrin T./Colb 
SUBSCRIBED, ACKNOWLEDGED, AND SWORN TO before me this l & 
day of March 2005. 
SONJA H. BURDASH 
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE Of HTM 
CO EAST SOUTH TQIPIE SUITE 2D00' 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 64111 
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Prefatory Comment 
There is room for argument about the extent to which insurance regulators 
should be seriously concerned about the process of acquisition of insurers, 
i.e./ the formation of an insurance holding company system. That question has 
been resolved here by basically following former law, which was based on the 
NAIC Model Act. 
There is no room for argument, however, that after formation of a holding 
company system there must be serious concern with mtergroup transactions. 
They are subject to abuse involving vast sums of money, the inproper transfer 
of which can endanger policyholder and public interests. This chapter carries 
concern for such transactions a step farther than does the Model Act or 
previous law. See section 96-17-6.5. 
The Model Act (the former Utah law) has been criticized as excessively 
cumbersome and as requiring unnecessary information. In the course of 
preparing this draft, a number of files were examined where there had been 
acquisitions under the act. No evidence of excessive burdensomeness was founa 
in the files examined. The transaction is one of great consequence, and it 
should be expected that the acquiring company would have to spend both time 
and money making its plans and then making the case for allowing the 
transaction. Without extensive information, the commissioner would have to 
give approval in the aark. 
The draft gives great flexibility to the conmissioner in deciding what 
information to ask for and what acquisitions to monitor closely. 
The existing holding company statutes have been brought into some question 
by the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 
S.Ct. 2629 (1982) holding the general Illinois corporate takeover statute 
unconstitutional. An effort has been made in drafting this chapter to avoia 
the pitfalls exposed by that case. For example, it is no part of the purpose 
of this chapter to give existing management an advantage in the takeover 
attempt. Nor does the chapter seek to protect all shareholaers but only, or 
at least primarily, Utah shareholaers. In the process others may get some 
protection too. In these respects, this chapter is consistent with the 
purposes of the Williams Act, as aescribea in Eagar v. Mite Corp. , Id. 
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2635-40. It is believed that the chapter is not invalid as the Illinois 
Takeover Act was held to be in that case. It is neither an excessive burden 
on commerce nor inconsistent with the objectives of the Williams Act. 
96-17-1. Scope and purposes. 
(1) Scope. (a) Unless specifically exempted under subsection (b), this 
chapter applies to all entities doing an insurance business (as defined in 
subsection 96-1-3(24a) in Utah. 
(b) (i) The commissioner may exempt any class of insurers from any 
provisions of this chapter, when he deems the exemption consistent with the 
purposes of this chapter and in the public interest. 
(ii) On request of the person required to supply information or perform 
an act, the commissioner may exempt that person from any provisions of this 
chapter when he deems the exception consistent with the purposes of this 
chapter and in the public interest. 
(2) The purposes of this chapter include: 
(a) To exercise surveillance over the acquisition of a domestic insurer, 
to ensure that in the process of making it part of an insurance holding 
company system the interests of policyholders, Utah shareholders and the 
public are not harmed. 
(b) To provide special protection for the policyholders of a life 
insurance company that is acquired by another person. 
(c) To provide for the regulatory monitoring of those intercorporate 
relationships and transactions among affiliates within an insurance holding 
company system tnat may affect the solidity of insurers. 
(d) To control the payment of dividends that might affect the solidity of 
insurers. 
(e) To provide in appropriate cases for recoupment of diviaends paid. 
Comment 
The power to grant exemptions 'under subsection (1) i s a necessary 
corollary of the broadly s ta ted requirements of this chapter . If the 
commissioner has unusual powers to acquire information, he should have 
adequate power to waive the requirements when he does not need the 
information. The usual procedure for establishing an exemption would be a 
rule, though an individual insurer or group of insurers could be exempted by 
an order. The exemption can be terminated in the same way i t i s created. 
Subsection (2) is new. I t is useful to have a statement of purposes to 
help in the interpretat ion of the chapter. 
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96-17-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Security holder" means the holder of any security, including common 
or preferred stock, debt obligations, and any other instrument convertible 
into or evidencing the right to acquire any of the foregoing. 
(2) "Voting security" includes any security convertible into or 
evidencing a right to acquire a voting security. 
(3) "Person" does not include a securities broker performing only the 
usual and customary broker's function. 
(4) "Insurer" does not include an unauthorized insurer. 
Comment 
Most terms that need to be defined are aefined for other purposes as 
well. They are in section 96-1-3. These definitions come from former 
subsections 31-39-1(4) , (5), (7) and (8). 
96-17-3. Acquisition of control of or merger with domestic insurer. 
(1) Filing requirements. (a) No person other than the issuer may in any 
manner acquire or seek to acquire any voting security of a domestic insurer 
if, after consummation, the person would, directly or indirectly, or could by 
exercise of any right, be in control of the insurer, without first filing witn 
the commissioner a statement containing the information required by this 
section. 
(b) No person may enter into an agreement to merge with or otherwise to 
acquire control of a domestic insurer without first filing with the 
commissioner a statement containing the information required by this section. 
(c) Unless a domestic insurer is acting under authority of another 
provision of the insurance code or an order of the commissioner, it may not 
acquire or seek to acquire any of its own voting securities without first 
filing with the commissioner a statement containing such portion of the 
information required by this section as the commissioner may request. 
(d) The transactions or activities described in subsections (1) (a) , (b) 
or (c) may not be consummated unless approved by the commissioner in the 
manner prescribed m suosection (5) of this section. 
(e) At the time the statement is filea witn the commissioner under 
suosection (1)(a) or (D ) , the person snail file tne statement also witn t. e 
insurer. The insurer shall senG an informative ana accurate summary of tne 
statement, or tne statement filed under subsection (1) (c) of tnis section, to 
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its shareholders within five business days, with information about how a 
shareholder may obtain a copy of the full statement at his o\/n expense. 
(f) The distribution of the summary under subsection (1) (d) shall be at 
the expense of the person making the statement. To secure the payment, that 
person shall file with the commissioner an acceptable bond or deposit in an 
amount the commissioner aetermines. 
(g) For purposes of this section, a domestic insurer includes any other 
person controlling a domestic insurer unless that other person is either 
directly or through its affiliates primarily engaged m business other than 
the business of insurance. 
(2) Content of statement. The statement under subsection (1) of this 
section shall be made under oath and shall contain the following information: 
(a) If any rule or order under section 96-17-2.5 is relied on, the full 
text of the rule or order. 
(b) The name and address of each person by whom or on whose behalf the 
merger or other acquisition of control is to be effected ("acquiring party"), 
and 
(l) If a natural person, his principal occupation and all offices and 
positions held during the past five years, and any conviction of crimes other 
than minor traffic violations during the past ten years; 
(n) If not a natural person, the nature of its business operations 
during the past five years or for such lesser period as it and its 
predecessors have been in existence; an informative description of the 
business it and its affiliates intend to do and a list of all its and its 
affiliates' directors or executive officers and those who perforin functions 
appropriate to such positions. 
(in) For each such additional natural person the information required by 
subsection (2)(b)(l) of this section. 
(c) The source, nature and amount of the consiaeration to be used in 
effecting the merger or other acquisition of control, a description of any 
transaction for obtaining such funds, and the identity of persons furnismng 
the funds. Where the source is a loan maae in tne lender's ordinary course of 
ousmess, tne identity of the lencer may, at the commissioner's discretion, 
remain confidential on request of the person filing tne statement. 
(a) Fully aucited financial Jnformation as ro tne earnings arc financial 
condition of eacn acquiring party for the preceding five fiscal ^ears (or for 
^nj-) 
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such lesser period as an acquiring party and its preoecessors have been in 
existence) , and similar unaudited information as of a date not earlier than 90 
days prior to the filing of the statement. 
(e) Any plans each acquiring party or those wno control it may nave to 
liquidate the insurer, to sell its assets or merge or consolidate it with any 
person, or to make any other material change in its business or corporate 
structure or management. 
(f) The number of shares of any security referred to in subsection (1) 
which each acquiring party proposes to acquire, and the terms of the 
acquisition. 
(g) The amount of each class of any security referred to in suosection 
(1) which each acquiring party beneficially owns or of which he has a right to 
acquire beneficial ownership. 
(h) A full description of any arrangements in which any acquiring party 
is involved with respect to any security referred to in subsection (1) of this 
section, including the identity of the persons with whom they were entered 
into. 
(I) A description of each purchase oy any acquiring party of any security 
referred to in subsection (1) during the twelve calendar months preceding tne 
filing, including the dates of purchase, names of the purchasers, and the 
consideration. 
(j) A description of any recommendations to purchase any security 
referred to in subsection (1) made during the twelve calendar months preceding 
the tiling of the statement, by any acquiring party, or by anyone based upon 
interviews or at the suggestion of any acquiring party. 
(k) Copies of all offers and agreements to acquire or exchange any 
securities referred to in subsection (1) of this section and, if distributed, 
of soliciting material used. 
(1) The terms of any agreement, contract or understanding with any 
broker-dealer as to solicitation of securities referred to in subsection (1) , 
and the amount of compensation to be paid to such broker-dealers . 
(m) Sucn additional information as the commissioner prescribes by rule as 
necessary or appropriate for the protection of policyholders and Utah security 
holders of tne insurer and of tne public interest. 
(3) Supplements to information required. (a) If the person required to 
file tne statement under subsection (1) is a partnersnip, limitec partnership, 
syndicate or other group, the commissioner may require that tne information 
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called for by subsection (2) be given for each partner, each member of a 
syndicate or group, and each person who controls a partner or member. If any 
person required to file is a corporation , the commissioner may require that 
the information be given for tne corporation, each officer and director of tne 
corporation, and each person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial 
owner of more than ten percent of the outstanding voting securities of the 
corporation. 
(b) If any material change occurs in the facts filed under this section, 
an amendment setting forth the change1, together with copies of all documents 
and other material relevant to tne change, shall be filed with the 
commissioner and sent to the insurer within two business days after the person 
learns of the change. The insurer shall send the amendment to its 
shareholders promptly. 
(4) Alternative filing materials. If any transaction under subsection 
(1) is proposed to be made pursuant to federal law or another state !s law 
requiring the disclosure of similar information, the person required to file 
may use such documents in making the filing. 
(5) Approval by commissioner. The commissioner shall approve any merger 
or other acquisition of control referred to in subsection (1) unless, after a 
hearing, he finds that: 
(a) After the change of contro] , the domestic insurer wculd not satisfy 
the requirements for the certificate of authority it then has; or 
(b) The merger or other acquisition of control would substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in insurance in Utah; or 
(c) The financial condition of any acquiring party might jeopardize tne 
financial stability of the insurer, or prejudice the interest of its 
policyholders or the interests of any Utah security holders who are 
unaffiliated with the acquiring party; or 
(d) The terms of tne transaction are unfair ana treasonable to Utah 
security holders; or 
(e) The plans the acquiring party has to liquidate tne insurer, sell its 
assets or consolidate or merge it *ath any person, or to make any otner 
material cnange in its business or corporate structure or management, are 
unfair and unreasonanle to policyholders of tne insurer and net in the public 
interest:; or 
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(f) The competence, experience and integrity of those persons who would 
control the insurer are such that it would not be in the interest of 
policyholders of the insurer and of the public to permit the merger or other 
acquisition of control. 
(6) Hearing. The hearing required under subsection (5) shall begin 
within twenty-five days and be closed within thirty-five days after the 
filing. The commissioner shall give at least fifteen days' notice thereof to 
the filer and to the insurer. The filer shall give at least seven days notice 
of the hearing to any persons aesignated by the commissioner at the time he 
gives notice to the filer. The insurer shall give notice to its security 
holders promptly on receipt of the notice. The commissioner shall make a 
final determination within twenty days after the conclusion of the hearing. 
Subject to reasonable limitations and restrictions the commissioner imposes to 
keep the proceedings manageable and to prevent shareholders from using the 
proceedings to gain leverage in negotiations for the sale of their shares, the 
filer, the insurer, persons to whom notice of hearing was sent, and any other 
person whose interests may be affected may on written request be given the 
right to present evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and offer oral 
and written arguments and conduct discovery proceedings. All discovery 
proceedings shall be concluded not later than three days prior to the 
commencement of the hearing. If the commissioner denies the right: to 
participate in the hearing, he shall state reasons in reasonable detail. 
(7) Violations. It is a violation of this section: 
(a) To fail to file any statement required to be filed under it; or 
(b) To attempt to effectuate an acquisition of control of, or merger 
with, a domestic insurer without the commissioner's approval under this 
section. 
(8) Jurisdiction. The district court for Salt Lake County has 
jurisdiction over every person not resident, domiciled, or authorized to do 
business in Utah who files or is obligated to file a statement with the 
commissioner under this section, and over all actions involving the person 
arising out of actions under or violations of this section. Each person is 
deemed to have appointed the commissioner his attorney upon whom may be served 
all lawful process under sections 96-2-44 and 96-2-45 in any such action. 
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Comment 
This section continues, with considerable editorial and substantive 
change, former section 31-39-2, which was almost identical with Model Act 
section 3. The section places a substantial procedural nurale before persons 
seeking to acquire control of a domestic insurer. Because the hurdle is one 
requiring considerable effort to surTOunt, it gives tne Utah commissioner 
meaningful control over the concentration of business in the state and over 
the character and financial backing of those who control domestic insurers. 
The provision is complex but seems sound, especially when coupled with the 
power in section 96-17-2.5 to waive requirements tnat m a particular 
situation serve no purpose justifying tneir cost. 
The recent case of Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982) suggests 
there may be some danger of invalidation of the law on commerce clause grounds 
(or possibly because of conflict with the Williams Act) if the procedure goes 
too far in protecting management against takeovers, or non-Utah security 
holders against imposition, or conf] icts with federal procedures that might be 
applicable. The section has been considerably changed to try to establish a 
better balance between management and the acquiring persons that will not 
render the process vulnerable. Suggestions for further improvement are 
especially welcome. 
Subsection (1) (f) provides for tne expenses of mailing. They may be very 
burdensome and not very productive. Should the commissioner be given 
substantial discretion to give notice by publication to reduce cost? 
Subsection (1) (g) is not found in the former Utah act but is in tne Model 
Act. It is inserted here for consideration of the commission. It raises 
difficult questions, for in some hypothetical (but possible) situations it 
could compel the disclosure of an almost infinite amount of information. 
Suppose, for example, that a domestic Utah insurer were controlled by anotner 
insurer (a nondomestic one) wnich in turn was controlled by another and so on 
for several levels, finally ending up with a major national insurer like 
Hartford Fire or Travelers. Presumably this provision could be interpreted as 
requiring the information specified in the section and the involvement in tne 
procedure of all tne corporations back to the Hartford Fire in the one case 
(thougn not I.T. & T. because it and its affiliates are primarily engaged in 
other businesses than insurance) , and back to Travelers Corporation in the 
other. The question to be considered here is whether it is useful for the 
statute to reach so far. If not, wnat should the limits oe? 
Under subsection (6) , the hearing rules of the department should be 
followed if they are reasonably suitable. The standing provision in this 
subsection is very generous and in some conceivable situations the hearing 
might collapse of its own weight. It could be almost as complicated as the 
IBM antitrust case of recent notoriety. The version presented here gives the 
commissioner power to confine the hearing somewhat but there is a question 
whether the statute should not confine standing much more ana also explicitly 
restrict the rights of interested persons to be involved m the actual 
proceedings m the hearing. 
Subsection (9), dealing with jurisdiction, is shortened by reference to 
general provisions in the insurance code. 
96-17-d. Acquisition of aomestic life insurer. 
(1) Trust agreement. Before an acquisition or merger of a Gcrrestic l±fe 
insurer is approved oy tne commissioner, the commissioner snail require the 
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acquiring person or surviving company to execute a written trust agreement 
acceptaole to the commissioner unaer which assets approved by the commissioner 
in an amount equal to the total policyholder liabilities of the insurer m 
Utah, immediately preceding acquisition or merger, are maintained in trust for 
the exclusive benefit of those policyholders. No reinsurance agreement 
covering such liabilities may affect the trust assets without the prior 
approval of the commissioner. 
(2) Other applicable provisions. The trust assets are subject to 
chapters 96-20 and 96-23. 
(3) Deposit provisions. Section 96-2-27.5 does not apply. 
Comment 
This provision is not in the Model Act but is in former section 
31-39-2.5. It was added to tne law in 1977. It eliminates a good deal of 
guessing about whether the acquirer of a life insurer will be aole to perform 
the assumed obligations. Subsection 96-17-4(2) is completely changed, however. 
96-17-5. Registration of insurers. 
(1) Registration. (a) Except under subsection (1) (b) of this section, 
every insurer authorized to do business in Utah wmch is a member of an 
insurance holding company system as defined in subsection 96-1-3 (24b) shall 
register with the commissioner withm fifteen days after it becomes subject to 
registration unless the commissioner for good cause shown extenas tne time for 
registration, and then within the extended time. 
(b) Subsection (1)(a) of this section aoes not apply to a foreign insurer 
subject to disclosure requirements and standards in the jurisdiction ot its 
domicile which are substantially similar to those contained in tnis section. 
The commissioner may require such an insurer to furnish a copy of the 
registration statement or otner information filea with the insurance 
regulatory authority of the domicile. 
(2) Information and form required. The registration statement shall be 
on a form prescribed by the commissioner, wnich shall contain current 
information about: 
(a) The capital structure, general financial condition, ownership and 
management of the insurer and any person controlling the insurer. 
(o) The identity, nome office aadress and telepnone numDer of everv 
memoer of the insurance holding company system. 
(c) The following agreements m force, relationsmps sucsisting, ara 
transactions currently outstanding between tne insurer ana all its affiliates: 
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(l) Loans, other investments, or purchases, sales or exchanges of 
securities of the affiliates by the msurer or of the insurer by its 
affiliates; 
(n) Purchases, sales or exchange of assets; 
( m ) Transactions not in the ordinary course of business; 
(iv) Guarantees or undertakings for the benefit of an affiliate whicn 
result in contingent exposure of the insurer's assets to liability, other than 
insurance contracts entered into in the ordinary course of the insurer's 
business; 
(v) All management and service contracts and all cost-snaring 
arrangements other than cost allocation arrangements based upon generally 
accepted accounting principles; and 
(vi) Reinsurance agreements covering all or substantially all of one or 
more lines of insurance of the ceding company. 
(d) Classes of reinsurance transactions specified by the commissioner by 
rule. 
(e) Other transactions between registered insurers and any affiliates 
that may be included from tune to tune in registration forms adopted or 
approved by the commissioner. 
(3) Materiality. No information need be disclosed on the registration 
statement if it is not material for the purposes of this section. Unless the 
commissioner by rule or order provides otherwise, sales, purchases, exchanges, 
loans or extensions of credit, or investments, involving one-half of 1% or 
less of an insurer's admitted assets as of the 31st day of December next 
preceding are not deemed material for purposes of this section. 
(4) Amendments to registration statements. Each registered insurer snail 
keep current the information m its registration statement by reporting on 
forms provided by the commissioner all material changes or additions within 
fifteen days after the end of the month in wmch it learns of eacn change or 
addition. 
(5) Termination of registration. The commissioner shall terminate the 
registration of any insurer that demonstrates it is no longer a member of an 
insurance holding company system. 
(6) Consolidated filing. The commissioner may require or allow two or 
more affiliated insurers to file a consolidated registration statement or 
consolidated amendment reports. 
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(7) Disclaimer. Any person may file with the commissioner a disclaimer 
of affiliation with any other person, fully disclosing all material 
relationships and bases for affiliation between the two and the basis for 
disclaiming affiliation. After the filing of the disclaimer, the duty to 
register or report under this section arising out of the relationship is in 
abeyance until the commissioner disallows the disclaimer. The commissioner 
may disallow the disclaimer only after a hearing under section 96-2-36. 
Comment 
This section contains most of former section 31-39-3, which was based on 
Model Act section 4. 
Aside from editorial changes, there are a few substantive changes. In 
subsection (2)(d) reinsurance of classes designated by the commissioner is 
included as a kind of transaction to be reported. Reinsurance arrangements 
are easily subject to abuse, especially within a corporate family. 
Subsections (7) and (10) of the former statute are omitted as unnecessary. 
96-17-6. Standards. 
(1) Transactions with affiliates. Material transactions by registered 
insurers with their affiliates are subject to the following standards: 
(a) The terms shall be fair and reasonable. 
(b) The books, accounts and records of each party shall be so maintained 
as to disclose clearly and accurately the precise nature and details of the 
transactions. 
(c) The insurer's capital and surplus following any dividends or 
distributions to shareholder affiliates shall continue to be adequate for its 
financial needs. For purposes of this section, in determining whether an 
insurer's capital and surplus are adequate for its financial needs, section 
96-23-11 shall guide the determinations. 
(2) Dividends and other distributions. (a) No insurer subject to 
registration may pay an extraordinary dividend or make any other extraorainary 
distribution to its shareholders until either thirty days after the 
commissioner has received notice of the declaration thereof and has not 
disapproved the payment or the commissioner has approved it. 
(b) For purposes of this section, an extraordinary dividend or 
distribution includes any dividend or distribution of cash or other property, 
whose fair market value together with that of other dividends or 
distributions, excluding pro rata distributions of any class of the insurer's 
own securities, made within the preceding twelve months exceeds the areater of: 
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(i) Ten percent of the insurer's capital and surplus as of the 
thirty-first day of December next preceding, or 
(ii) If the insurer is a life insurer, the net gain from operations or if 
the insurer is not a life insurer, Lhe net income on investment and operations 
combined for the twelve month period ending the thirty-first day of the 
preceding December. 
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an insurer may declare an 
extraordinary dividend or distribution conditioned upon the commissioner's 
approval. The declaration confers no rights on shareholders until the 
commissioner has approved the payment or has not disapproved it within the 
thirty day period under subsection (3) (a) of this section. 
Comment 
This section continues former section 31-39-4, which was based upon Model 
Act section 5. 
The standards for adequacy of capital and surplus are the same as those 
for compulsory surplus under section 96-23-11, which is incorporated by 
reference. 
The permissible maximum non-extraordinary dividend for nonlife companies 
of the net investment income, the standard of former subsection 31-39-4(3), is 
no longer realistic in a period when very large investment income has to 
balance out an underwriting loss of large dimensions. Payment of the net 
investment income in some recent years would (for the whole industry) have 
amounted to close to 20% of capital and surplus; for some individual insurers 
it would undoubtedly have amounted to substantially more. Such a dividend 
would be extraordinary. The maximum has therefore been changed to the net 
combined income from operations and investment. Even that would be a very 
large sum in some years, but it would be much less likely to strip insurers of 
needed capital and surplus for at least it would leave the insurer in 
approximately the same position (apart from inflation) it occupied in the 
prior year. That provides no room for growth unless the insurer was 
overcapitalized, which may sometimes be the case. 
96-17-6.5. Liability of affiliates. 
(1) Right of receiver to recover dividends paid. If an order for the 
liquidation, rehabilitation or conservation of an insurer authorized to do 
business in Utah is entered under chapter 96-45, the receiver has a right to 
recover on behalf of the insurer the amount of distributions other than stock 
dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock at any time during the five 
years preceding the petition for liquidation, rehabilitation or conservation, 
subject to the limitations of subsections (2) to (4). 
(2) Dividend payments recoverable. No dividend is recoverable if the 
recipient shows that when paid the distribution was lawful and reasonable, and 
that the insurer did not know and could not reasonably have known that the 
distribution might adversely affect its solvency.
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(3) Persons liable. (a) Affiliates at time of payment. Any person who 
was an affiliate of the insurer at the time the distributions were paid is 
liable up to the amount of distributions received. 
(b) Affiliates at time of declaration of distribution. Any person who 
was an affiliate of the insurer at the time the distributions were declared is 
liable up to the amount of distributions it would have received if it had been 
paid. 
(c) Joint and several liability. If under subsections (3) (a) and (b) two 
persons are liable with respect to the same distributions they are jointly and 
severally liable. 
(4) Aggregate limitation. The maximum amount recoverable under this 
section is the amount needed in excess of all other available assets to pay 
all claims under the receivership, less for each recipient any amount that 
recipient has already paid to receivers under similar laws of other states. 
(5) Secondary liability. If any person liable under subsection (3) is 
insolvent, all its affiliates that controlled it at the time the dividend was 
declared or paid are jointly and severally liable for any resulting deficiency 
in the amount recovered from the insolvent affiliate. 
Comment 
Under certain circumstances, one purpose of creating an insurance holding 
coirpany system, especially on the part of a nomnsurer which acquired an 
insurer, was to 'liberate' excess surplus from a cash-rich company. There are 
undoubtedly some circumstances in which insurers, especially nonlife insurers, 
are overcapitalized and excess surplus can safely be withdrawn from them. 
Were it not for the income tax consequences, the excess should be paid out as 
dividends to shareholders, who could then reinvest as they saw fit. But 
income tax liability leads to an effort to find a productive outlet for the 
use of the capital with minimum income tax consequences. Payment to a parent 
is one route to such reapplication of the capital. 
This section seeks to cure any error of judgment or any venality in 
deciding how much surplus can safely be withdrawn from a subsidiary insurer if 
the amount withdrawn helps lead to insolvency within a few years. It is 
modeled after Wisconsin section 617.23. Section 96-45-55 is its necessary 
correlate. Ihe nature of the problem is illustrated by an incident m early 
1969. 
After being acquired by a nonmsurance holding company, the Great American 
Insurance Company, then of New York but now of Ohio, which was then and is now 
authorized to do business in Utah, and which had a surplus of over $300 
million at year-end 1968, voted a dividend of over $171 million payaole to its 
parent holding company. [At year-end 1980, it had surplus of about $385 
million]. 
Immediately after declaration of the dividend, the New York insurance 
department launcned an investigation to determine wnat effect so large a 
dividend would have on tne financial condition of tne company and on the 
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amounts of insurance it would safely be able to write in the future. The New 
York Department noted that it did not have authority to disapprove even such a 
large dividend. Although the dividend may not have endangered the solidity of 
the particular company at all, the fact that such a payment could be made in 
the way it was made and without regulatory surveillance even in the 
domiciliary state raised issues far transcending the individual case and its 
individual merits. It urgently called for the commissioner to have an 
opportunity to consider whether the insurer's solidity is endangered. Model 
legislation was developed by the NAIC and was widely adopted. 
There are other potential abuses, beside excessive dividends, in the 
holding company development. They include all of the devices for "milking" 
that have been ingeniously exploited in other contexts. They encompass the 
full range of less than arm's-length transactions that benefit affiliates at 
the expense of the insurer. They permit evasions of insurance laws and 
regulations by a parent holding company through payments to insurance agents 
and employees, for example, that could not be done by an insurance company 
alone. 
The statutory provision proposed here is designed to give the commissioner 
power to recoup the loss resulting from such abuses in at least some cases. 
Conment on Cfrnitted Section 
Former section 31-39-5 (based on Model Act section 5) is not continued in 
this chapter. All the powers it gives the commissioner are already 
incorporated in sections 96-2-25, 96-2-26 and 96-2-27. 
96-17-7. Confidential Treatment. 
All information, documents and copies thereof obtained by or disclosed to 
the commissioner or any other person in the course of an examination or 
investigation made under subsection 96-2-25(1)(b) and all information reported 
under sections 96-17-3 and 96-17-5 are confidential under subsection 
96-2-28(6) , are not subject to subpoena and may not be made public by the 
commissioner or any other person, except to insurance departments of other 
states, without the prior written consent of the insurer or the particular 
affiliate to which it pertains except that if the commissioner, after a 
hearing, determines that the interests of policyholders, Utah shareholders or 
the public will be served by the publication of the information he may publish 
all or any part thereof in a manner he deems appropriate. 
Comment 
This section continues former section 31-39-6, which was based on Mcdel 
Act section 7. 
Comment on Omission 
Former section 31-39-7 is omitted as unnecessary. 
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96-17-9- Renedies . 
(1) Voting of securities. No security which is the subject of any 
agreement or arrangement regarding acquisition or which is acquired or to be 
acquired in contravention of this chapter or of any rule or order issued 
hereunder, may be voted or counted for quorum purposes at any shareholders' 
meeting. Any action of shareholders requiring the affirmative vote of a 
specified percentage of shares may be taken as though such securities were not 
issued and outstanding. No action taken at any such meeting is invalidated by 
the voting of the securities unless the action would materially affect control 
of the insurer or unless a Utah court has so ordered. 
(2) Injunctions. If an insurer or the commissioner has reason to believe 
that any security of the insurer has been or is about to be acquired in 
violation of this chapter or of any rule or order issued nereunder, either may 
apply to the district court for Salt Lake County or for the county in which 
the insurer has its principal place of business to enjoin the transactions or 
the voting of any security so acquired, to void any vote of the security 
already cast, and for such other equitable relief as the nature of the case 
and the interests of the insurer's policyholders, creditors, Utah shareholders 
or the public may require. 
(3) Sequestration of voting securities. In any case where a person has 
acquired or is proposing to acquire any voting securities in violation of this 
chapter or any rule or order issued hereunder, the district court for Salt 
Lake County or for the county in which the insurer has its principal place of 
business may, upon the application of the insurer or the commissioner and on 
such notice as the court deems appropriate, seize or sequester any voting 
securities of the insurer owned directly or indirectly by such person, and 
issue such orders as may be appropriate to effectuate the provisions of this 
chapter. 
(4) Situs of ownership. For the purposes of this chapter, the situs of 
the ownership of the securities of domestic insurers is deemed to be in Utah. 
Comment 
This section continues former subsections 31-39-8(2) and (3), wnich were 
based on Model Act section 8. Subsection (1) is omit tea as unnecessary. 
Comment on emitted Sections 
Former sections 31-39-9, 31-39-10, 31-39-11, 31-39-12 ana 31-39-13 are 
omitted because tney have alreaay been dealt witn adequately elsewnere in tne 
insurance code. 
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Insurance Company, in Liquidation and 
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Plaintiffs, 
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RUETENIK WOLF, individually; LISA A. 
WOLFKLAIN, individually; LOGAN A. 
WOLF, individually; LELAND A. WOLF 
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LOUISE WOLF, a/k/a LOUISE WOLF 
HANSEN, individually; KEITH HANSEN, 
individually; MATTHEW WOLFKLAIN, 
individually; CINDY M. WOLF, 
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AWL INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., a 
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SERVICES, INC., a California corporation; 
HEALTH RELIANCE, INC., a Delaware 
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REVISED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
REGARDING LIQUIDATOR'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION AND AFFIDAVIT OF 
LELAND A. WOLF 
Case No. 980905251 MI 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
corporation; THE WELLNESS HEALTH 
PLAN PROVIDER GROUP, a Nevada 
corporation; WOLFPACK INSURANCE 
SERVICES, INC., a California corporation; 
WOLF/NET, INC., a California corporation, 
Defendants. 
LELAND A. WOLF; SALLY RUETENIK 
WOLF; LOGAN A. WOLF; LOUIS WOLF 
HANSEN; LELAND A. WOLF 
ASSOCIATES, INC.; HEALTH RELIANCE, 
INC.; and THE WELLNESS HEALTH PLAN 
PROVIDER GROUP, INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
V. 
MICHAEL WHEELER and BRUCE 
NORIEGA, j 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Plaintiffs American Western Life Insurance Company, In Liquidation and Merwin U. 
Stewart, the Court-appointed liquidator ("Liquidator") filed the Liquidator's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on or about August 19, 2002. The following pleadings were filed and 
considered by the Court in conjunction with the Liquidator's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment: 
a. Liquidator's Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment dated August 16, 2002. 
b. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated September 13, 2002. 
c. Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated September 11, 2002. 
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d. Liquidator's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment dated December 16, 2002. 
e. Correction to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated December 16, 2002. 
f. Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated January 13, 2003. 
g. Liquidator's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Liquidator's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment dated January 21, 2003. 
Upon receipt of Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated September 13, 2002 and the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated 
September 11, 2002, the Liquidator filed his Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition and Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated October 8, 2002. The following pleadings 
were filed and considered by the Court in conjunction with the Liquidator's Motion to Strike 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition and Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf: 
a. Liquidator's Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition and 
Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated October 8, 2002. 
b. Liquidator's Memorandum in Support of Liquidator's Motion to Strike 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition and Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated October 8, 
2002. 
c. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike Affidavit of Leland 
A. Wolf dated October 18, 2002. 
d. Defendants' Statement of Disputed Material Facts dated October 18, 2002. 
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e. Defendants' Summary of the Deposition Testimony of Bruce Noriega dated 
October 18, 2002. 
f. Defendants' Summary of the Deposition Testimony of Michael Wheeler dated 
October 18, 2002. 
g. Liquidator's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Leland A. Wolf dated December 16, 2002. 
h. Liquidator's Reply Memorandum in Support of Objections to Affidavit of Leland 
A. Wolf dated December 16, 2002. 
Oral arguments on the issues raised by the above referenced pleadings were heard by the 
Court on January 6, 2003. Plaintiffs American Western Life Insurance Company, in Liquidation, 
and Merwin U. Stewart, in his capacity as the Liquidator appointed by this Court were 
represented by John P. Harrington and Kristine M. Larsen of Ray, Quianey & Nebeker and J. 
Ray Barrios, Jr., General Counsel of the Liquidation Office. Defendants Leland A. Wolf, Sally 
R. Wolf, Lisa A. Wolfklain, Logan A. Wolf, Leland A. Wolf & Associates, Inc., Louise Wolf 
Keith Hansen, Matthew Wolfklain, Cindy M. Wolf, Western Health Network, Inc, AWL 
Insurance Services, Inc., AWL Financial Services, Inc., Health Reliance, Inc., The Wellness 
Health Plan Provider Group, Wolfpack Insurance Services, Inc., and Wolf/Net, Inc. (collectively 
referred to as the "Wolf Family Defendants") were represented by Edward W. McBride, Jr. 
Third-party Defendant Michael C. Wheeler was represented by Darren K Nelson of Parr, 
Waddoups, Brown Gee & Loveless. Third-party Defendant Bruce Noriega was represented by 
D. Jason Hawkins of Snow Christensen & Martineau. At the conclusion of the hearing on 
January 6, 2003, the Court requested the supplemental briefs cited above. The decision of the 
Court was announced in open court on January 29, 2003. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. American Western Life Insurance Company ("AWLIC") was an insurance 
company organized under the laws of the State of Utah. On or about November 30, 1985, 
Leland A. Wolf & Associates, Inc., a California corporation ("LAWA") purchased AWLIC. 
Through subsequent reorganizations, LAWA's ownership of AWLIC was converted to Class A 
preferred AWLIC stock. Leland A. Wolf and Sally R Wolf, as joint tenants with rights of 
survivorship, own 70.76% of the issued and outstanding common shares of AWLIC. Leland A. 
Wolf, as an individual, owns 19.88% of the issued and outstanding common shares of AWLIC. 
The remaining 9.35% of AWLIC shares were gifted in December of 1995 by Leland A. Wolf 
and Sally R. Wolf to each of their children and their respective spouses. See Form B dated 
April 21, 1994, Annual Supplement to Insurance Holding Company System Registration 
Statement filed with the Insurance Department of the State of Utah and personally signed by 
Leland A. Wolf, an individual and the Ultimate Controlling Person of AWLIC ("Form B"). 
2. Leland A. Wolf, as an individual, owns 37.2% of LAWA and Sally R. Wolf, wife 
of Leland A. Wolf, owns 37.2% of LAWA. See Form B, Item 2(b)(1). The remaining 
shareholders of LAWA are Wolf family members. 
3. Leland A. Wolf and Sally R. Wolf have been directors and officers of AWLIC 
since the purchase of AWLIC by LAWA on November 30, 1985. The first pages of the Annual 
Statements of AWLIC to the Utah Department of Insurance for the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 
1995, and 1996 indicate that Leland A. Wolf and Sally R. Wolf were officers and directors of 
AWLIC. In addition, the first pages of the Quarterly Statement of AWLIC for the quarter ending 
March 31, 1997 and June 30, 1997 indicate that Leland A. Wolf and Sally R. Wolf were officers 
and directors until the entry of the Liquidation Order on August 28, 1997. 
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Rental Agreement 
4. Effective February 1, 1992, AWLIC entered into a Rental Agreement with 
LAWA wherein AWLIC agreed to rent from LAWA "office furniture, fixtures, equipment, 
computer components and software systems designed to administer health care plans" (defined in 
the Rental Agreement as "Equipment") for a monthly rental fee. 
5. Pursuant to Exhibit B of the Rental Agreement, AWLIC was obligated to pay a 
monthly fee of $55,000 to LAWA. The monthly fee was determined exclusively by Leland A. 
Wolf. No independent, competitive evaluation of the $55,000 monthly rental fee was obtained. 
6. At the time the Rental Agreement was entered into, a contemporaneous inventory 
of Equipment being rented by AWLIC was not established nor maintained by either AWLIC or 
LAWA. Neither AWLIC nor LAWA ever had supporting written documentation or a listing of 
the precise Equipment that was subject to the Rental Agreement. Without knowing the precise 
quantity and quality of the Equipment being rented, it is impossible to determine a fair or 
reasonable monthly rental fee. 
7. The Rental Agreement appears to have been approved by the AWLIC Board of 
Directors as reflected in the Minutes of the Board of Directors dated January 9, 1992. However, 
the AWLIC Board of Directors never actually met at any time. Mr. Bruce Noriega, President of 
AWLIC, specifically states that the Board of Directors' meeting of January 9, 1992 never took 
place. The minutes of the Board of Directors were created to satisfy the requirements of the 
Utah Department of Insurance ("Utah DOI") and falsely represented that an actual meeting 
occurred. 
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8. No notice or report, either oral or written, of the AWLIC Board of Directors' 
approval of the Rental Agreement was given to the Utah DOI immediately after the AWLIC 
Board's approval. 
9. From September of 1992 to the cessation of the Rental Agreement in April of 
1995, AWLIC paid LAWA $1,174,489.00. The total amount of monthly rental fees is derived 
from the accounts payable ledgers maintained by AWLIC, copies of which have been made 
available to the Wolf Family Defendants and their counsel. 
Computer Equipment Purchase 
10. On or about January 12, 1996, AWLIC purchased from LAWA various pieces of 
used computer equipment in the total amount of $277,888.17. A listing of the used computer 
equipment prepared by AWLIC at the time of the purchase contains a legend explaining the price 
at which various pieces of used computer equipment were valued for purposes of the sale. 
11. Michael Wheeler and his accounting staff were instructed by Leland A. Wolf to 
designate certain LAWA used computer equipment to be valued at approximately $300,000.00. 
Michael Wheeler and his accounting staff subsequently calculated certain valuation formulas 
(e.g., 1.2 times book value) whereby the value of the used computer equipment would most 
closely approximate Leland A. Wolfs desired number. 
12. At the time of the used computer equipment purchase, no efforts were made to 
have an appraisal done or to ascertain the fair market value of the used computer equipment. 
13. The minutes of the AWLIC Board of Directors dated July 29, 1996 indicated that 
the used computer equipment purchase from LAWA in the amount of $277,888.17 was "ratified" 
after the sale was completed and not prior to the purchase as required by §31A-5-414(l)(a), Utah 
Code Ann. 
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14. No notice or report, either oral or written, of the AWLIC Board of Directors' 
ratification of the used computer equipment purchase was given to the Utah DOI immediately 
after the AWLIC Board's ratification or any time subsequent. 
Used Furniture Purchase 
15. In May of 1996, AWLIC purchased from LAWA various pieces of used furniture 
in the total amount of $471,000.00. A listing of the used furniture was prepared by AWLIC at 
the time of the purchase. The used furniture consisted of used Herman Miller modular furniture 
that had been previously rented by AWLIC from LAWA. 
16. AWLIC used a 1986 or 1988 listing of retail prices for Herman Miller furniture to 
value the used furniture. The value assigned to the used furniture was manipulated until the total 
value equaled $471,000. 
17. At the time of the used furniture purchase, no efforts were made to have a 
legitimate appraisal done or to ascertain the fair market value of the used furniture. 
18. The minutes of the AWLIC Board of Directors dated June 29, 1996 indicated that 
the used furniture purchase from LAWA in the amount of $471,000 was "ratified" after the sale 
was completed and not prior to the purchase as required by § 31A-5-414 (l)(a), Utah Code Ann. 
19. No oral or written report of the AWLIC Board of Directors' ratification of the 
used furniture purchase was given to the Utah DOI immediately after the AWLIC Board's 
ratification. 
20. To the extent any of the foregoing Findings of Fact should be denominated as a 
Conclusion of Law, such Finding of Fact shall be considered a Conclusion of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Memorandum in Opposition to the Liquidator's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment filed by the Wolf Family Defendants on September 13, 2002 failed to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Specifically, the Wolf 
Family Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition failed to begin with a section that contained a 
verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the Wolf Family 
Defendants contended a genuine issue existed followed by a concise statement of material facts 
which support the Wolf Family Defendants' contentions. As a result, all of the facts recited by 
the Liquidator in its Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are 
deemed admitted and true. 
2. The Wolf Family Defendants filed the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf. The filing of 
the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf did not cure or remedy the Wolf Family Defendants' failure to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Even 
if the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf was to be considered as a statement of the disputed material 
facts of the Wolf Family Defendants, the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf contained non-admissible 
evidence (e.g., hearsay, unsubstantiated conclusions and opinions, irrelevant evidence, etc.). 
Such non-admissible evidence did not create an issue of disputed material fact. Therefore, even 
if the failure to comply with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was 
overlooked, the Wolf Family Defendants have failed to marshal admissible evidence that created 
a question of fact. 
3. The Liquidator has the authority and standing to bring this action. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-310, the Liquidator is "vested by operation of law with the title to all 
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of the property, contracts, rights of action . . . of the insurer ordered liquidated, wherever located, 
as of the date of the filing of the petition for liquidation." 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314 provides that the Liquidator "may continue to 
prosecute and institute in the name of the insurer or in his own name, any suits and other legal 
proceedings, in this state or elsewhere." 
5. Before an insurance company enters into a material transaction with a director or 
a company that the director controls, the insurance company must be certain that it complies with 
§ 31A-5-414, Utah Code Ann., which states as follows: 
Transactions in which directors and others are interested. 
(1) Any material transaction between an insurance corporation 
and one or more of its directors or officers, or between an insurance 
corporation and any other person1 in which one or more of its directors or 
officers or any person controlling the corporation has a material interest, is 
voidable by the corporation unless all the following exist: 
(a) At the time the transaction is entered into it is fair to the 
interests of the corporation. 
(b) The transaction has, with full knowledge of its terms 
and of the interests involved, been approved in advance by the board or by 
the shareholders. 
(c) The transaction has been reported to the commissioner 
immediately after approval by the board or the shareholders. 
(2) A director, whose interest or status makes the transaction 
subject to this section, may be counted in determining a quorum for a board 
meeting approving a transaction under Subsection (l)(b), but may not vote. 
Approval requires the affirmative vote of a majority of those present. 
(3) The commissioner may by rule exempt certain types of 
transactions from the reporting requirement of Subsection (l)(c). The 
commissioner has standing to bring an action on behalf of an insurer to have 
a contract in violation of Subsection (1) declared void. Such an action shall 
be brought in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-5-414 (2001). 
The definition of "person" is provided by § 31A-1-103(84), Utah Code Ann.: ""Person" includes an 
individual, partnership, corporation, incorporated or unincorporated association . . ." 
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6. The statute imposes three requirements on an insurance company before it can 
enter into a transaction with a director. One, the transaction must be fair to the insurance 
company at the time the transaction is entered into. Second, the insurance company's Board of 
Directors (with full knowledge of the terms and the interests involved) must approve the 
transaction before it is consummated. Third, the transaction must be reported to the insurance 
commissioner immediately after the board of directors approves it. 
7. The requirements of the statute apply to the three transactions at issue which 
include the rental agreement, the used computer equipment purchase and the used furniture 
purchase. 
8. The rental agreement violated two of the three requirements. First, at the time the 
transaction was entered into, there is no evidence that the monthly rental payment of $55,000.00 
was fair to the interests AWLIC. Second, the Wolf Family Defendants failed to immediately 
notify the insurance commissioner of this transaction with directors. 
9. The used computer equipment transaction failed to satisfy all three requirements 
imposed by the statute. There is no evidence that the $277,888.17 payment from AWLIC to 
LAWA for used computer equipment was fair to the interests of AWLIC. Second, there is no 
evidence whatsoever that the purchase was approved by the AWLIC Board of Directors prior to 
the consummation of the transaction. Finally, there is no evidence that the insurance 
commissioner was notified of the transaction immediately after the AWLIC Board acted or even 
after the transaction was ratified. 
10. The used furniture purchase did not satisfy any of the three requirements 
mandated by the statue. There is no evidence that the payment of $471,000 from AWLIC to 
LAWA for used furniture was fair to the interests of AWLIC because prior to the transaction, 
11 
Defendants never obtained any verifiable evidence such as an appraisal to ascertain the fair 
market value of the furniture. The transaction was not approved by the AWLIC Board of 
Directors before the transaction took place. The insurance commissioner was never given notice 
of the transaction. 
11. The Liquidator is entitled to void these transactions with directors and AWLIC is 
entitled to restitution of the monies paid to LAWA and Sally Wolf. 
12. In connection with the transactions with directors and pursuant to § 31-5-414, 
Utah Code Ann., the Wolf Family Defendants are entitled to a setoff for whatever value, if any, 
AWLIC received from the rental agreement, the used computer equipment sale and the used 
furniture sale. The value of the setoff shall be determined at trial and LAWA and Sally Wolf 
shall have the burden of proving any setoff. 
13. Leland A. Wolf, Sally Wolf and LAWA are subject to violated Section 31A-27-
322 of the Utah Code Annotated which states as follows: 
Recoupment from Affiliates 
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation 
of an insurer authorized to do business in this state is ordered under this 
chapter, the receiver appointed under the order has a right to recover on 
behalf of the insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount 
of distributions, other than stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital 
stock, made at any time during the five years preceding the petition for 
liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery is subject to the 
limitations of Subsections (2) through (6). 
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, when 
paid, the distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did not 
know and could not reasonably have known that the distribution might 
adversely affect its solvency. 
(3) The maximum amount recoverable under this section is the 
amount needed, in excess of all other available assets, to pay all claims under 
the receivership, reduced for each recipient by any amount the recipient has 
already paid to receivers under similar laws of other states. 
12 
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(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at 
the time the distributions were paid is liable up to the amount of 
distributions he received. Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the 
insurer at the time the distributions were declared is liable up to the amount 
of distributions he would have received if they had been paid immediately. If 
two or more persons are liable regarding the same distributions, they are 
jointly and severally liable. 
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all 
affiliates that controlled that person at the time the dividend was declared or 
paid are jointly and severally liable for any resulting deficiency in the 
amount recovered from the insolvent affiliate. 
(6) This section does not enlarge the personal liability of a director 
under existing law. 
(7) An action or proceeding under this section may not be 
commenced after the earlier of: 
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator under 
Section 31A-27-303 or a liquidator under Section 31A-27-310; or 
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under Subsection 
31A-27-306(2) or the liquidator is terminated under Section 31A-27-339. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322. 
14. An affiliate is defined as "any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with, another person. A corporation is an affiliate of another corporation, 
regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural persons manages the 
corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-301(4). 
15. Leland A. Wolf and Sally Wolf are all affiliates of AWLIC. LAWA is also an 
affiliate of AWLIC because there is common management and ownership, i.e., Lee and Sally 
Wolf own and control both AWLIC and LAWA. 
16. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322, the Liquidator is entitled to recover 
from any affiliate any distribution made and received at any time during the five years preceding 
the petition for liquidation. The petition for liquidation was filed on August 18, 1997. 
Consequently, any payments made on or after August 18, 1992 to any affiliate are recoverable by 
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the Liquidator. Under this statute, Leland A. Wolf, Sally Wolf and LAWA are not entitled to 
any setoff or other mitigating factors or circumstances. 
17. "When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking 
to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plan language imless the language is 
ambiguous." Wilson v. Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002) (quotations 
omitted). Furthermore, "[i]n construing a statute, [we] must assume that 'each term in the statute 
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) (quotations omitted). Thus, the "primary goal in 
interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, 
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2000). 
18. The express language of Section 31A-27-322 of the Utah Code Annotated is clear 
and unambiguous. Therefore, effect must be given to the plain language of the statute. 
19. The statute provides that the liquidator may recover "the amount of distributions" 
which is the broad general rule. The next phrase (i.e., "stock dividends are not recoverable") 
creates an exception to that general rule or a subset of the general class. 
20. The word "dividend" as used in this statute creates a special class of distributions 
which the recipient shareholder could demonstrate as fair and reasonable and therefore not 
returnable to the liquidation estate. This limitation on recovery only applies to the subset of 
dividends; it does not apply to the broad general category of "distributions''. 
21. If the statute was considered ambiguous, which this Court does not find, the 
legislative history of the statute would be considered. After reviewing the supplemental 
pleadings filed by the parties, the legislative history indicates that setoffs and the consideration 
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of other mitigating circumstances would not be allowed. The repayment of distributions to 
affiliates without setoffs is consistent with the underlying policy of marshalling assets, protecting 
policyholders, and giving priority to third-party arms-length creditors. 
22. To the extent any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law should be denominated as 
a Finding of Fact, such Conclusion of Law shall be considered a Finding of Fact. 
(REMINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK) 
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ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. The Liquidator's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED for 
the reasons stated forth above. However, the Court is not entering a judgment at this time due to 
the fact that evidence of additional affiliate distributions may be introduced at trial which is 
currently scheduled to commence on May 5, 2003. 
2. The Liquidator's Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition and 
the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf is granted for the reasons set forth above. 
DATED this 2~*2^day
 0f May, 2003. tr&s&b 
BY THE COURT 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH CREST INSURANCE 
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION, and 
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, IN 




LWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS 
CORP., a California corporation, and 
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a 
California corporation, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF LWP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030915527 
Judge Hanson 
Defendants LWP Claims Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC") and LWP Claims 
Solutions, Inc.fLWPCSI") (colllectively "LWP"), submit this memorandum in reply to 
arguments made by the Liquidator in opposition to LWP's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. For reasons set forth both herein and in LWP's opening memorandum, 
LWP's motion should be granted. 
-<?-23 -ul 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Liquidator brought this action and filed his motion for summary judgment 
against LWP,1 claiming that, under Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-27-322, he is entitled to 
recoup from LWP, as a matter of law, payments made for claims handling services 
performed pursuant to contract.2 Although there remain peripheral factual disputes that 
LWP has addressed in the Supplemental Affidavit of John A. Igoe filed herewith, the 
issue presented by LWP is not a factual one; rather, it presents the issue of whether the 
Liquidator's claims must be dismissed as a matter of law because he is not entitled to 
recoupment from LWP under § 31 A-27-322. 
The Liquidator flatly states that "[apliate transactions are so susceptible to 
manipulation and abuse that the Liquidator is statutorily empowered by § 31 A-27-322 to 
recoup those paid monies regardless of any defense asserted by the original 
recipient/affiliate." Liquidator's Opposition Memorandum ("Liquidator's Opposition") 
at 1, emphasis supplied. The Liquidator here argues that he need not even prove the 
The Liquidator originally sought summary judgment on payments from both Wasatch 
Crest Insurance Co. and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company. The Liquidator now seeks only 
partial summary judgment on the claims regarding payments from Wasatch Crest Insurance Co. 
Liquidator's Opposition Memorandum at 36. He dropped his request for summary judgment regarding 
payments from Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company because he has not established that LWP and 
Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company were affiliates during the time that it made payments to LWP. 
The Liquidator here concedes the basis for LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment as to those claims. 
2
 Notably, the Liquidator makes no allegations whatsoever of abuse, manipulation or 
overreaching on the part of LWP. He tacitly admits both receipt of the claims handling services from LWP 
and the reasonableness of the terms of the contracts for those services. (That reasonableness is also 
demonstrated by the fact that the Utah Guaranty Association continues to utilize LWP to perform the same 
services on the same terms during the liquidation. Exhibit A, If 18. ) In other words, acknowledging that 
the companies received full value for the payments contemporaneously made to LWP, the Liquidator 
wants a short-sighted windfall that will put LWP out of business and end its benefit to the Guaranty 
Association. Neither the statute nor the Liquidator's allegations support that unseemly result. 
-2-
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elements of § 31A-27-322 in order to recoup money from LWP. He is wrong. LWP's 
motion is based in the clear failure of the Liquidator to allege and establish facts to 
support the simple elements of his cause action. Indeed, the Liquidator has failed to 
plead even a prima facie case, because (1) the Liquidator has not pled or argued, and 
cannot demonstrate, that LWP is an "affiliate that controlled the insurer" as expressly 
required by § 31 A-27-322, and (2) the payments received were not "distributions" 
under §31 A-27-322. 
II. ISSUES RELATING TO FACTUAL STATEMENTS 
A, LWP properly controverted incorrect factual statements. 
In the Liquidator's Opposition at 2-3, he takes issue with the format used by 
LWP in responding to the factual statements in the Liquidator's summary judgment 
memorandum. The Liquidator complains about LWP's responses, ignoring the fact that 
he failed to comply with his requirement under Rule 7(c)(3)(a) that each "statement of 
fact shall be separately stated and numbered." The Liquidator included multiple, run-on 
facts in single numbered paragraphs. See, e.g., Liquidator's Facts numbered 5 and 8 
(the Liquidator includes at least six different facts in paragraph 8, alone). LWP tailored 
its response to the Liquidator's statement of facts to minimize the confusion caused by 
the Liquidator's noncompliance with Rule 7. The Liquidator has shown no confusion or 
prejudice as a result of LWP's response. To the contrary, the Liquidator demonstrated, 
by fully responding to LWP's statement of disputed facts, that he understood it. 
A further examination of LWP's response to the Liquidator's statement of facts 
demonstrates that LWP in fact complied with the requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) by 
-3-
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controverting those statements that were incorrect. It responded separately to each of 
the Liquidator's statements of facts and designated by number the paragraph to which it 
responded. LWP then stated whether or not the specific fact was admitted or denied. 
Because the Liquidator included multiple facts in most of its numbered paragraphs, 
LWP indicated which specific fact within each paragraph was being admitted. Thus, the 
Liquidator's statements cannot be deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A). 
B. Undisputed facts. 
Perhaps because of the complicated structure of insurance companies and the 
transactions that give rise to this dispute, the parties have devoted extensive effort to 
the affidavits and factual statements in their memoranda. Indeed, LWP has filed a 
Supplemental Affidavit of John A. Igoe to further explain some of those circumstances. 
Notwithstanding that effort, the facts relevant to LWP's Motion for Summary 
Judgment remain undisputed. It remains clear, for example, that LWP was not an 
affiliate of WCMIC when WCMIC made payments to LWP, and LWP was an affiliate of 
WCIC only between the asset purchase on November 165, 1999 and the sale of LWP's 
stock to John Igoe and Judy Adlam on May 8, 2002. Exhibit A, fflf 9,10; Liquidator's 
Opposition at 10, 16.3 It is equally clear that LWP itself never owned, directed or 
controlled WCG, WCIC, FCL or WCMIC, and the Liquidator candidly admits that he 
"does not rely on Mr. Igoe's positions with LWPCAC, Insurance Co. and Group to 
establish control and affiliate status." Liquidator's Opposition at 36. There is no claim 
3
 Whether that sale was effective as of closing or on the effective date for accounting 
purposes of January 1 is irrelevant to LWP's motion 
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that LWP received any dividend or other distribution of equity from WCIC, WCMIC or 
any affiliated entity. 
It is equally clear that LWP received payments for claims services, and that it 
actually performed the services for which it was paid. That the exact amounts paid 
remain a matter of dispute is irrelevant to LWP's motion. The fairness of the terms 
under which LWP performed its adjustment and other claims handling services is 
further indicated by the fact that LWP continues to perform such services to WCIC and 
WCMIC on the same terms for the Utah Guaranty Association during the liquidation. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. LWP was never an "affiliate that controlled the insurer" as expressly 
required to invoke § 31A-27-322. 
The Liquidator has neither pled nor attempted to prove the basic element of 
control necessary for him even to state a cause of action against LWP. Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-27-322 plainly allows a Liquidator to recover certain distributions made to 
an affiliate "that controls an insurer " The statute was obviously designed to keep 
parent companies from raiding the capital of subsidiaries they control. However, there 
is and can be no allegation that LWP controlled either WCIC or WCMIC because it did 
not. In the instant case, the Liquidator attempts to turn the statutory scenario on its 
head and claim as controlled distributions not equity distributed to a parent but 
payments made to a subsidiary for services rendered. He goes to great lengths to 
demonstrate that LWP was an affiliate of WCIC for a period of time and argues that 
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some of the same individuals managed WCIC, WCG and LWP at various times. 
Liquidator's Opposition at pp. 34-40. His argument doesn't suffice. 
LWP does not dispute its affiliate relationship with WCIC as a sister subsidiary 
for approximately two years. That it may for a time have been a sister affiliate, 
however, does not come close to proving that LWP was an affiliate "that controlled the 
insurer." That point is fatal to the Liquidator's claim. 
The Liquidator argues that he can ignore the statutory element of control, 
asserting that: "[o]nce affiliate status is proved, the affiliate has no defenses to assert 
that will spare the affiliate from disgorging the distributions it received." Liquidator's 
Opposition at 39. In making this statement, the Liquidator blatantly misstates the law. 
While affiliate status may be established by proof of common management with another 
entity under § 31A-1-301(5), the Liquidator is empowered to recover equity 
distributions under § 31 A-27-322 only from an "affiliate that controls the insurer." As 
noted in LWP's opening memorandum, there is no presumption of control under the 
Utah insurance code.4 Rather, control remains a separate element of affirmative proof 
under the statute that the Liquidator has not attempted to meet. 
The Liquidator chooses to ignore the language which limits recoupment to 
affiliates in control of an insurer for the obvious reason that LWP never controlled 
WCIC or WCMIC.5 Nowhere in the Liquidator's summary judgment motion, or in the 
4
 See, Utah Code Ann § 31A-1-301(27). 
5
 There are numerous examples where the Liquidator willfully ignores the controlling 
language of § 31 A-27-322 For example, the Liquidator argues that "LWPCAC is, therefore, an affiliate of 
both [WCG and WCIC] As a result, LWPCAC must disgorge at least $5,615,090 " Liquidator's 
-6-
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Liquidator's Opposition does the Liquidator acknowledge that recoupment may only be 
obtained from a controlling affiliate. In fact, as noted, the Liquidator failed even to 
allege in his complaint that LWP controlled WCIC or WCMIC. His failure (and inability) 
to do so dooms his action. 
B. Contemporaneous payments made to LWP by the insurers for claims 
handling services were not "distributions" under § 31 A-27-322. 
Though there is a disagreement as to the amount paid, the parties agree the 
funds sought by the Liquidator were paid to LWP by WCIC and WCMIC for claims 
handling and administrative services rendered to or on behalf of the insurers by LWP. 
The Liquidator has not alleged that these payments were excessive, unfair or obtained 
by fraudulent means, but instead baldly asserts, without any precedential support, that 
any payment of any nature made to an affiliate by an insurer is a "distribution" subject to 
recovery under § 31 A-27-322. 
The term "distribution" is not defined in the Utah Insurance Code, and extensive 
research revealed no reported case discussing the meaning of the term in the context 
of insurance cases.6 The Liquidator's argument about the meaning of the term is 
Opposition at 44 The Liquidator also states "[i]t may be difficult for LWP to comprehend that 
§ 31 A-27-322 concerns itself with only two operative questions (1) were distributions made?, and 
(2) were the distributions made to an affiliate? Anything else is irrelevant" Liquidator's Opposition at 39 
The Liquidator's illogic ignores the plain language of the statute which restricts its application only to those 
affiliates that controlled an insurer and so directed the distribution in question 
6
 In the Liquidator's Opposition at 31, n 7, he cites to an interlocutory decision written by 
the Liquidator's counsel, in the case of American Western Life Insurance Company in Liquidation, et al v. 
Leland A Wolf, et al (Case No 980905251) The Liquidator cites the case for the proposition that 
"distribution" under § 31 A-27-322 includes all transfers of property to an affiliate by an insurer This 
unpublished district court decision, of course, has no precedential value Moreover, that case apparently 
involved a situation where individuals in control of an insurer entered into transactions on less than arms-
length terms that resulted in payments to those in control, a situation entirely different from the present 
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contradicted by the common meaning of the word "distribution," the definition of 
"distribution" in Utah law governing the regulation of corporations, the use of the word in 
§ 31A-27-322, and the way the term is used elsewhere in the Utah Insurance Code, all 
of which consistently support LWP's position that the term "distribution" means a 
transfer of money or property in respect of the equity of an insurer, such as a dividend, 
and does not encompass payments made for services.7 
As noted in LWP's opening memorandum at 4, the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act defines a "distribution" as a "direct or indirect transfer of money or other 
property. . . in respect of any of [a corporation's] shares. . . in the form of a declaration 
or payment of a dividend, a purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of shares, 
distribution of indebtedness or otherwise." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-102(13). This 
and other definitions indicate that a "distribution" is a kind of payment or transfer of 
money or property which involves dividing, apportioning, or giving out the equity of a 
company in respect to shares. The definition given in the corporate context makes it 
clear that a distribution is a transfer based on stock ownership. The statutory 
case In addition, for the reasons stated herein and in LWP's opening memorandum, LWP respectfully 
submits that the broad interpretation of the term "distribution" in American Western Life is incorrect 
7
 The Liquidator's definition of 'distribution" as any payment is contrary to the legislative 
purpose of Section 322 of remedying potential abuses by insurance holding companies See LWP's 
Memorandum at 2-4 Under the Liquidator's construct, an insurer's payments for services fairly rendered 
by an affiliate in the ordinary course of business within five years of the liquidation filing would be fully 
recoverable, but dividends of any size would not be recoverable if lawful and made without reason to know 
that the insurer's solvency was jeopardized Thus, a parent corporation could cause a subsidiary insurer 
to issue a $50 million dividend that would not be recoverable, but a small payment made to an affiliate for 
services fairly rendered would have to be disgorged 
-8-
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requirement of affiliate control as a prerequisite for recoupment comports entirely with 
this concept. 
Further, the terms "distribution" and "dividend" are used synonymously in 
Subsections (4) and (5) of § 31 A-27-322. Subsection (4) establishes that a person who 
is an affiliate in control of an insurer at the time of distributions is liable up to the 
amount of distributions received. Subsection (5) uses the word "dividend" completely 
interchangeably with the word "distribution" in Subsection (4): "If any person liable 
under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all affiliates that controlled that person at the time the 
dividend was declared or paid are jointly and severally liable for any resulting 
deficiency. . . ." 
The language of other sections of Chapter 27 of Title 31 A, titled "Insurers 
Rehabilitation and Liquidation," also supports LWP's position. Section 320, for 
example, allows a liquidator to recover a "transfer" made within one year prior to the 
liquidation filing when the transfer is fraudulent. And Section 321 allows the Liquidator 
to recover a "preference," which is defined as "a transfer of any of the property of an 
insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor," made within a certain time period.8 The use of 
the terms "transfer" and "preference" to describe payments recoverable under those 
provisions confirms that "distribution," as used in Section 322, does not mean all 
payments. Rather, read correctly and in context, Section 322 covers only those 
This provision, not Section 322, is the law that entitles the Liquidator to pursue recovery of 
payments made for services rendered such as those at issue here 
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transfers made by an affiliate with respect to the equity of an insurer for the benefit of 
those in control. 
Further, the word "distribution" is used throughout the Utah Insurance Code, 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A, to refer to transfers based on stock ownership. Under 
§ 31A-5-506, for example, "[n]o policyholder in a nonlife mutual may receive a 
distribution of shares . . ." of a certain type. Section 31A-5-418 refers to "dividends and 
other distributions" and provides that "a stock corporation may make distributions" if the 
"dividend" would not reduce the insurer's total adjusted capital below a certain level. 
The section on registration of insurers, § 31A-16-105(2)(c)(vii), states that registration 
statements shall contain information on "dividends and other distributions" to 
shareholders, and § 31 A-16-106(2)(b), (c) and (d) provide standards for determination 
of whether a "dividend or distribution" is extraordinary. In all of these contexts, 
distribution is used to describe transfers made with respect to shares, not all payments 
or other transfers. 
The Liquidator also argues that Professor Spencer L. Kimball's comments on the 
1986 Utah Insurance Code confirm the Liquidator's definition of "distribution" when, in 
fact, the draft section and its comments do just the opposite. Liquidator's Opposition at 
29-30. After acknowledging that § 96-17-6.5 of the 1983 Draft Code was the precursor 
to § 31A-27-322 of the Code enacted in 1986, the Liquidator quotes the closing 
paragraphs of Professor Kimball's comment: "There are other potential abuses, beside 
excessive dividends, in the holding company development." Professor Kimball's 
comment then describes some of those potential abuses. Section 96-17-6.5 of the 
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Draft Code, however, is limited to distributions based on stock ownership and uses the 
terms "dividend" and "distribution" interchangeably.9 
The payments to LWP for claims handling services were simply not 
"distributions" and are thus not subject to recoupment under § 31A-27-322. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted, finding in LWP's favor on the Liquidator's claims as a matter of law and 
dismissing the Liquidator's action with prejudice. 
Dated this 22nd day of April 2005. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
CHARLES R. BROWN 
JENNIFER A. JAMES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
The language from Professor Kimball cited by the Liquidator also confirms that the 
recoupment powers were intended to prevent "abuse," including "improper transfer" of money, and "the full 
range of less than arm's-length transactions that benefit affiliates at the expense of the insurer" 
Liquidator's Opposition at 29, 30 None of those circumstances is even alleged in the present case The 
Liquidator's action is instead an effort to get something for nothing - to recover monies paid pursuant to 
contract for services actually rendered for the acknowledged benefit of the insurer The claims are not 
fair, nor are they allowed by the statute invoked by the Liquidator 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply 
Memorandum in Support of LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment to be hand-delivered 
to the following this 22nd day of April 2005: 
John P. Harrington 
Jennifer L. Lange 
Holland & Hart LLP 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Ray Barrios, Jr. 
Liquidation Office General Counsel 
215 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
-12-
Tab 9 
Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217) 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. IGOE 
Civil No. 030915527 
Judge Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH } 
.'SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
I, John A. Igoe, having first been duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I have reviewed the Affidavit of Orrin T. Colby, Jr. filed by the Liquidator in 
support of the Liquidator's motion for summary judgment and in opposition to LWP's 
motion for summary judgment. 
2. Mr. Colby's Affidavit is inaccurate and misleading in a number of respects. 
While LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment does not depend on these points, I would 
like to correct them. 
3. In paragraph 6, Mr. Colby asserts that I was the Chief Operating Operator 
and President of Wasatch Crest Group ("WCG") from 1999 to July 2003. As I stated in 
paragraph 18 of my previous affidavit, I resigned from those positions on May 28, 2002. 
Further, I was not Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of WCG prior to 
November 6, 2001 when I became Acting Chairman of the Board and CEO, after 
Mr. Colby was removed from those positions. 
4. Mr. Colby's statements in paragraph 8 of his affidavit concerning my role 
in the negotiation of the sale of the assets of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, 
Inc. ("LWP Commercial") to WCG are also inaccurate. I negotiated on behalf of LWP 
Commercial but not WCG. At the time of the negotiations, I was a member of the 
Board of Directors of WCG, but there were other directors who negotiated the asset 
purchase on behalf of WCG. After the asset purchase, I was not the CEO of LWP 
Commercial but instead served in that role for a newly created company, LWP Claims 
Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC") to which WCG transferred the assets of LWP 
2 
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Commercial. In 2002, LWPCAC was sold to Judy Adlam and me, rather than to my 
wife and me as Mr. Colby incorrectly asserts. 
5. In Paragraph 10 of his affidavit, Mr. Colby states that he attended board 
meetings of Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company ("WCMIC") and that I also 
attended those meetings as a member and officer. This statement is false. I never 
served as a member of the Board of Directors of WCMIC or as an officer of that 
company, and I did not attend its board meetings in that capacity. I did not attend any 
WCMIC board meeting after November 27, 2000. 
6. Paragraph 11 of Mr. Colby's affidavit is also inaccurate. WCG was not the 
parent company of LWPCAC after January 1, 2002 when the sale of LWPCAC by 
WCG to Judy Adlam and me became effective. That sale closed on May 28, 2002, 
effective as of January 1, 2002. Further, WCIMC was not an affiliate of WCG after a 
November 27, 2000 capital restructuring in which WCMIC relinquished its shares in 
WCG. 
7. Mr. Colby states in paragraph 12 of his affidavit that I was CEO of WCG 
at the time the administrative services agreements between Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Company ("WCIC") and LWPCAC and between WCMIC and LWP were entered into. 
This statement is untrue. The administrative services agreements were orally entered 
into in approximately June of 2000, and the agreement with WCIC was formalized in a 
written administrative services agreement with an effective date of January 1, 2001. At 
that time, Mr. Colby was CEO of WCG. I did not become Acting CEO of WCG until 
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Mr. Colby was removed as CEO on November 6, 2001, well after these arrangements 
were made. The administrative services agreements were drafted by Judy Adlam and 
Charles Wilcox, Executive Vice President of Insurance Operations for WCIC. The 
agreements were in turn reviewed and approved by the full board of directors of WCG. I 
was only one of at least five directors of WCG at that time. I did not control the board, 
which was instead under the control of an investor group. 
8. Paragraph 14 of Mr. Colby's affidavit is inaccurate in stating that LWPCAC 
had the same employees and management team as WCG and WCIC from November 
2001 through July 2003 when, in fact, I resigned from all management positions with 
the Wasatch Crest companies on May 28, 2002, the date of the closing of the sale of 
LWPCAC. After that date, I was not involved in any way in the management of any 
Wasatch Crest companies, and Wasatch Crest management was not involved in the 
management of LWPCAC. Further, I was never an officer and director of WCMIC and 
never made management decisions for that company. I was not CEO of any Wasatch 
Crest company (except LWPCAC) prior to November 27, 2001 when I became Acting 
CEO of WCG and WCIC. 
9. Mr. Colby asserts in paragraph 15 of his affidavit that WCG, WCIC, 
LWPCAC and WCMIC, among other companies, were under the common management 
and control of the officers and directors of WCG. This broad assertion is inaccurate. 
WCG was the parent of WCIC at all relevant times but the parent of LWPCAC only 
from November 16, 1999 until January 1, 2002 when the sale of LWPCAC to Judy 
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Adlam and me became effective. LWPCAC was not under common the control of 
WCG after January 1, 2002. Similarly, WCMIC was not under common control with 
WCG or the other companies after the capital restructuring effective on November 27, 
2000. 
10. In paragraph 16 of his affidavit, Mr. Colby states that WCG, WCIC and 
WCMIC and LWPCAC were affiliates during all relevant times. He is mistaken for the 
reasons given in paragraph 9 above. 
11. Paragraph 17 of Mr. Colby's affidavit is false and misleading because I 
never participated in the management of WCMIC, which was not affiliated with WCG 
after November 27, 2000. The administration of WCMIC's claims was performed by 
LWPCAC, but these services were provided pursuant to a contractual arrangement 
between WCMIC and LWPCAC. I had no supervisory role with WCMIC. And, as 
noted, I was not involved in the management of WCG or WCIC after May 28, 2002. 
12. Paragraph 18 of Mr. Colby's affidavit is similarly misleading. LWPCAC 
was not managed or controlled by the management and controlling persons of WCG 
after January 1, 2002. 
13. I have also reviewed the Liquidator's Memorandum in Opposition to 
LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Liquidator's Memorandum"). The 
Liquidator's memorandum recited the inaccurate statements of Mr. Colby described 
above and contains additional inaccurate and misleading statements. 
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14. For example, on page 20 of the memorandum, the Liquidator disputes 
LWP's assertion that the Managing General Agency Agreement with North American 
Specialty Insurance Company ("NAS") was between WCG and NAS, arguing instead 
that the agreement was between WCIC and NAS. The Liquidator also disputes that 
LWPCAC handled claims arising out of the agreement for WCG, rather than WCIC. 
The Liquidator argues that LWP should produce the contract to verify its allegations. 
LWP does not have the original or a copy of the Managing General Agency Agreement, 
but, on information and belief, asserts that this agreement is in the possession of the 
Liquidator and that it was not produced because it confirms LWP's assertion that LWP 
provided claims handling services to WCG, not WCIC, pursuant to the Managing 
General Agency Agreement between WCG and WCIC. Compensation to LWP for 
these services was paid out of the WCIC bank account, but these were WCG funds, as 
WCG at times deposited funds into and withdrew funds out of the WCIC bank 
accounts. These inter-company transactions were appropriately accounted for in the 
books and records of WCG and WCIC. 
15. On pages 22 -23 of the Liquidator's Memorandum, the Liquidator states 
that Group was the parent company of LWPCAC "at all times between 1999 and July 
2003," a statement inconsistent with the accurate acknowledgment in the preceding 
paragraph on page 22 that LWPCAC was sold to Judy Adlam and me on May 28, 2002. 
LWPCAC was not owned by WCG after the effective date of the sale, January 1, 2002, 
but even if LWPCAC could be considered to have been owned until the date the sale 
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documents were signed, that is, May 28, 2002, it was not a subsidiary of WCG after 
May 28, 2002. 
16. On page 35 of the Liquidator's Memorandum, the Liquidator comments 
that I do not aver that WCG or WCIC did not own, direct or control the business or 
operations of LWPCAC. I agree and have stated that WCG owned LWPCAC and 
directed the operations of LWPCAC from November 16, 1999 until January 1, 2001 
when WCG sold LWPCAC. I have never averred, however, that WCIC controlled or 
directed LWPCAC at any time. WCIC was a wholly owned subsidiary of WCG, as was 
LWPCAC. As such, LWPCAC never owned or controlled WCIC, and WCIC never 
owned or controlled LWPCAC. 
17. When my wife and I sold the assets of our claims administrative business, 
LWP Commercial, to WCG in November 1999, we received $500,000 in cash and 
$700,000 in promissory notes (only $333,000 of these notes were paid by WCG). 
When Judy Adlam and I purchased LWPCAC from WCG in 2002, we paid 
approximately $4 million to WCG (up front cash of $2 million, assumption of 
approximately $1.8 million in liabilities and a contingency payment of $175,000). This 
purchase price was found to be fair and adequate consideration for the company by the 
outside appraiser retained by WCG's Board. By paying over $3 million more to WCG 
for the business than WCG paid for the business, WCG (the parent of WCIC) was 
compensated fully and fairly for any increase in the value of LWPCAC which occurred 
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by virtue of the claims handling agreements with WCIC and WCMIC and LWPCAC's 
other business operations. 
18. LWPCAC (which changed its name to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. in the 
third quarter of 2002) continues to provide claims handling services to WCIC and 
WCMIC during the liquidation period through an agreement with the Utah Guaranty 
Association which is handling insurance claims for the liquidation estates of WCIC and 
WCMIC. The services are provided on the same terms as the 2001 agreements 
between WCIC and LWPCAC and between WCMIC and LWPCAC. 
19. Attached as Exhibit A is a schedule showing revenue recorded by 
LWPCAC from NAS, WCIC, and WCMIC for claims handling and administrative services 
during 2000 and 2001. The numbers were taken from LWPCACfs general ledger and 
represent amounts that were audited by WCG's independent auditors (Ernst & Young) 
as part of their annual review and audited financial report on Wasatch Crest companies. 
Dated this ffftTay of April 2005. 
j p t iNA . IGOE 7 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this (& —day of April 2005 
• M N K W N E B I NOTARY PUBLIC 
« 1 8 o u m M i n , 1 3 t h Floor . 
K * U k » C * y , Utah 84111 I 
ttht comnteston Exufew • 
r £8.2008 
i of Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Supplemental Affidavit of John A. Igoe to be hand-delivered to the following this 22nd 
day of April 2005: 
John P. Harrington 
Jennifer L. Lange 
Holland & Hart LLP 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Ray Barrios, Jr. 
Liquidation Office General Counsel 
215 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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LWP Claims Solutions, Inc 
Revenue History 
North American Specialty Insurance Company (NAS) 
Wasatch Crest Insurance Company (WCIC)* 
Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company (WCMIC) 
includes Wasatch Crest Casualty Insurance Company 
Revenue Source 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: 
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY IN LIQUIDATION, and 




CASE NO. 030915527 
(Consolidated with 030915528) 
The above-referenced matter was before the Court on cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment. The first Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed by LWP Claims Administrators Corporation and LWP 
Claims Solutions, Inc., seeking Summary Judgment determining that 
payments made to LWP Claims Administrators and LWP Claims Solutions 
are not subject to return to the liquidator as liquidator alleges. 
The liquidator for Wasatch Crest Insurance Company has filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to have this Court determine as 
a matter of law that the payments made to LWP are in fact subject 
to return to the liquidator on the basis that the liquidator was an 
affiliate of Wasatch Crest Insurance Company which controlled the 
insurer, and that the payment for claims services were a dividend, 
all referring to Section 31A-27-322 of the Utah Code Ann., 1953 as 
amended. 
IN RE: WASATCH CREST 
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court heard argument of counsel, and at the conclusion of 
argument took the matter under advisement to further review the 
submissions of the parties and consider the oral arguments offered 
by counsel in relation thereto. 
The Court has had an opportunity to consider all those matters 
and being fully advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
The liquidator for Wasatch Crest Insurance Company is entitled 
to recover from LWP any amounts that LWP received from Wasatch 
Crest Insurance Company that constitutes a "dividend" if, at the 
time the dividend was received, LWP was an affiliate of Wasatch 
Crest Insurance Company and controlled Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Company. 
The liquidator argues that LWP was an affiliate, and LWP 
agrees that it was an affiliate. The liquidator asserts that 
because there were common owners and operators of both Wasatch 
Crest and LWP, that constitutes sufficient evidence of control so 
as to meet the statute. Finally, the liquidator argues that the 
payment for claims services made by Wasatch Crest to LWP do 
constitute a dividend, and therefore recoverable. 
LWP, while admitting that it was an affiliate, denies that it 
controlled the insurer, and suggests that there is absolutely no 
evidence in the record that LWP controlled Wasatch Crest, so as to 
influence the payments made by Wasatch Crest to LWP for insurance 
IN RE: WASATCH CREST 
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
claims services. Further, LWP argues that the payment for services 
rendered do not constitute a dividend that is recoverable under the 
statute. 
Unfortunately, Section 31A-27-322, of the Utah Code Ann., 1953 
as amended, is not a model of clarity, however, the Court is able 
to determine the intent of the legislature by referring to the 
plain language of the statute. 
There is no question that LWP was an affiliate of Wasatch 
Crest Insurance Company. The Court is not persuaded, however, that 
mere common ownership or operation, at least to the extent set 
forth in this record, is a sufficient basis to presume control. 
Assuming for the sake of discussion that there were some periods of 
time in which there were joint owners or joint operators, that 
fact, in and of itself, is insufficient to raise a question of LWP 
controlling Wasatch Crest for the purposes of making payments to 
Wasatch Crest which might be considered a dividend or, for that 
matter, a distribution. 
The Court determines herein that there is no evidence that LWP 
as an affiliate "controlled the insurer," as required by the 
statute, which determination ends the inquiry as to whether or not 
the payments received by LWP for insurance service work are 
recoverable by the liquidator. 
IN RE: WASATCH CREST 
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
However, the Court deems it advisable at this point in time to 
proceed forward, and indicate that, even assuming that LWP was an 
affiliate that controlled the insurer, the statute does not allow 
recovery of payments for services rendered under Section 31A-27-
322, inasmuch as the legislature used, and presumably advisedly so, 
the term "dividend." A dividend cannot be considered as a payment 
for services rendered, and therefore assuming that LWP in fact 
controlled Wasatch Crest Insurance Company for the purposes of 
making distributions, it did not receive a dividend. 
Accordingly, the Court accepts the position of LWP as the 
correct position as to when affiliates may be required to repay 
dividends to an insurer, and grants LWP's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Court likewise is therefore required to deny the 
Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the liquidator on this 
issue. 
Counsel for LWP should prepare an appropriate Order, all in 
accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
setting forth in detail the basis for this Court's decision, and 
submit that Order for review and signature. 
The Court requests a second Order, although it only needs to 
be in brief form, indicating that the receiver's Motion for Summary 
IN RE: WASATCH CREST 
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Judgment is denied. That Order should/likewise be submitted to the 
Court for review and signature. / 
IN RE: WASATCH CREST 
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this c:V day of 
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Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217) 
Charles R. Brown (Bar No. 0449) 
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CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-322-2516 
Fax: 801-521-6280 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH CREST INSURANCE 
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION, and 
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, IN : ORDER GRANTING LWP'S 
LIQUIDATION, and MERWIN U. : MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STEWART, Liquidator, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
: Civil No. 030915527 
-vs- : Judge Hanson 
LWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS 
CORP., a California corporation, and 
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a 
California corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 17, 2005, came on for 
hearing before the Court on Monday, May 16, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. Defendants were 
represented by Edwin C. Barnes and Jennifer A. James of the law firm of Clyde Snow 
Sessions & Swenson. Plaintiffs were represented by John P. Harrington and Jennifer L. 
FILEDI DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
•79-7/^ 
Lange of the law firm of Holland & Hart and by J. Ray Barrios, Jr., Estate General 
Counsel. 
The Court, having reviewed the extensive materials filed by Defendants and 
Plaintiffs, considered the arguments of counsel, and taken the matter under advisement 
for further review, issued a Memorandum Decision on June 21, 2005 stating that 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment would be granted. Now, in accordance with 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court issues this more detailed 
statement of the multiple grounds for the Court's decision. Plaintiffs also filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment that was argued and submitted at the same time. Based on the 
reasoning of the Memorandum Decision and this Order, the Court will enter a separate 
Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion. 
The action filed by the Plaintiffs (collectively, the "Liquidator") on June 7, 2004 
asserts the right to recoup certain payments made by Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Company ("Insurance") and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company ("Mutual") to 
LWP under the stated authority of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322. The first section of 
that statute reads as follows: 
If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or 
conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in this 
state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver appointed 
under the order has the right to recover on behalf of the 
insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer the 
amount of distributions, other than stock dividends paid by 
the insurer on its capital stock, made at any time during the 
five years preceding the petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, 
or conservation. This recovery is subject to the limitations of 
Subsections (2) through (6). 
-2-
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The parties agree that the Liquidator's Complaint, and both parties' Motions for 
Summary Judgment, turn on this statutory language. In particular, the dispositive issue 
presented by both motions is whether payments made by Insurance and Mutual to LWP 
are subject to recoupment under this statute. For the reasons stated herein, the Court 
has determined as a matter of law that they are not. Accordingly, the Court grants 
LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Both Defendants and The Liquidator have provided affidavits referencing 
numerous documents in support of the positions they advocate. They disagree on some 
factual points, but those disagreements all involve matters peripheral to the issues 
presented to the Court by LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment. The affidavits and 
materials filed with the Court demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any fact 
material to LWP's motion. The principal material facts as to which no genuine issue 
exists are as follows: 
1. Insurance was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah, which 
was placed into liquidation in the Third District Court on or about July 31, 2003. 
2. Mutual was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah, which 
was placed in liquidation in the Third District Court on or about July 31, 2003. 
3. Defendant LWP Claims Administrators Corp. was a California corporation, 
the name of which was changed to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. Though they are listed 
as separate Defendants in this matter, they are the same company. 
-3-
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4. Wasatch Crest Group purchased substantially all of the assets and 
business operations of a prior business, LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., 
from John and Erica Igoe on November 16, 1999. In connection with that purchase, 
Wasatch Crest Group formed a new entity, LWP Claims Administrators Corp., to hold the 
acquired assets. LWP was later sold to John Igoe and Judy Adlam. 
5. Shortly after the purchase of the LWP assets, John Igoe became president 
and chief operating officer of Wasatch Crest Group and two of its subsidiaries, including 
Insurance. Igoe was never an officer or director of Mutual. 
6. LWP was a subsidiary of Wasatch Crest Group and therefore a sister 
company or affiliate of Insurance from October 1998 until the sale of LWP to Igoe and 
Adlam in 2002. Mutual was restructured on November 27, 2000 so that it was no longer 
a subsidiary of Wasatch Crest Group, and LWP was not an affiliate of Mutual at any time 
after that date. (The Liquidator originally alleged an affiliate status between LWP and 
Mutual, but later withdrew its summary judgment motion as to the claims of Mutual. The 
Liquidator does not question the November 27, 2000 reorganization date or that Mutual 
then relinquished its interest in Wasatch Crest Group. The affiliate relationship of 
Mutual, however, is immaterial to the disposition of LWP's motion.) 
7. LWP began providing workers compensation claims adjusting and 
administrative services to Insurance in about June 2000. In return for these services, 
LWP received a percentage of the premiums earned by Insurance and a percentage of 
the medical cost savings realized by Insurance through the claims administration. LWP's 
-4-
services were provided first pursuant to an oral agreement, and later pursuant to a 
written agreement with equivalent terms. 
8. A similar oral agreement for claims adjusting and administrative services 
was reached between Mutual and LWP Commercial. The agreement with Mutual, 
however, was never executed. All payments made to LWP by Mutual were for claims 
adjusting and administrative services after the November 27, 2000 date when Mutual 
relinquished its interest in Wasatch Crest Group. 
9. John Igoe and Judy Adlam purchased the stock of LWP from Wasatch 
Crest Group for the sum of $2 million in cash, an assumption of liabilities of 
approximately $1.8 million, and a contingency payment later made in the amount of 
$175,000. The parties disagree as to whether the effective date of the sale was 
January 1, 2002 or May 8, 2002, but that issue is not material to LWP's motion. The 
Liquidator does not contend, and there is nothing in the record to indicate, that the terms 
for the purchase of the LWP stock were other than fair market value. Payment of fair 
market value to Wasatch Crest Group in 2000 would logically have included payment for 
the value of ongoing claims adjusting and administrative business as of that date. In any 
event, the Liquidator does not contradict LWP's assertion that the Wasatch Crest Group 
board of directors retained Hales & Company to provide independent advice as to the 
fairness of this transaction. 
10. John Igoe and Judy Adlam resigned from their respective positions with all 
Wasatch Crest companies as of May 8, 2002, the closing date of the transaction. 
-5-
11. Though the parties differ on the exact amounts paid, it is admitted that 
LWP received payments from Insurance and Mutual and that all such payments were for 
claims adjusting and administrative sen/ices. The combined payment figures for both 
entities submitted to the Court by the parties range from $5,142,263.00 to 
$6,678,668.64. 
12. It is acknowledged by the parties that all of the payments in question were 
made for claims adjusting and administrative services performed pursuant to the oral and 
written agreements. 
13. There is no claim or evidence that LWP received any dividend or other 
distribution of equity from Insurance or Mutual. 
14. Since Insurance and Mutual were placed into liquidation, LWP has 
continued to provide adjusting and administrative services for the claims of Insurance 
and Mutual at the request of the Utah Guaranty Association, on the same commercial 
terms previously extended to Mutual and Insurance. 
15. While some individuals served simultaneously on the governing boards of 
both LWP and Insurance prior to May 8, 2002, there was not a complete identity of those 
boards. Neither was it demonstrated that LWP "controlled" Insurance or Mutual, through 
their boards of directors or otherwise, to the extent LWP could have required Insurance 
or Mutual to make payments to LWP. 
16. The Liquidator does not contend, and has not offered any evidence to 
support a contention, that LWP ever owned either Insurance or Mutual. There is no 
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allegation that LWP appointed or otherwise controlled the directors of Insurance or 
Group. In particular, the Liquidator concedes that it does not "rely on Mr. Igoe's positions 
with LWPCAC, Insurance Company and Group to establish control and affiliate status." 
Instead, the Liquidator addressed the control issue by asserting that LWP, Insurance and 
Mutual were "under common control." 
DISCUSSION 
From these facts it is apparent that LWP was an affiliate of Insurance, at least 
until early 2002. Both parties agree, and the Court finds, that LWP had affiliate status 
with Insurance. LWP contends that all amounts paid by Mutual to LWP were paid after 
Mutual had relinquished its interest in Wasatch Crest Group and thus during a period in 
which LWP was not an affiliate of Mutual. The Liquidator has not acquiesced to this 
argument of LWP, but withdrew its Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to Mutual 
so that the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment now embraces only the claims 
advanced on behalf of Insurance. LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment, by contrast, 
seeks dismissal of all claims advanced by the Liquidator on behalf of both Insurance and 
Mutual. In light of the Court's dispositive ruling on related issues, the question about the 
affiliate status of Mutual need not be resolved. 
The statute in question, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322, may not be a model of 
clarity, but the Court is able to determine the legislative intent from the plain language of 
the statute. That statute allows a liquidator to recover only "distributions" made to an 
affiliate "that controls an insurer." The Liquidator essentially argues that affiliate status 
-7-
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is the same as control; that is, it is enough that some of the same people served on the 
various corporate boards or held management positions. That is not a sufficient 
showing, as there is, under the Utah State Insurance Code, no presumption of control 
from the fact that an individual or individuals hold a particular position. Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-1-301(27)(a). 
The Liquidator was granted sweeping powers by § 31A-27-322 for the limited 
purpose of recovering distributions made to an "affiliate that controlled the insurer." It 
appears that the Legislature used that language advisedly and that the word "controlled" 
would not have been included if affiliate status were all it intended to require. That 
construction also makes practical sense, as the potential abuses the Liquidator 
describes as underlying the statute can arise only if the party receiving the distribution is 
in a position of control sufficient to dictate its payment. 
Accordingly, the Liquidator would have to demonstrate that LVVP "controlled" 
Insurance or Mutual to the extent that it could direct them to make payments to LWP in 
order to prevail herein. There is, in the Complaint and the extensive documents 
submitted to the court, neither allegation nor evidence that LWP actually "controlled" 
either Insurance or Mutual. That these entities may have been affiliates does not, in and 
of itself, suffice. Without claim and proof of actual control, the Liquidator is not entitled to 
recover money from LWP under Section 31A-27-322 as a matter of law. 
While the foregoing determination is sufficient for the Court to grant LWP's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and conclude this action in its entirety, the Court deems it 
-8-
advisable also to address the issue of whether the payments the Liquidator seeks to 
recover under Section 31A-27-322 were "distributions," and thus recoverable in the event 
LWP were shown to have controlled Insurance or Mutual. The Court concludes that the 
payments to LWP for claims adjusting and administrative services contemporaneously 
rendered were not such "distributions." 
The Liquidator argues that all payments made to affiliates within five years 
preceding the Petition for Liquidation are "distributions" subject to recovery under that 
statute. LWP counters that the term "distributions" means dividends or other 
distributions of equity, and that it does not include payments for services rendered. 
The term "distribution" is not expressly defined in the Utah Insurance Code. It is, 
however, defined in the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act as a "direct or indirect 
transfer of money or other property . . . in respect to any of [a corporation's] shares . . . in 
the form of a declaration or payment of a dividend, a purchase, redemption, or other 
acquisition of shares, distribution of indebtedness or otherwise." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-1 Oa-102(13). Under this provision, "distribution" means a payment or transfer of 
money or property which involves dividing, apportioning, or giving out the equity of a 
company in respect to shares. 
The term "distribution" is used similarly where it appears in the Utah Insurance 
Code. For instance, the terms "distribution" and "dividend" are used synonymously in 
subsections (4) and (5) of Section 31 A-27-322. There, the word "dividend" in subsection 
(5) is used interchangeably with the word "distribution" in subsection (4). The Court also 
-9-
notes that the Liquidator's definition of the term "distribution" would result in the 
anomalous situation where pure dividends of any size could not be recovered if lawful 
and made without reason to know that the dividend might adversely affect the company's 
solvency, but small payments for services fairly rendered in the ordinary course of 
business would be fully recoverable. The Court can perceive a real potential for abuse in 
the distribution of a company's equity arising from situations of affiliate control, but that 
potential for abuse is not present in payments by the company for services actually and 
fairly rendered. 
The Court also notes the contrasting descriptions of payments made in other 
sections of the Utah Insurance Code where the term "distribution" is not used. For 
instance, Section 31 A-27-320 allows a liquidator to recover "transfers" made within one 
year prior to the liquidation filing when the transfer is fraudulent. Further, Section 
31A-27-321 allows a liquidator to recover a "preference," which is specifically defined as 
"a transfer of any of the property of an insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor" within a 
certain time period. The words "transfer" and "preference" are clearly used by the 
legislature to describe the various payments recoverable under those sections. Their 
use indicates that the Legislature intended something else by the term "distribution" in 
Section 31A-27-322. The term does not embrace all payments for services rendered, 
recovery of which may be available under the limited circumstances described in 
Sections 31 A-27-320 or -321. Rather, the term "distribution" embraces only dividends or 
other transfers of equity made to a controlling affiliate. 
-10-
The evidence before the Court confirms that the monies that the Liquidator seeks 
to recover here were not dividends or other transfers of equity; rather, they were 
payments made by Insurance and Mutual for services contemporaneously rendered. 
Notably, the Liquidator has advanced no argument that the payments to LWP were 
excessive, unfair or obtained by fraudulent means. The Court may also infer that the 
terms are commercially reasonable from the fact that the Utah Guaranty Association has 
continued to utilize LWP's services on the same terms to adjust Wasatch Crest claims 
since the filing of the Petitions for Liquidation. The Court need not rely on that inference, 
however, because the payments made by Insurance and Mutual to LWP for services 
rendered are not "distributions" within the meaning of Section 31A-27-322. Since the 
payments from Insurance and Mutual that the Liquidator seeks to recoup from LWP were 
not distributions, they are not recoverable under Section 31 A-27-322 as a matter of law. 
ORDER 
The Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any fact material to LWP's 
motion and that LWP is entitled to summary judgment as prayed. In particular, LWP is 
entitled to judgment dismissing the Liquidator's Complaint and each cause of action 
therein as a matter of law on the alternative grounds that LWP was not an affiliate "that 
controlled the insurer" as required for recovery under Section 31 A-27-322, and that the 
payments made to LWP by Insurance and Mutual were not "distributions" within the 
-11-
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meaning of that section. Accordingly, the Liquidator' Complaint is hereby dismissed, with 
prejudice. 
Dated this ; § / day of SMui ijtffur 2005. 
BY TbfE COURT: 
A* -^ „ C/x 
Approved as to form: 
'IMOTHY R. HANSONr; f 
/District Court Jucige " „«** 
John P. Harrington 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
Granting LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment to be delivered or mailed, postage 
prepaid, as indicated to the following this 31st day of August 2005: 
John P. Harrington 
Jennifer L. Lange 
Holland & Hart LLP 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Hand-delivered 
J. Ray Barrios, Jr. 
Liquidation Office General Counsel 
215 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Cindy GUTIERREZ, Petitioner, 
v. 
The Honorable Tyrone E. MEDLEY, Respondent. 
Melissa Gutierrez, Petitioner, 
v. 
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Respondent. 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Johnny Augusti Gutierrez, et al., Defendants and 
Appellant. 
Nos. 970472,970473 and 970476. 
Dec. 29, 1998. 
Murder defendant moved to quash subpoenas 
issued to his wife and daughter on ground that 
Subpoena Powers Act did not permit issuance of 
subpoenas to aid State in investigation after 
criminal charges had been filed. The District Court, 
Salt Lake Division, Tyrone Medley, J., denied 
motion to quash. Defendant appealed, and wife and 
daughter brought original proceeding in which they 
petitioned for extraordinary relief. The Supreme 
Court, Russon, J., held, on issue of first impression, 
that Subpoena Powers Act could not be used after 
charges had been filed. 
Ordered accordingly. 
Stewart, J., filed concurring opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €=>l 134(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
The proper interpretation and application of a 
statute is a question of law which Supreme Court 
reviews for correctness, affording no deference to 
the district court's legal conclusion. 
[2] Statutes €==>181(1) 
361kl81(l) Most Cited Cases 
[2] Statutes €==>184 
361kl84 Most Cited Cases 
In interpreting a statutory act, court is to give effect 
to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose 
the act was meant to achieve. 
[3] District and Prosecuting Attorneys €=>8 
13 lk8 Most Cited Cases 
Subpoena Powers Act, under which witnesses may 
be subpoenaed to aid State in criminal investigation, 
can be used only prior to the filing of formal 
criminal charges. U.C.A.1953, 77-22-1, 
77-22-2(l)(a),(2)(a). 
*913 John D. O'Connell, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
Cindy Gutierrez. 
Rebecca C. Hyde, Salt Lake City, for Melissa 
Gutierrez. 
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Judge 
Medley. 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Christine Soltis, Asst. 
Att'y Gen., E. Neal Gunnarson, Barbara J. Byrne, 
Bel-Ami De Montreux, Salt Lake City, for the State. 
James C. Bradshaw, Salt Lake City, for Johnny 
Gutierrez. 
RUSSON, Justice: 
Johnny Gutierrez, his wife Cindy Gutierrez, and his 
daughter Melissa Gutierrez challenge the Third 
District Court's order denying a motion to quash 
subpoenas issued to Cindy and Melissa Gutierrez 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2. We 
reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
On or about August 5, 1996, Roberto Huerta was 
shot and killed during a gun battle at the home of 
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defendant Johnny Gutierrez. Both Cindy and 
Melissa Gutierrez were at the home at the time of 
the shooting. Both were interviewed briefly at the 
scene and were told that a homicide detective would 
contact them later to obtain a statement concerning 
their observations. When a detective later 
contacted them, Cindy and Melissa refused to 
cooperate. 
On August 7, 1996, a criminal information was 
filed against Johnny Gutierrez and several others, 
[FN1] charging them with murder. *914 Following 
a preliminary hearing, defendants were bound over 
to stand trial. 
FN1. The other defendants are Lupe 
Najera, Gilbert Najera, and Steven Najera. 
On August 15, 1997, one year after charges had 
been brought and one week before the scheduled 
trial, the district court issued an order, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-22-1 to -5 (the "Subpoena 
Powers Act"), permitting the State to subpoena 
Cindy and Melissa Gutierrez to provide sworn 
statements "to aid the State in its pre-trial 
investigation of the killing of Roberto Huerta." 
Johnny Gutierrez moved to quash the subpoenas on 
the ground that the Subpoena Powers Act did not 
permit such subpoenas after the filing of formal 
criminal charges. Cindy and Melissa Gutierrez 
also opposed the subpoenas. On September 18, 
1997, the court denied the motion to quash, ruling 
that the Subpoena Powers Act was not limited to the 
period of investigation preceding the filing of 
criminal charges but could be utilized during 2iny 
period of the State's pretrial investigation of a 
criminal case. In support of its ruling, the court 
stated that the language of the Subpoena Powers 
Act did not specifically limit its use to only the 
period of investigation preceding the filing of 
charges. The court further supported its decision 
by citing to Utah Code Ann. § 77-22b-l, entitled 
"Immunity granted to witness." That section 
states in part: 
A witness who refuses, or is likely to refuse, on 
the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination to testify or provide evidence 
or information in a criminal investigation, 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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including a grand jury investigation or 
prosecution of a criminal case, ... may be 
compelled to testify or provide evidence or 
information by any of the following, after being 
granted use immunity... 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-22b-l(l)(a) (Supp.1998) 
(emphasis added). The district court reasoned that 
because section 77-22b-l describes a criminal 
investigation to include a criminal prosecution, it 
followed that a criminal investigation under the 
Subpoena Powers Act included that period of 
investigation during prosecution, and thus the 
subpoena power could be used after the filing of 
criminal charges. 
Johnny Gutierrez appeals the denial of his motion 
to quash the subpoenas, and Cindy and Melissa 
Gutierrez petition for extraordinary relief against 
the Honorable Tyrone E Medley, also challenging 
the denial of the motion. The Gutierrezes argue 
that the language of the Subpoena Powers Act, its 
legislative history, and important policy 
considerations all compel the conclusion that the 
Act cannot be used after criminal charges have been 
filed. The Gutierrezes also argue that the 
subpoenas should be quashed because the State did 
not request or obtain authorization from the district 
court to conduct a Subpoena Powers Act 
investigation, as is required. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-22-2(1) (1995). 
The State responds that the Subpoena Powers Act 
is not limited to the time prior to the filing of 
charges, but can be used during any period of the 
State's pretrial investigation. The State also argues 
that the procedures of the Act were complied with 
because the district court found that there was good 
cause for the investigation. 
Thus, the principal issue before us is whether the 
Subpoena Powers Act can be used to subpoena 
witnesses after formal criminal charges have been 
filed. Because we hold that the Subpoena Powers 
Act cannot be used after charges have been filed 
and we reverse the district court on that ground, we 
need not consider whether the State complied with 
the procedures of the Act in this case. [FN2] 
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FN2. The State also argues that defendant 
Johnny Gutierrez lacks standing to 
challenge the subpoenas inasmuch as he is 
not the subject of the subpoena and he has 
not otherwise put forth evidence that an 
exception in his case should apply. See 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1991); Society of Prof. Journalists v. 
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987). 
Because the petitions of Cindy and Melissa 
Gutierrez raise the same issue Johnny 
Gutierrez raises, i.e., whether the 
Subpoena Powers Act can be used after 
charges have been filed, we will consider 
the merits of the issue without addressing 
whether, under the facts of this case, 
Johnny Gutierrez lacks standing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] The proper interpretation and application of a 
statute is a question of law which *915 we review 
for correctness, affording no deference to the 
district court's legal conclusion. See Salt Lake 
Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 
(Utah 1995). 
ANALYSIS 
Upon a showing of good cause and the approval of 
the district court, the Subpoena Powers Act permits 
the attorney general, the county attorney, or the 
district attorney (the "state's attorneys") to conduct 
a criminal investigation. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-22-2(1 )(a). Once such an investigation is 
approved by the court, the state's attorneys may 
subpoena witnesses and compel their testimony and 
the production of physical evidence. Id. § 77-
22-2(2)(a). The state's attorneys are required to 
disclose, among other things, that the subpoena is 
issued in aid of a criminal investigation, the general 
subject matter of the investigation, that the witness 
has the privilege to refuse to answer any question 
that may result in self-incrimination, and that the 
witness has the right to have counsel present during 
interrogation. Id. § 77-22-2(3) & (4). If the witness 
is suspected of committing the crime that is under 
investigation, the state's attorneys must inform the 
witness of that status, as well as the nature of the 
charges under consideration against him. Id. § 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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77-22-2(5). Furthermore, upon showing a 
reasonable likelihood that the public release of the 
identity of the witness or the substance of the 
evidence obtained would threaten harm to a person 
or impede the investigation, the court may order the 
identity of the witness and the evidence obtained to 
be kept secret. The court may also order the 
witness, under appropriate circumstances, not to 
disclose the substance of his or her testimony to 
others. Id. § 77-22-2(7). 
While the Gutierrezes and the State do not dispute 
that the state's attorneys can conduct an 
investigation under the Act in which they have the 
power to subpoena witnesses and compel their 
testimony, they do dispute when that power may be 
exercised. The Gutierrezes claim that the subpoena 
power can be used only prior to the filing of 
criminal charges. Thus, according to the 
Gutierrezes, an investigation under the Act is 
limited to the preindictment investigation. The 
State, however, draws no distinction between an 
investigation prior to the filing of charges and an 
investigation after the filing of charges. Thus, the 
State claims that when it is authorized to conduct a 
"criminal investigation" under the Act it may use 
the subpoena power any time during its pretrial 
investigation. 
[2] Therefore, we need to determine when the 
subpoena power can be used. In other words, we 
need to decide when a criminal investigation, for 
purposes of the Subpoena Powers Act, begins and 
ends. In interpreting a statutory act, we seek to 
give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of 
the purpose the act was meant to achieve. See 
Mariemont v. White City Water Improvement Dist., 
958 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1998). In doing so, we 
look to the plain language of the act and consider 
the act in its entirety, " 'harmoniz[ing] its provisions 
in accordance with the legislative intent and 
purpose.' " Id. at 225 (citations omitted). If there 
is ambiguity in the act's plain language, "we then 
seek guidance from the legislative history and 
relevant policy considerations." Id. at 224-25 
(citations omitted). 
[3] We conclude that the Subpoena Powers Act is 
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ambiguous as to when the subpoena power may be 
used. On the one hand, the legislature soughl to 
"grant subpoena powers in aid of criminal 
investigations." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22- 1. As 
the State points out, this phrase is not specifically 
limited to the investigation prior to the filing of 
charges, and it is axiomatic that the State 
investigates criminal cases both before and after 
charges have been filed. On the other hand, the 
Act when read as a whole seems to suggest that a 
criminal investigation, for purposes of the Act, ends 
with the filing of criminal charges. For example, 
the Act states in part that (1) it is necessary "to 
provide a method of keeping information gained 
from investigations secret both to protect the 
innocent and to prevent criminal suspects from 
having access to information prior to prosecution," 
id § 77- 22-1 (emphasis added); (2) if the state's 
attorneys have evidence that the particular witness 
"has committed a crime that is under investigation, 
*916 [they] shall inform that witness in person prior 
to interrogation of that witness's target status and of 
the nature of the charges under consideration 
against him," id § 77-22-2(5) (emphasis added); 
and (3) "[t]he subpoena need not disclose the names 
of possible defendants;' id § 77-22- 2(6)(a) 
(emphasis added). 
The use of language such as "prior to prosecution," 
"target status," "charges under consideration," and 
"possible defendants," implies that the Act is to be 
used prior to formal charges. In our prior cases, we 
have taken this view, although we have never 
directly ruled on the issue See Parsons v Barnes, 
871 P.2d 516, 519 n. 3 (Utah 1994) (emphasizing 
that "[a] county prosecutor proceeds under section 
77-22-2 prior to commencing prosecution of a 
defendant or defendants"); In re Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 652 (Utah 1988) 
(stating that the Act is intended to "enable the state's 
attorneys to gather sufficient evidence with which to 
initiate formal adjudicative crimmal 
proceedings"). But see id at 666 (Stewart, 
Assoc.C.J., dissenting) (stating that "the Act allows 
prosecutors to engage in criminal discovery even 
after a formal charge has been filed"). Having 
found the Act ambiguous as to when the state's 
attorneys may use the subpoena power, we look to 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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the legislative history to infer the legislative intent. 
The Subpoena Powers Act was sponsored by 
Representative M. Byron Fisher in 1971 and was 
enacted that same year. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-45-19 to -21 (1971). The Act was then 
recodified in 1980 as Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-22-1 to 
-3. In 1988, this court addressed the 
constitutionality of the Act. See In re Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988). In that 
case, the Act was upheld as constitutional, but only 
after this court interpreted the Act as "incorporating 
a number of substantive and procedural 
safeguards." Id at 636 In 1989, the legislature 
amended the Act to specifically include those 
safeguards. 
During debate of the proposed Act in the House of 
Representatives in 1971, Representative Fisher 
stated: 
The purpose of the bill is to permit the 
investigation of criminal activities and suspect 
crimes by [the state's attorneys] by ... allowing 
them to subpoena witnesses and to bring people 
before them for the purpose of obtaining 
information for the filing of criminal complaint 
This action would take place prior to the filing of 
complaints and would not necessarily come 
about in the filing oj a criminal complaint or 
culminate in that activity 
Floor Debate, Statemenl of Rep M. Byron Fisher, 
39th Utah Leg., Gen Sess. (Feb. 17, 1971) 
(emphasis added). Later that same day, 
Representative Fisher also stated, "With the 
subpoena power, [the state's attorneys] could obtain 
... evidence and if it showed what is believed is 
occurring, then the action could be brought and a 
complaint filed" Id (emphasis added). On 
reintroducing the bill the next day to continue the 
debate, Representative Fisher stated that the 
proposed Act "is the subpoena powers granting to 
the [state's attorneys] an opportunity to obtain 
evidence by investigation without the filing of 
complaint for the determination of whether 
criminal complaints should be filed" Floor Debate, 
Statement of Rep. M. Byron Fisher, 39th Utah Leg., 
Gen. Sess. (Feb. 18, 1971) (emphasis added). As 
this history makes clear, the subpoena power was 
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intended to be used prior to the filing of criminal 
charges. 
This conclusion is further supported by the 
legislature's amendments in 1989. Those 
amendments constituted a significant overhauling of 
the Act, which incorporated the substantive and 
procedural safeguards read into the Act in In re 
Criminal Investigation. In that case, this court also 
rejected the claims that the Act violated a 
defendant's constitutional rights to present evidence 
and cross-examine witnesses. In doing so, this 
court relied heavily on its view that investigations 
under the Act are "preliminary investigative 
proceedings" which "only lead[ ] to the filing of 
criminal charges." In re Criminal Investigation, 
754 P.2d at 652. Thus, at the time of the 1989 
amendments, the legislature knew that this court 
viewed the use of the subpoena power as occurring 
only prior to the filing of formal charges. Because 
the legislature did not amend the Act to specifically 
state that the subpoena power could be *917 used 
after the filing of charges, we conclude that this 
court's view that it could not be so used is consistent 
with legislative intent. See Christensen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 
1982) ("A well-established canon of statutory 
construction provides that where a legislature 
amends a portion of a statute but leaves other 
portions unamended ... the legislature is presumed 
to have been satisfied with prior judicial 
constructions of the unchanged portions of the 
statute and to have adopted them as consistent with 
its own intent."). [FN3] 
FN3. Furthermore, we note that had the 
legislature clearly stated that the Act 
applied after the filing of charges without 
adding other substantive provisions 
permitting a defendant to present evidence, 
confront the witness, and engage in 
reciprocal discovery, the Act might have 
then been of questionable constitutional 
validity. See In re Criminal Investigation, 
754 P.2d at 650-52; id. at 666 (Stewart, 
Assoc.C.J., dissenting); Wardius v. 
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 
L.Ed.2d82(1973). 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the 
Subpoena Powers Act can be used by the State only 
prior to the filing of formal criminal charges. We 
therefore grant the petitions of Cindy and Melissa 
Gutierrez for extraordinary relief and order the 
district court to quash the subpoenas. 
Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
DURHAM, and Justice ZIMMERMAN concur in 
Justice RUSSON's opinion. 
STEWART, Justice, concurring: 
I concur with the majority in holding that the 
Subpoena Powers Act does not permit prosecutors 
to take discovery depositions after the filing of an 
information. I submit that a contrary construction 
of the Act would raise significant due process issues. 
Furthermore, given the many recent revelations of 
oppressive prosecutorial abuses by various federal 
special prosecutors under the federal Independent 
Counsel Act, [FN1] which vests special prosecutors 
with broad inquisitional powers directed at the 
person, I again reiterate the objections I stated with 
respect to the Utah Act and this Court's opinion in 
In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 659-66 
(Utah 1988) (Stewart, Assoc.C.J., dissenting). 
That opinion sustained the constitutionality of the 
Act with respect to its preinformation ex parte 
inquisitorial procedures. I pointed out in that 
dissent the vast potential, if not temptation, for 
prosecutors- whether well-meaning, unduly 
zealous, or partisan-to crush personal liberties and 
rights of privacy. I repeat what I stated in my 
dissent in In re Criminal Investigation: 
FN 1. Independent Counsel 
Reauthorization Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §§ 
591-99. 
I believe the Subpoena Powers Act (the "Act") is 
unconstitutional on its face. The United States 
Supreme Court has observed, in language which I 
believe is applicable to this Act, "A general, 
roving, offensive, inquisitorial, compulsory 
investigation, conducted by a commission without 
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any allegations, upon no fixed principles, and 
governed by no rules of law, or of evidence, and 
no restrictions except its own will, or caprice is 
unknown to our constitution and laws; and such 
an inquisition would be destructive to the rights 
of the citizen, and an intolerable tyranny." Jones 
v. S.KC, 298 U.S. 1, 27, 56 S.Ct. 654, 662, 80 
L.Ed. 1015 (1935) (quoting In re Pacific Ry. 
Comm'n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.Cal.1887)). This 
language applies in essential respects to the 
powers the Legislature has sought to confer on 
county prosecutors and the Attorney General 
The Subpoena Powers Act vastly extends the 
compulsory inquisitorial power of state and 
county prosecutors over both citizens and 
government officials. Anglo-American history is 
fraught with examples of abuses of similar 
powers by government officials. 
754 P.2d at 659-60. 
972 P.2d 913, 359 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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C 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Claudia HILL, by and through her Guardian ad 
Litem, Mary Hill Fogel, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
GRAND CENTRAL, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 12082. 
Nov. 25, 1970. 
Complaint for libel. The Second District Court, 
Weber County, John F. Wahlquist, J., entered a 
judgment dismissing the complaint and the plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that 
where trial judge overruled motion of defendant to 
dismiss complaint, he had performed the full 
measure of his duties, and he acted improperly 
when he entered order reciting that upon failure of 
plaintiff to produce evidence to support allegations 
of actual malice within 30 days defendant would be 
granted a summary judgment and then entered a 
summary judgment. 
Judgment of dismissal reversed with directions. 
Henriod, J., concurred in result. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Judgment €=>183 
228kl83 Most Cited Cases 
When motion to dismiss is accompanied by 
affidavits it may be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment, but court should not on its own initiative 
try to convert a motion for dismissal into one for 
summary judgment, as court has no more right to 
ask plaintiff how he will establish his claim than he 
has to require defendant to state what his defense 
will be. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b) (6). 
[2] Pretrial Procedure €=^306.1 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
307Ak306.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 307Ak306, 127k79 Discovery) 
Where answers to interrogatories are to be used to 
establish fact, the answers can be used only as 
admissions against party making them. 
[3] Pleading €==>360 
302k360 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 302k360( 16)) 
[3] Pretrial Procedure €==>691 
307Ak691 Most Cited Cases 
Where trial judge overruled motion of defendant to 
dismiss libel complaint, he had performed the full 
measure of his duties, and he acted improperly 
when he entered order reciting that upon failure of 
plaintiff to produce evidence to support allegations 
of actual malice within 30 days defendant would be 
granted a summary judgment and then entered a 
summary judgment. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
12(b)(6). 
**150 *122 Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for 
plaintiff-appellant. 
Rex J. Hanson, Leonard H. Russon, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant-respondent. 
**151 ELLETT, Justice: 
The appellant appeals from the granting of a 
summary judgment against her in her action for 
libel. 
After she filed her complaint wherein she alleged 
malice on the part of the defendant, the defendant 
without answering moved to dismiss the complaint 
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), 
U.R.C.P. 
The order of the court was unique: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. That defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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complaint be denied. 
2. That plaintiff be granted 30 days from the date 
of this hearing to produce evidence to support her 
allegations of actual malice. 
3. That upon failure of the plaintiff to produce 
evidence to support her allegations of actual 
malice, within 30 days, defendant will be granted 
a summary judgment upon defendant's motion for 
the same. 
*123 Thereafter the defendant moved for summary 
judgment. Interrogatories were propounded by the 
plaintiff and answered by the defendant and an 
affidavit was filed by plaintiffs attorney. Based 
upon the pleadings, the affidavit of plaintiffs 
counsel and defendant's answers to interrogatories 
the court granted the motion for summary judgment. 
We think at a pretrial conference, after the issues 
are stated by way of pleadings on both sides, it is 
proper for the court to make inquiry as to what 
evidence will support a contention and to eliminate 
those issues which cannot be supported by 
competent proof. However, we do not think il is 
proper for a court to require a plaintiff to state what 
proof he will produce on an issue which has not 
even been raised. 
[1] True it is that when a motion to dismiss is 
accompanied by affidavits it may be treated as a 
motion for summary judgment, yet the court should 
not on his own initiative try to convert a motion for 
dismissal into one for summary judgment. He has 
no more right to ask the plaintiff how he will 
establish his claim than he has to require the 
defendant to state what its defense will be. It would 
have been highly improper for the court, on the 
motion to dismiss, to have given the defendant 30 
days to present proof as to the truth of the alleged 
statement or as to the lack of malice. 
The answers to the interrogatories in this case were 
apparently taken as being true since the summary 
judgment was based upon them, at least in part. 
Summary judgment is never used to determine 
what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether 
there are any material issues of fact in dispute If 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 2 
there be any such disputed issues of fact, they 
cannot be resolved by summary judgment even 
when the parties properly bring the motion before 
the court. 
[2] In any case where answers to interrogatories are 
to be used to establish a fact, they can only be used 
as admissions against the party making them. They 
are objectionable when offered by the party making 
them because they are self-serving and not subject 
to cross-examination. 
[3] The trial judge performed the full measure of 
his duty when he overruled the defendant's motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. He was in 
error in dismissing the complaint as he did. 
The judgment of dismissal is reversed with 
directions to reinstate the complaint and to proceed 
with the case pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Costs are awarded to the appellant. 
CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER and 
TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the result. 
25 Utah 2d 121,477 P.2d 150 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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United States District Court,N.D. Georgia,Atlanta 
Division. 
In re CHICKEN ANTITRUST LITIGATION. 
Civ. A. No. C-74-2454-A. 
March 22, 1982. 
Subsidiaries of a defendant in chicken antitrust 
litigation filed a motion for clarification, asking the 
court to rule that they were entitled to recover as 
members of settlement classes, and asking the court 
to rule that they had opted out of the class 
settlement in the event court found them not entitled 
to class membership because of affiliation with or 
ownership by their parent. The District Court, 
O'Kelley, J., held that three subsidiaries of a 
defendant were not entitled to participate in the 
settlement fund, since they were not sufficiently 
independent of their parent to warrant participation; 
they "shared" officers and directors, raising a 
strong inference of parental domination, and they 
were completely owned by their parent. 
Order in accordance with opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Corporations 101 €=^1.6(1) 
101 Corporations 
1011 Incorporation and Organization 
101kl.6 Particular Occasions for 
Determining Corporate Entity 
101kl.6(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Three subsidiaries of a defendant in chicken 
antitrust litigation were not entitled to participate in 
settlement fund, since they were not sufficiently 
independent of their parent to warrant participation; 
they "shared" officers and directors, raising a 
strong inference of parental domination, and they 
were completely owned by their parent. 
[2] Evidence 157 €=>91 
157 Evidence 
157III Burden of Proof 
157k91 k. Party Asserting or Denying 
Existence of Facts. Most Cited Cases 
Generally, burden of proof of disputed facts rests on 
party affirming the existence of the facts and 
claiming rights and benefits from their existence. 
[3] Corporations 101 €=^1.5(3) 
101 Corporations 
1011 Incorporation and Organization 
101kl.5 Separate Corporations, Disregarding 
Separate Entities 
101kl.5(3) k. Parent and Subsidiary 
Corporations. Most Cited Cases 
While full ownership alone would be insufficient to 
show that a subsidiary was not independent of its 
parent, it is a factor highly indicative of control by 
the parent. 
[4] Corporations 101 €=>1.5(3) 
101 Corporations 
1011 Incorporation and Organization 
101kl.5 Separate Corporations, Disregarding 
Separate Entities 
101kl.5(3) k. Parent and Subsidiary 
Corporations. Most Cited Cases 
"Shared" officers and directors raise a strong 
inference of domination of subsidiary by its parent 
and indicate "common direction and supervision." 
*1006 ORDER 
O'KELLEY, District Judge. 
Presently pending before the court are two motions 
by KFC FN1 and a stipulation filed by KFC and the 
Settlement Administration Committee modifying 
the two previous motions. KFC is a putative class 
claimant in the settlement fund established in this 
> 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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protracted antitrust litigation. In KFC's first 
motion, KFC moved for clarification, asking the 
court to rule that KFC was entitled to recover as a 
member of two settlement classes, Class 111(b) and 
Class IV, made up respectively of (1) restaurants 
and fast food franchisees, and (2) wholesale 
distributors. In the same motion, KFC asked the 
court to rule that KFC had opted out of the class 
settlement in the event the court should find that 
KFC was not entitled to class membership because 
of affiliation with or ownership by a defendant. 
The second motion by KFC was a 60(b) motion, 
filed after final judgments were entered on March 
19, 1980 setting up the settlement *1007 classes. 
Final judgments were entered before the court had 
ruled on the KFC motion for clarification. KFC 
subsequently filed the 60(b) motion for relief from 
the final judgments, apparently having read the 
judgments to deny class membership to KFC. 
FN1. "KFC," as used in the two motions, 
is a collective term referring to KFC 
Corporation and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, KFC National Management 
Company. 
On June 11, 1981, this court entered an order 
addressing the motion for clarification and the 60(b) 
motion. In that order, the court concluded that the 
60(b) motion was premature since its resolution 
would depend upon a ruling on KFC's class status 
The court accordingly declined to rule on the 60(b) 
motion. The court declared, "KFC unquestionably 
is not a member of Settlement Class 111(b)." The 
court went on to say, however, that the court would 
defer ruling on whether KFC had effectively opted 
out until such time as the parties had fully briefed 
the issue. 
KFC and the Settlement Administration Committee 
have recently filed a stipulation addressing the 
status of KFC. The stipulation narrows the issues 
presented by the two KFC motions to the question 
whether KFC Corporation and two of its 
subsidiaries may participate in the settlement as 
members of Classes 111(b) and IV. In the 
stipulation the parties agree that KFC Corporation 
(KFC) is a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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Heublein, Inc., that KFC National Management 
Company (Management) is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of KFC, and that Commonwealth Food 
Services, Inc. (CFI), now dissolved, was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Management. The parties 
agree for the purposes of the motions that KFC, 
Management, and CFI filed timely proofs of claim 
to participate as members of Classes 111(b) and IV, 
and have elected not to opt out of the settlement. 
KFC and Management seek to participate in the 
settlement fund as purchasers of broilers sold to 
consumers through Kentucky Fried Chicken stores 
owned and operated by KFC and Management.™2 
CFI sets forth a claim to participate as a wholesale 
distributor,FN3 stating that during the relevant 
period,™4 CFI purchased to resell at wholesale 
approximately 6,638,590.23 pounds of broilers 
from processors other than defendant Heublein, Inc. 
Finally, the parties agree that certain documents 
which were attached to the response of the 
settlement committee to KFC's 60(b) motion 
pertaining to the corporate relationships among the 
three claimants are accurate. The court will treat 
this stipulation as a modification of the motion to 
clarify. The court will therefore grant the motion 
to clarify and will determine the eligibility of the 
claimants to participate. 
FN2. Class III is comprised of hotel, 
motel, restaurant, fast-food franchisee, and 
institutional feeder claimants. 
FN3. Class IV is made up of wholesale 
distributors. 
FN4. The relevant period was January 1, 
1970 through October 31., 1977. 
[1] In the final judgments entered March 19, 1980, 
this court restricted the right of any defendants or 
defendant affiliates to recover. The restriction 
stated: 
(1) all named party defendants, their affiliates, and 
subsidiaries, to the extent that they are not legally 
independent and autonomous from their 
parent-defendant or affiliate-defendant, shall be 
excluded from participating as claimants under any 
of the settlement classes herein; 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(2) all legally independent and autonomous 
subsidiaries and/or affiliates of all named 
defendants herem not expressly excluded from 
settlement Classes I-IV may participate as either 
direct purchaser claimants under settlement Class V 
or as wholesaler-distributor claimants under 
settlement Class IV as appropriate whether or not 
they are controlled or owned in whole or m part by 
their parent-defendant or affiliate-defendant, 
(3) no legally independent and autonomous 
subsidiaries and/or affiliates of all named 
defendants herein who are permitted to participate 
as claimants m these settlements under part (2) 
supra shall be permitted to recover for purchases 
from their parent-defendant or affiliate-defendant 
Accordingly, only defendant-affiliates or 
defendant-subsidiaries that can show that *1008 
their corporation is "legally autonomous and 
independent" of the defendant parent/affiliate may 
participate as claimants This restriction was 
imposed to preserve the settlement fund for truly 
adverse entities who were harmed by the alleged 
wrongdoing by defendants and to prevent reduction 
of the settlement fund by defendants through their 
subsidiaries and affiliates in violation of obvious 
intent of the settlement agreement Smce all three 
claimants here are subsidiaries of defendant, 
Heublem, Inc , the court is now called upon, for the 
first time, to define its "independent and 
autonomous" standard 
In the court's view, factors discussed in cases 
considermg whether to disregard the corporate 
fiction are also relevant to the question whether a 
subsidiary is sufficiently independent of its parent 
to warrant permitting the subsidiary to participate m 
a settlement fund partially contributed by its parent 
In Markow v Alcock, 356 F2d 194 (5th Cir 1966), 
in discussmg whether to disregard the corporate 
fiction, the court listed these factors 
(1) are the formal legal requirements observed, (2) 
is the "subsidiary" adequately financed or does the " 
parent" furnish the capitalization , (3) by whom 
are the salaries and expenses paid, (4) do the 
directors of the "subsidiary" act m the independent 
and primary interest of the "parent," (5) are the two 
operations so integrated through the commingling 
of funds, interactivities and common direction and 
© 2006 Thomson/West No 
supervision that they should be considered as one 
enterprise, and (6) generally, is one corporation so 
organized and controlled and its business conducted 
in such a manner as to make it merely an agency, 
instrumentality, adjunct or alter ego of the other? 
Markow v Alcock, 356 F2d 197-98 (citations 
omitted) See also Andrew Martin Marine Corp v 
Stork-Werkspoor Diesel, 480 F Supp 1270 
(ED La 1979) (applying the Markow factors) and 
Johnson v Warnaco, lnc, 426 F Supp 44 
(SD Miss 1976) (applying similar factors derived 
from Fish v East, 114 F 2d 177 (10th Cir 1940)) 
In Luckett v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 618 F2d 1373 
(10th Cir 1980), the court cited the following 
factors m deciding whether to disregard the 
corporate status of a subsidiary (1) the parent owns 
all the stock, (2) both have common directors and 
officers, (3) the parent finances the subsidiary, (4) 
the parent causes the subsidiary's incorporation, (5) 
the subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital, (6) 
the parent pays salaries or expenses of the 
subsidiary, (7) the subsidiary has no business 
except with its parent or subsidiary corporation or 
no assets except those transferred by its parent or 
subsidiary, (8) directors and officers do not act 
independently in the interests of the subsidiary, (9) 
formal legal requirements of the subsidiary such as 
keeping corporate minutes are not observed, (10) 
distinctions between the parent and the subsidiary 
and subsidiary and its subsidiary are disregarded or 
confused, (11) subsidiaries do not have full boards 
of directors 
618 F 2d at 1378, n 4 
[2] While many of the factors outlined in these 
cases are also probative on the question of 
mdependence and autonomy of a subsidiary from its 
parent, the court will require a considerably lesser 
showing for its "independent and autonomous" 
standard than is required when disregard of the 
corporate entity is sought The court strongly feels 
that only truly adverse entities should be permitted 
to participate in the settlement fund Otherwise, 
the settlement fund could be dissipated in violation 
of the obvious intent of the settling plaintiffs, and 
future antitrust settlements would be discouraged 
Furthermore, in the view of the court, the burden of 
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proof on the "legally independent and autonomous" 
standard belongs upon the subsidiary corporation 
seeking to recover as a claimant. Generally, the bu 
rden of proof of disputed facts rests on the party 
affirming the existence of the facts and claiming 
rights and benefits from their existence. Marcum v. 
United States, 452 F.2d 36 (5th Cir.1971). In this 
case, the subsidiaries seeking to recover as 
claimants are in the better position to present to the 
*1009 court facts showing their independence from 
defendant Heublein, Inc., and they are the parties 
seeking to participate in the settlement fund 
partially set up by their parent corporation. 
Therefore, the court finds that the burden rests 
properly on the subsidiaries to show their 
independence from the parent. 
In the June 11, 1981 order, the court declared 
without discussion that KFC was not a member of 
settlement Class 111(b). That order dealt with "KFC 
" in the aggregate, which was comprised of KFC 
and Management. The order did not address KFC's 
claim to membership in Class IV, nor were the 
claims of CFI discussed in that order.™5 The 
court is not inclined, however, to alter its previous 
ruling excluding KFC and Management from 
participation in Class 111(b). Furthermore, since the 
court finds that KFC, Management and CFI have 
failed to show that they are legally independent and 
autonomous of parent/defendant Heublein, Inc., 
none may recover as claimant members of either 
Class 111(b) or Class IV. 
FN5. CFI's claims were not raised in the 
initial motion by KFC. 
[3][4] The parties stated in their stipulation that the 
documents labeled Exhibits D through I and 
attached to the Settlement Administration 
Committee's brief in opposition to the 60(b) motion 
were authentic. The court has studied these 
documents and finds that they reveal that the 
relationship among Heublein, Inc., KFC, and 
Management was not sufficiently autonomous and 
independent to permit these subsidiaries to recover 
as claimants. The stipulation shows that each 
subsidiary was "wholly owned." KFC had been 
publicly owned until it was acquired by Heublein in 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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1971. After the acquisition, Heublein owned all of 
the KFC slock. While full ownership alone would 
be insufficient to show that the subsidiaries were 
not independent, it is a factor highly indicative of 
control by the parent. See Luckett v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., supra. Furthermore, the exhibits 
reveal that several officers and directors of 
defendant Heublein, Inc., were also officers and 
directors of KFC, Management, and other 
subsidiaries of Management. These "shared" 
officers and directors raise a strong inference of 
domination by the parent and indicate the "common 
direction and supervision" cited as a relevant factor 
in Markow v. Alcock, supra. The shared directors 
and complete ownership alone would convince the 
court that for purposes of claiming a portion of a 
settlement fund partially contributed by defendant 
Heublein, Inc., KFC and Management are too 
entangled with Heublein to permit their 
participation. The court need not rest its decision 
on these factors alone, however. The documents 
filed by the Committee show that Barry Rowles and 
Mike Miles, officers and directors of KFC and 
Management, reported to Hicks Waldron, president 
of Heublein. This indicates control and 
supervision of KFC by Heublein, Inc. Exhibit D 
shows that in answer to a question concerning 
frequency of meetings of the boards of directors and 
whether minutes were maintained, the KFC legal 
department supplied this response: "Meetings of 
the boards of KFC and Management seldom, if 
ever, were held. Necessary action was taken by 
consent resolution." This failure to hold board 
meetings indicates a disregard of the formality of 
the corporate entity, a factor mentioned in both 
Markow v. Alcock, supra, and Luckett v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., supra and, further, that the boards were 
not actual functioning bodies. Another document 
also demonstrates an intermingling of authority. A 
memorandum dated July 9, 1979, from David M. 
Stigler, Assistant General Counsel for Heublein, 
Inc., to Michael J. McGraw, Vice-President/General 
Counsel for KFC, clearly shows cooperation 
between the legal departments of KFC and 
Heublein in directing their franchisees to prepare 
claims in this litigation. While the court is hesitant 
to read too much into a single memorandum, the 
conclusion that an identity of interest existed is 
inescapable. In short, several items of information 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Vit+*A.//™ 1^V) M/^ctlaw pnm/nrint/nrintstream a<*nv9r<i=WT W6 06#destination=atn&vr=2 0&. . 6/15/2006 
560 F.Supp. 1006 
560 F.Supp. 1006 
(Cite as: 560 F.Supp. 1006) 
supplied to the court show that free interchange of 
information between Heublein and KFC occurred. 
*1010 The court can only conclude, in the 
absence of any evidence which would demonstrate 
independence, and in the face of several items 
indicating control by Heublein, that neither KFC 
nor Management are independent or autonomous of 
Heublein, Inc., for purposes of participating in the 
claimant universe.™6 
FN6. The court expresses no opinion 
whether the corporate status of the 
subsidiaries should be disregarded, and is 
only deciding that the subsidiaries are so 
closely related to a defendant in this action 
that they are barred from recovering as 
plaintiffs. The court would presume that a 
greater showing of inter-relation and 
intermingling than was made for this 
purpose would be required to cause 
disregard of the corporate entity for other 
purposes. 
Where CFI is concerned, there is more of a close 
question since the court has been supplied with only 
scant information about its status. CFI is a wholly 
owned subsidiary, however, and its kinship to 
Heublein, Inc., derives from two other wholly 
owned subsidiaries whose status the court has found 
non-autonomous. Therefore, in view of the failure 
of CFI to come forward with evidence to show its 
legal independence and autonomy from Heublein, 
the court will find CFI barred as a claimant as well. 
In summary, the court previously ruled that the 
60(b) motion was premature. By the terms of this 
order and the stipulation filed by the parties, it is 
now moot and will therefore be denied. The KFC 
motion for clarification as modified by the 
stipulation is granted. The court holds that neither 
KFC, Management nor CFI are entitled to 
participate in the Settlement Fund. 
D.C.Ga.,1982. 
In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation 
560 F.Supp. 1006 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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1 P.3d 1074, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 89, 2000 UT 28 
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Briefs and Other Related Documents 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
In re Marriage of Juanita GONZALEZ and Martin 
Briceno. 
Juanita Gonzalez aka Juanita L. Briceno, Petitioner 
and Appellant. 
Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance 
Company, Intervenor and Appellee. 
No. 970521. 
Jan. 28,2000. 
Rehearing Denied May 31, 2000. 
Insured's alleged common law wife filed petition 
for adjudication of marriage to insured, who had set 
fire to her home, and insurer was permitted to 
intervene upon petitioner's stipulation. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone E. 
Medley, J., granting summary judgment in favor of 
insurer on statute of limitations grounds, and denied 
petitioner's motions to dismiss insurer's complaint in 
intervention and to amend her complaint. Petitioner 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, A.C.J., 
held that proceeding for adjudication of marriage 
was required to be commenced, but not completed, 
within one year of termination of relationship 
between alleged common law wife and insured. 
Affirmed in part, but reversed and remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
Russon, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Howe, C.J., joined. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error €==>893(1) 
30k893(l) Most Cited Cases 
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Page 1 
De novo standard of review applies when 
intervention as of right is before the Supreme Court 
on appeal. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24(a). 
[2] Statutes €=>181(1) 
361kl81(l) Most Cited Cases 
[2] Statutes €=^184 
361kl84 Most Cited Cases 
In construing a statute, the Supreme Court's aim is 
to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the 
purpose the statute was meant to achieve. 
[3] Statutes €=^181(1) 
361kl81(l) Most Cited Cases 
[3] Statutes €==>184 
36Ik 184 Most Cited Cases 
[3] Statutes €=^206 
361k206 Most Cited Cases 
When doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning 
or application of an act's provisions, an analysis of 
the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its 
provisions harmonized in accordance with the 
legislative intent and purpose. 
[4] Statutes €^>183 
36Ik 183 Most Cited Cases 
[4] Statutes €^>206 
361k206 Most Cited Cases 
[4] Statutes C=>208 
361k208 Most Cited Cases 
In construing a statute, courts will look to the 
reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as 
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of 
the statute dealing with the subject. 
[5] Constitutional Law €==>48(1) 
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases 
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[5] Statutes €=^181(1) 
361kl81(l) Most Cited Cases 
Courts have a duty to construe a statute whenever 
possible so as to effectuate legislative intent and 
avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or 
infirmities. 
[6] Limitation of Actions €==>61 
241k61 Most Cited Cases 
Proceeding for adjudication of marriage was 
required to be commenced, but not completed, 
within one year of termination of relationship 
between alleged common law wife and husband. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-1-4.5(2). 
[7] Limitation of Actions €=^61 
241k61 Most Cited Cases 
Statute of limitations applicable to petitions for 
adjudication of marriage requires that an action for 
adjudication must be filed within a year of the 
termination of the relationship. U.C.A.1953, 
30-1-4.5(2). 
[8] Stipulations €=>18(2) 
363kl8(2) Most Cited Cases 
Insurer's intervention, pursuant to parties' 
stipulation, was properly allowed in action 
commenced by insured's alleged common law wife 
seeking adjudication of marriage to insured, who 
had set fire to her home; insurer's interest in action 
was not so speculative so as to preclude alleged 
wife from agreeing to have insurer's challenges 
adjudicated in determination proceeding. 
*1074 Concurring opinion of Zimmerman, J., with 
Chief Justice and one 
Justice concurring. 
*1075 Tamara J. Hauge, Salt Lake City, for 
Gonzalez. 
Robert L. Stevens, Salt Lake City, for Metropolitan. 
SUMMARY 
DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice: 
**1 Petitioner Juanita L. Gonzalez appeals a 
decision of the district court granting summary 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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judgment in favor of intervenor Metropolitan 
Property & Casualty Insurance Company 
("Metropolitan") and denying her motions to 
dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention 
and to amend her complaint. This is an action 
based on Ms. Gonzalez's petition for adjudication of 
marriage, brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
30-1-4.5 (Supp.1998), regarding her relationship 
with Martin Briceno. [FN1] Metropolitan moved to 
intervene. Ms. Gonzalez contested the intervention 
but ultimately stipulated to it. Metropolitan moved 
for summary judgment on the ground that Ms. 
Gonzalez failed to complete the adjudication of her 
petition within the statutory time period. This 
appeal followed. We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings, but note the following 
divergence in the justices' separate opinions 
concerning the issues: (1) as to the interpretation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp.1988) 
("ONE-YEAR LIMITATION"), this opinion 
reflects a majority view, being concurred in by 
Justices Stewart and Zimmerman; (2) as to the 
propriety of the trial court's refusal to dismiss 
Metropolitan as an intervenor below 
("INTERVENTION"), Justice Zimmerman concurs 
in that portion of Justice Russon's opinion, joined 
by Chief Justice Howe, but only to the extent it 
holds that intervention pursuant to the stipulation 
was properly permitted. 
FN1. The 1998 version of the statute is 
exactly the same as the statute originally 
passed in 1987. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 According to the petition for adjudication of 
marriage (the "petition"), Ms. Gonzalez and Mr. 
Briceno began living together in September, 1983. 
On October 21, 1995, Briceno set fire to Gonzalez's 
home. Ms. Gonzalez alleges that her relationship 
with Briceno "terminated" on that day. At the time, 
Briceno had insurance throu^ti Metropolitan. If 
Gonzalez was Briceno's spouse at the time of the 
fire, she would have a claim under the Metropolitan 
policy. Presumably, premiums were calculated on 
this basis. 
**3 On February 5, 1996, Metropolitan filed a 
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motion to intervene pursuant to rule 24(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Metropolitan 
asserted that Briceno had no reason to contest the 
recognition of the alleged marriage and that 
Metropolitan's interest was therefore not 
represented in the action. In its memorandum in 
support of the motion, Metropolitan stated that it 
moved to intervene because Gonzalez had filed the 
petition "to establish her insurance claim against 
Metropolitan." Gonzalez opposed the motion, 
arguing that Metropolitan had failed to attach a 
memorandum of points and authorities or 
appropriate affidavits, as required under rule 4-501 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Gonzalez answered the intervener's complaint on 
March 11, 1996. On March 12, 1996, the parties 
filed a Stipulation for Leave to Allow Metropolitan 
to Intervene. An order granting Metropolitan leave 
to intervene was filed on March 12, 1996. 
**4 Metropolitan formally denied Ms. Gonzalez's 
insurance claim on June 4, 1996. On August 7, 
1996, the trial court set a date of January 7, 1997, 
for trial of Ms. Gonzalez's petition, depending on 
the court's availability. On October 4, 1996, 
Metropolitan moved for summary judgment. Its 
motion was based upon "the fact that Ms. Gonzalez 
did not have a uniform reputation as the wife of 
Martin Briceno," as required under section 30-1-4.5 
of the Utah Code. No affidavits were attached. 
That motion was denied. 
**5 A minute entry of January 6, 1997, noted that 
the trial date, scheduled for the following day, had 
been stricken. The trial was continued because of a 
criminal trial that took precedence on the court's 
calendar. On March 18, 1997, the court ordered a 
new scheduling conference for April 8, 1997. Trial 
was reset for August 5, 1997. Gonzalez never 
requested an accelerated trial. 
*1076 **6 On April 10, 1997, Metropolitan filed a 
"Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Failure 
to Comply with Statutory Time Limits," in which it 
claimed that Ms. Gonzalez's petition should be 
dismissed because she failed to obtain a judgment 
concerning her alleged marriage within one year of 
its termination, as required under Utah Code Ann. § 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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30-1-4.5. Metropolitan contended that the statutory 
time period ran from the date the relationship 
terminated, allegedly October 21, 1995, and that the 
statute of limitations was not tolled by filing the 
action. Metropolitan did not contend, and has not 
argued here, that the statute of limitations expired 
prior to Ms. Gonzalez's commencement of this 
proceeding. 
**7 In an affidavit in support of her memorandum 
in opposition, Gonzalez admitted that on October 
21, 1995, she considered her relationship with 
Briceno "permanently terminated." She also 
indicated, however, that "[s]ince that time, I have 
re-established a relationship with Martin." 
Gonzalez filed a second motion to amend her 
petition to allege the re-establishment of the 
relationship on April 23, 1997. 
**8 On May 8, 1997, Gonzalez moved to dismiss 
Metropolitan's complaint as intervenor. She 
asserted that she had stipulated to Metropolitan's 
intervention based on its alleged suggestion that a 
decision on her marital status would dispose of all 
coverage questions in Briceno's insurance policy. 
She then argued that Metropolitan was not a proper 
party under rule 24(a) because it had in fact already 
denied Gonzalez's insurance claim based on lack of 
coverage. She asserted that Metropolitan's 
intervention would prejudice the rights and social 
status of herself and her three children, whose father 
is Briceno, inasmuch as denial of her petition would 
prevent all of them from "assuming[ ] legal rights, 
responsibilities and social status due them under the 
circumstances of their joint relationships." 
**9 In Metropolitan's memorandum in opposition, 
it argued that its interest in Ms. Gonzalez's status 
remained, despite its unequivocal denial of 
coverage to her. 
**10 After arguments on all the motions, 
Gonzalez's motion to amend was denied, as was her 
motion to dismiss the intervener's complaint. The 
court granted Metropolitan's motion for summary 
judgment based on Gonzalez's failure to comply 
with the statutory time limit. 
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**11 In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the 
complaint in intervention, the court concluded that 
Gonzalez had "presented no valid legal basis for her 
withdrawal of [the] Stipulation," thus allowing the 
complaint m intervention to stand The court also 
ruled that Metropolitan "falls squarely withm rule 
24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
regarding intervention " In its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding intervener's motion for 
summary judgment, the court held that the statutory 
limitation period expired on October 21, 1996, 
which date occurred after the commencement of the 
action This date was also prior to the initial trial 
date set by the court 
**12 In its conclusions of law, the trial court 
determined that the "petitioner is not and never has 
been married to Martin Bnceno in any solemnized 
or unsolemmzed relationship " 
**13 Petitioner raises three issues on appeal 
First, she argues that it was error for the trial court 
to grant Metropolitan's motion for summary 
judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that 
the petition was not adjudicated withm one year of 
the termination of the relationship Second, Ms 
Gonzalez contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing to grant her motion to dismiss 
Metropolitan's complamt in intervention Finally, 
Ms Gonzalez argues that the trial court should not 
have denied her motion to amend the petition to 
allege a contmumg relationship with Bnceno 
**14 As noted m f 1, this opmion (Durham, J) , 
jomed by Justice Stewart and Justice Zimmerman, 
determines the result regarding the statute of 
limitations issue As to the intervention issue, 
Justice Zimmerman concurs in that portion of 
Justice Russon's opmion, joined by Chief Justice 
Howe, but only to the extent it holds that 
intervention pursuant to the stipulation was properly 
permitted 
*1077 STANDARD OF REVIEW 
**15 A trial court's grant of summary judgment is 
appropriate only when no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to a 
© 2006 ThomsonAVesl No 
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judgment as a matter of law See Utah R Civ P 
56(c), see also Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
Paving, Inc v Blomquist, 713 P2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1989) When deciding whether the trial 
court correctly found that there was no genume 
issue of material fact, this court reviews the facts 
and inferences to be drawn therefrom m the light 
most favoiable to the losing party See id 
Additionally, because summary judgment is granted 
as a matter of law, we give the trial court's legal 
conclusions no deference and review their decision 
for correctness See White v Gary L Deseelhorst 
NP Ski Corp, 879 P 2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994) 
[1] **16 This court has not heretofore identified 
the standard it employs when reviewing a motion to 
intervene as of right under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(a) See Lma v Chambers, 657 P2d 
279 (Utah 1982) (reversmg trial court's denial of 
intervention but not stating standard of review for 
that reversal) We now adopt a de novo standard 
of review when interveni ion as of right is before us 
on appeal [FN2] 
FN2 The majority of federal appeals 
courts follow a de novo standard of review 
when intervention as of right is involved 
See Northwest Forest Resource Council v 
Ghckman, 82 F 3d 825, 836 (9th Cir 1996) 
(intervention as of right reviewed de 
novo), Alameda Water & Sanitation Dist 
v Browner, 9 F 3d 88, 90 (10th Cir 1993) 
(same), Sierra Club v Robertson, 960 
F2d 83, 85 (8th Cir 1992) (same), United 
States v Texas Eastern Transmission 
Corp, 923 F2d 410, 412 (5th Cir 1991), 
Grubbs v Noms, 870 F 2d 343, 345 (6th 
Cir 1989) (same), Walters v City of 
Atlanta, 803 F 2d 1135, 1151 n 16 (11th 
Cir 1986) (reviewing denial of motion to 
intervene as of right "for error"), Cook v 
Boorstin, 763 F2d 1462, 1468 
(DC Cir 1985) (holdmg application for 
mtervention as of right seems to pose only 
question of law, but "we would ordinarily 
give substantial weight to a trial court's 
findings" regarding whether intervention 
comports with efficiency and due 
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process). But see In re Sierra Club, 945 
F.2d 776, 779 (4th Cir.1991) (utilizing 
abuse of discretion standard). 
While several other circuits appear to be 
adopting an abuse of discretion standard, 
they make distinctions between 
intervention as of right and permissive 
intervention. The standard seems to 
inhabit an area somewhere between de 
novo review and abuse of discretion when 
intervention as of right is involved. See 
International Paper Co. v. Town of Jay, 
887 F.2d 338, 345 (1st Cir.1989); Harris 
v. Pemsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir.), 
cert denied, 484 U.S. 947, 108 S.Ct. 336, 
98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987); United States v. 
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 
968, 990-91 (2d Cir.1984). 
ONE-YEAR LIMITATION 
**17 In 1987, the Utah Legislature enacted a 
statute that recognized the possibility of establishing 
an unsolemnized marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 
30-1-4.5 (Supp.1998). [FN3] Subsection two of the 
statute states, in pertinent part, "The determination 
or establishment of a marriage under this section 
must occur during the relationship described in 
subsection (1), or within one year following the 
termination of that relationship." Id. § 30- 1-4.5(2) 
(emphasis added). 
FN3. The statute sets forth the following 
criteria that must be met in establishing the 
existence of an unsolemnized marriage: 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized 
according to this chapter shall be legal and 
valid if a court or administrative order 
establishes that it arises out of a contract 
between two consenting parties who: a) 
are capable of giving consent; b) are 
legally capable of entering into a 
solemnized marriage under the provisions 
of this chapter; c) have co-habited; d) 
mutually assume marital rights, duties, and 
obligations; and, e) who hold themselves 
out as and have acquired a uniform and 
general reputation as husband and wife. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1998). 
**18 The trial court found that "[m]ore than one 
year has passed since the termination of the 
relationship between Martin Briceno and the 
petitioner," and that Ms. Gonzalez had therefore not 
met the requirement that determination of the 
marriage occur within one year of the relationship's 
termination. The trial court appeared to assume 
that the statute required completion of the 
proceeding, not merely its commencement, within 
the one-year period. Furthermore, it put the burden 
of assuring a resolution of the petition on Ms. 
Gonzalez, stating: "This court is just confident that 
if a request for expedited disposition had been [sic] 
in this matter, between January and early October of 
1996, we could have brought this matter to a 
resolution." Finally, *1078 at the same hearing, the 
trial court did not permit Gonzalez a second 
amendment to her petition to allege a resumption of 
her relationship with Briceno, which she contended 
would show a continuous relationship from the time 
they first began living together in 1983. 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
**19 The process of statutory interpretation is 
often a difficult one, as courts try to apply the terms 
of a statute to an unanticipated situation. As Judge 
Richard Posner has pointed out: 
Omniscience is always an unrealistic assumption, 
and particularly so when one is dealing with the 
legislative process. The basic reason why 
statutes are so frequently ambiguous in 
application is not that they are poorly drafted ... 
and not that the legislators failed to agree on just 
what they wanted to accomplish in the statute ... 
but that a statute necessarily is drafted in advance 
of, and with imperfect appreciation for the 
problems that will be encountered in, its 
application.... Matters are not decided until they 
have to be. 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the 
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. 
L.Rev. 800,811(1983). 
**20 Our own legislature seems to have had the 
same point in mind when it included a severability 
clause for chapter 246, in which the statutory 
marriage provision is found, stating that "if any 
provision of Chapter 246, or the application of any 
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provision to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of the chapter is to be given 
effect without the invalid provision or 
application." 1987 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 5. Thus, 
the legislature has acknowledged that unforeseen 
issues in the application of statutes such as the one 
involving statutory marriage might arise. 
**21 The facts of this case would appear to have 
been far from the legislature's contemplation when 
the statute recognizing unsolemnized marriages was 
enacted. [FN4] So far as the limited legislative 
history shows, the apparent aim was to give Utah's 
Office of Recovery Services an avenue to prevent 
the exclusion of an alleged "common law" spouse's 
income when an application for government 
benefits was made, thus preventing welfare fraud. 
See Floor Debate, remarks of Norman Angus, 
Director of State Social Services Admin., 47th Utah 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 17, 1987) (Sen. Recording 
No. 75). [FN5] Utah has no doctrine of common 
law marriage, and thus a statutory creation was 
necessary. The subsection of the statute 
concerning the amount of time allotted for 
adjudication of a petition after the relationship's 
termination was added in an amendment and was 
apparently designed to protect the parties to a 
putative marriage from fraud or mistake due to long 
delays in adjudication. The only substantive 
comment on the amendment appears to be the 
following: 
FN4. While the form of unsolemnized 
marriage recognized by Utah was created 
only relatively recently by statute, its roots 
are long and deep, lying in the common 
law concept of "common law" marriage. 
There appears to be no meaningful 
distinction between Utah's statutory 
scheme and the concept of common law 
marriage. 
FN5. For a fuller discussion of the 
legislative history of section 30-1-4.5, see 
Recent Developments in Utah 
Law—Legislative Enactments— Family 
Law, 1988 Utah L.Rev. 273. 
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This amendment ... brings in a time focus, the 
other protection that Senator Reese put in the bill 
yesterday provides that that determination of 
common law marriage must occur by a court or 
administrative agency during the relationship or 
within one year after its [sic] been terminated. I 
think that gives the protection of having a 
marriage declared twenty years after the 
relationship when the parties had no intention of a 
marriage. I think it would still give protection to 
the Office of Recovery Services 
Floor Debate, remarks of Sen. Lyle Hillyard, 47th 
Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 19, 1987) (Sen. CD No. 
81B). 
**22 Senator Hillyard's remarks suggest that the 
legislature was concerned with situations in which 
the couple never intended to *1079 be married but 
where, years later, most likely at the time that one 
of them dies, some party is trying to prove the 
existence of such a marriage. 
[2][3][4][5] **23 In construing a statute, our aim 
is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of 
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. See 
Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Mfg., 1999 
Utah 18, f 25, 974 P.2dl 1194, 1201. When doubt 
or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or 
application of an act's provisions, an analysis of the 
act in its entirety should be undertaken and its 
provisions harmonized in accordance with the 
legislative intent and purpose. See id. at 1202. " 
'One of the cardinal principles of statutory 
construction is that the courts will look to the 
reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as 
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of 
the statute dealing with the subject.* " Mountain 
States Tel & Tel. Co. v Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 
(Utah 1989) (citation omitted). Further, we have "a 
duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to 
effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or save it 
from constitutional conflicts or infirmities." State v. 
Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). 
1. Statute of Limitations 
[6] **24 Conventional statutes of limitation run 
until the date on which an action is commenced. 
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The question raised in this action is whether the 
somewhat unusual language of section 30-1-4 5 was 
intended to create a novel phenomenon a statute of 
limitations not tolled by the filing of an action, so 
that an action filed in a timely manner could still 
fail the limitation period due to delays in discovery 
or a court's crowded docket The legislature should 
not be deemed to have created such a potentially 
unfair rule without clear and convincing language 
evidencing its intent to do so, the ambiguities 
created in this statute appear to be the result of 
nothmg more than inartful drafting It is clear that 
the legislative purpose of preventing welfare fraud, 
which gave rise to the time limitation, has nothing 
to do with Ms Gonzalez's attempts to establish a 
statutory marriage to Mr Bnceno, and that strict 
construction of the subsection regarding the 
completion of an adjudication of the relationship no 
later than a year after it allegedly terminated does 
not further the underlymg purpose of the statute 
We are not persuaded that the legislature meant to 
place the burden of crowded court dockets, and 
other matters completely out of a petitioner's 
control, solely on the petitioner In fact, as noted 
above, in this case the trial was delayed at the 
beginning of 1997 because a criminal trial took 
precedence at the last moment 
[7] **25 A more reasonable interpretation of the 
legislature's intent, which would not upset the 
underlymg purpose of the statute, is that the statute 
is simply an ordinary statute of limitations which, 
like all statutes of limitations, requires that an action 
for adjudication must be commenced within a year 
of the termination of the relationship This would 
still protect parties who never meant to be 
statutorily married from adjudications many years 
after their relationship has ended, but without 
placmg an undue burden on petitioners who cannot 
control every circumstance in the judicial arena In 
fact, even if the insurer had not intervened in this 
uncontested action (a point addressed more fully 
below), given the court's initially scheduled trial 
date, the petition would not have been decided 
withm the one-year time-frame It seems unlikely 
that the legislature mtended to create such a trap for 
the unwary, leading to the dismissal of timely filed, 
uncontested lawsuits 
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**26 State and federal speedy trial acts provide 
some useful guidance m this area, masmuch as they 
also contam requirements that cases be resolved 
withm specific time-frames Section 77-l-6(l)(h) 
of the Utah Code, for example, requires that a trial 
begin withm thirty days after arraignment if the 
accused is not posting bail, as long as the court's 
other business presents no obstacle to this See 
Utah Code Ann § 77-l-6(l)(h) (1990) Even in 
the criminal trial context, however, where the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are implicated, 
the United States Supreme Court has declined to 
establish "rigid time requirements" to determine 
whether a defendant's nght to a speedy trial was 
violated See HOSOState v Hoyt, 806 P2d 204, 
208 (Utah CtAppl991) (citing Barker v Wingo, 
407 US 514, 521, 92 S Ct 2182, 33 LEd2d 101 
(1972)) The Court m Barker outlined a four-part 
test to assess any violation, including "[l][l]ength of 
the delay, [2] the reason for the delay, [3] the 
defendant's assertion of his right, and [4] prejudice 
to the defendant" Barker, 407 U S at 530, 92 
SCt 2182 Thus, even when a party has a 
constitutional right to a speedy trial, delay will be 
excused where it is not prejudicial Were the 
mtervenor in this case entitled to such concern, 
which of course it is not, the "delay" here would not 
rise to the level of bemg overly lengthy or 
prejudicial Indeed, Metropolitan could not 
demonstrate any prejudice m this case Moreover, 
as Ms Gonzalez has pomted out, without the 
msurer's intervention any delays would have been 
unlikely, except to the extent that they were caused 
by the court's own docket 
2 Constitutional Considerations 
**27 Were we to accept intervener's claim that the 
legislature meant to create an entirely new type of 
statute of limitations, the statutory tune limitation 
would be subject to constitutional challenge For 
example, m White v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 
907 F Supp 1012 (E D Tex 1995), the court had to 
apply a similar Texas statute The case mvolved a 
woman suing her auto msurer under the unmsured 
motorist clause of her policy, regarding the death of 
her alleged common law husband The Texas 
statute stated " 'A proceedmg in which a marriage 
to Ong U S Govt Works 
httD7/web2 westlaw com/nrint/nrint<?trenm a<5nY?rQ=WT W£ n£^Hp>cti«a+;^=c,+«jprTr^—n AP. ciy c/^nn/: 
1 P.3d 1074 
1 P.3d 1074, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 89, 2000 U T 28 
(Cite as: 1 P.3d 1074,2000 U T 28) 
Page 8 
is to be proved under this section must be 
commenced not later than one year after the date on 
which the relationship ended....' " Id. at 1017 
(quoting Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 1.91(b) (West 
Supp.1989) (emphasis added). [FN6] 
FN6. The court in White noted that 
although the 1989 version of the Texas 
statute had been recently amended, the 
earlier version of the statute specifically 
instructed that the 1995 amendment not be 
retroactively applied. See White, 907 
F.Supp. at 1017 n. 2 (citing Tex. 
Fam.Code Ann. § 1.91(b) (West 
Supp.1996) (Act of May 29, 1995, 74th 
Leg., R.S., ch. 891, § 1)). The 1995 
amendment extended the statute of 
limitations to two years, and by the terms 
of the amendment, even that time period is 
not absolute. See Shepherd v. Ledford, 
926 S.W.2d405,409 n. 1 (Tex.App.1996). 
**28 The court in White held the Texas one-year 
statutory limitation period unconstitutional under 
the United States Constitution on equal protection 
grounds. The court found that the statute made a 
distinction between "ceremoniously married 
persons" and "informally or common-law married 
persons," and that the one-year period to commence 
an action must be reasonably related to a legitimate 
governmental interest. See White, 907 F.Supp. at 
1017-18. Finding that the interest in requiring 
proof of the existence of a common law marriage in 
a timely fashion was to insure that Texas courts did 
not have to rely on stale evidence in divorce and 
probate proceedings, the court reasoned that while 
the interest was legitimate, the statutory scheme was 
not rationally related to the goals. See id. at 1018. 
**29 Noting the severity of the bar to commencing 
an action to prove a common law marriage within 
just one-year of the relationship's termination, the 
White court was particularly concerned about the 
community property rights that would be 
extinguished and the legitimacy of the two children 
of the marriage that would be unresolved. See id. 
The court relied on a United States Supreme Court 
case that held a similar Texas statute regarding a 
one-year period to prove the legitimacy of a child 
violated equal protection because the time period 
was too short in light of the important rights 
involved. See id; Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 
91, 100, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982). 
[FN7] But *I08I see Shepherd, 926 S.W.2d at 
405-09 (applying, without mentioning White, the 
Texas statute involved in White according to its 
terms). 
FN7. The constitutionality of the one-year 
statutory limitation period is not before us 
on this appeal, since Ms. Gonzalez 
concededly filed her petition within 
one-year of the termination of her 
relationship. Metropolitan argues that the 
case of Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 
(Utah Ct.App.1995), is dispositive here 
and stands for the proposition that a 
petition for adjudication of marriage must 
be brought and decided within a year of 
the relationship's termination. Intervenor 
misconstrues this case. In Bunch, a 
divorce action was filed ten months after 
the parties separated. Id. at 919. The trial 
court dismissed the complaint on the 
ground that no statutory marriage had been 
established and it therefore lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. On 
appeal, the court of appeals explicitly 
refused to consider constitutional 
arguments raised by the appellant, stating 
that these arguments were not sufficiently 
articulated below. Id. at 921. Finding 
section 30-1- 4.5 to be unambiguous 
regarding the time limitation, it affirmed 
the trial court. Id. We agree with Ms. 
Gonzalez that her case is clearly 
distinguishable inasmuch as it involves a 
petition to establish a marriage, not to 
obtain a divorce. We believe that today 
we begin to clarify some of the issues left 
unresolved by the court in Bunch. 
However, since the constitutionality of a 
one-year statute of limitations is not before 
us, we express no opinion on the issue. 
**30 In light of the considerations discussed 
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above, we construe the statute of limitations in 
question to avoid potential unconstitutionality, and 
conclude that section 30-1-4.5 requires only the 
filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage 
within one year after the termination of the 
relationship. Our decision rests on our analysis of 
the legislature's intent, and therefore, we do not 
reach the constitutional arguments raised by Ms. 
Gonzalez. See Sutherland on Statutory 
Construction § 45.11, at 49 (rev. 5th ed.1992). 
Further, in light of our ruling, we do not reach the 
issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Ms. 
Gonzalez's motion to amend her second petition. 
Should Ms. Gonzalez still wish to amend after 
remand, she should renew her motion, and we 
presume the court will give her motion due 
consideration in light of this opinion. Typically, 
motions to amend are liberally granted. See Timm 
v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). 
INTERVENTION 
**31 Next, we turn to Ms. Gonzalez's contention 
that it was error for the trial court to deny her 
motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in 
intervention. Gonzalez initially challenged 
Metropolitan's motion to intervene, but later 
reversed course and stipulated to the intervention. 
**32 Stipulations between the parties are usually 
honored by the courts. See First of Denver 
Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 
P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979). Nevertheless, the 
courts may ignore such agreements "when points of 
law requiring judicial determination are involved." 
Id. No consideration was undertaken by the trial 
court of Metropolitan's standing to intervene in Ms. 
Gonzalez's petition to adjudicate marriage; 
nevertheless, the question of the legitimacy of 
Metropolitan's presence in this lawsuit implicates 
significant public policy concerns that should be 
addressed on appeal. 
**33 Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a), an applicant must be allowed to intervene if 
four requirements are satisfied: (1) the application 
is timely; (2) the applicant has an interest relating 
to the property or transaction which is the subject of 
the action; (3) the applicant is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, 
impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect 
that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest is not 
adequately represented by the existing parties. 
**34 Spouses are ordinarily the only appropriate 
parties to divorce litigation. See Frank D. Wagner, 
Annotation, Divorce-Third Parties' Claims, 63 
A.L.R.3d 373, 378 (1975). An exception to this is 
generally made, however, for third-party claims that 
concern the "actual or equitable ownership of real 
property, or to some other asserted interest such as 
an encumbrance upon real property, or the 
ownership of personal property." Id. (footnotes 
omitted). This case, which concerns a petition for 
adjudication of marriage, is analogous to cases 
where a third party attempts to intervene in a 
divorce action. The threshold question here, for 
both the requirements of rule 24(a) and intervention 
in a marriage context, is whether Metropolitan has 
an interest relating to a property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action. 
**35 Metropolitan never alleged any "interest" in 
any property or transaction relating to the subject 
matter of the petition. In its complaint in 
intervention, prior to the stipulation, Metropolitan 
stated as its basis for intervention that it "believes 
that this petition is filed as an attempt to defraud an 
insurance company by falsely attempting to 
establish a marriage where none existed." *1082 
This is clearly not an acceptable reason for 
intervening as of right in a proceeding to establish 
the existence of a marriage. Laudable as 
attempting to prevent fraud is, it does not approach 
the type of property interest that is typically 
contemplated by courts considering this issue in the 
context of an intervenor's application in a divorce 
proceeding. 
**36 Looking to the treatment of this issue in 
other jurisdictions, we find that while most allow 
intervention in divorce proceedings, such 
intervention is granted only after the intervenor 
meets a heavy burden. Analyzing an identical 
intervention rule in West Virginia, the court found 
that "[a] third party seeking intervention in a 
divorce proceeding for the purpose of protecting a 
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property interest assumes the burden of 
demonstrating an interest which will outweigh the 
substantial privacy interests of the divorcing 
parties." Boyle v. Boyle, 194 W.Va. 124, 459 
S.E.2d 401, 404 (1995). In Boyle, the court denied 
intervention to a third party claiming a right to buy 
stock obtained by the wife as part of the divorce 
settlement. See id. at 405. Embracing the 
rationale of the Boyle court, another court recently 
allowed the second wife to intervene in a 
proceeding brought by the first wife, challenging 
the validity of her divorce settlement. See Cohen v. 
Cohen, 748 So.2d 91 (Miss. 1999). There, the 
court stressed (at least seven times in one form or 
another) the "rare fact driven" nature of this case 
and that it is a significant departure from the normal 
rule. See id. at 92-94. At the outset of its 
discussion in Cohen, the court made it clear that 
under its intervention rule, identical to our own, "an 
economic interest alone in the litigation is 
insufficient to allow intervention." Id. at 93. 
(citations omitted). 
**37 Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar 
rationale. For instance, in In re Marriage of 
Perkinson, 147 Ill.App.3d 692, 101 Ill.Dec. 137, 
498 N.E.2d 319 (1986), an order of dissolution of 
marriage was entered shortly before the former 
husband drowned while working on his employer's 
tugboat. The employer, however, potentially liable 
for the drowning death of the man, was not 
permitted to intervene in an action seeking to set 
aside the order of dissolution. See id. 101 Ill.Dec. 
137, 498 N.E.2d at 324. The court reasoned that 
though the former wife might bring a wrongful 
death action against the employer if the dissolution 
order was set aside, the employer's current interest 
in any future action that she might bring was at most 
"speculative, hypothetical, and incidental." Id. 
**38 Likewise, in Fisher v. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d 
354, 358 (N.D.I996), the court found that the 
children of divorcing parents did not have a right to 
intervene in their divorce proceedings regarding the 
appointment of a receiver for their closely held 
company, even if such appointment might affect the 
value of the children's shares in the company. The 
court's analysis begins by stating that "[a] 'direct' 
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interest is one that is not 'remote' or 'contingent.' " 
Id. at 356 (citing 3B James W. Moore, Moore's 
Federal Practice % 24.07[2], at 24-54 (2d 
ed.1995)). It continues, "[a] 'legally protective' 
interest is one that 'the substantive law recognizes 
as belonging to or being owned by the applicant.' " 
Id (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas 
Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 469 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 434, 83 L.Ed.2d 
360 (1984) (emphasis in original)). Finally, the 
court states that "[a] party who qualifies as a 'real 
party in interest' under rule 17(a), F.R. Civ. P., is a 
party with a 'legally protectible' interest." Id. (citing 
6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary 
Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1543, 
at 339 (2d ed. 1990)) ("[T]he real party in interest 
requirement ... must be satisfied for purposes of 
asserting ... a claim by an intervenor."). Since the 
court found that the valuation of minority shares in 
a close corporation was a speculative undertaking, it 
held that the children did not have an interest in 
their parents' property that was "direct, substantial, 
and legally protectible." Id. at 356. [FN8] 
FN8. See also Arnold v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 
39, 332 N.W.2d 672, 674 (1983) (denying 
intervention to parents of one of the 
divorcing parties on grounds that they 
attempted to introduce into dissolution 
proceeding a number of legal actions 
involving themselves and divorcing parties 
that had nothing to do with division of 
marital assets); Nielson v Thompson, 982 
P.2d 709, 712 (Wyo.1999) (denying 
intervention to creditor where divorcing 
husband had no "possessory or marketable 
interest" in his spouse's property, making 
payment of his debt to creditor unavailable 
from such source). 
*1083 **39 The claims of the parties who 
attempted to intervene in these actions are entirely 
analogous to those of the insurer in the present 
action. The privacy interests of a couple in 
determining their status and property rights without 
the interference of outside parties are clearly 
paramount. Certainly, Metropolitan's "interest" in 
this action is no greater than the employer in 
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Perkinson, who was likely to be sued if the order of 
dissolution was set aside. 
**40 Many of the cases denying intervention also 
find that it would be possible for the intervenor to 
bring a separate action to enforce any alleged rights, 
thereby avoiding their inappropriate insinuation into 
the private affairs of a married couple. See Ex 
parte Kirkley, 418 So.2d 118, 121 (Ala.1982) 
(former wife could not intervene in former 
husband's subsequent divorce proceeding to obtain 
any money owed her under their divorce decree, but 
rather could file contempt suit); Fisher, 546 
N.W.2d at 358; Boyle, 459 S.E.2d at 405. [FN9] 
FN9. Metropolitan would be able to 
contest its obligation in an action on the 
insurance contract, which is not before us 
on this appeal. 
**41 Metropolitan has failed to show any interest 
in this action that requires its intrusion into an 
otherwise private matter between two persons 
regarding the nature of their relationship. In fact, 
as petitioner argues, Metropolitan denied Ms. 
Gonzalez's insurance claim during the pendency of 
the proceedings below, making it clear that it could 
proceed without the court's adjudication of this 
matter. Accordingly, adopting the rationale of the 
court in Boyle, I would hold that the trial court erred 
in permitting Metropolitan to intervene, and that it 
should have granted Ms. Gonzalez's motion to 
dismiss. As noted earlier, this view is joined only 
by Justice Stewart, and a majority of the court 
affirms on this question. 
PROCEDURE ON REMAND 
**42 Having found that section 30-1-4.5 requires 
only that an action to determine or establish a 
marriage be commenced within a year of the 
termination of the relationship, we reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Metropolitan on the issue of the statute of 
limitations. 
**43 On remand, should Gonzalez choose to 
proceed with the petition for adjudication of 
marriage, the trial court should apply a 
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preponderance of the evidence standard of proof to 
the establishment of a marriage under the statute. 
See Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 935-36 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998). While no single factor is 
determinative in the trial court's analysis, and while 
"numerous factors should be considered," evidence 
proving each of the five statutory elements is 
essential. See Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793 
(Utah 1994). The parties must make a showing of 
capacity to marry, capacity to give consent, 
assumption of marital rights and duties, 
cohabitation, and a holding out as, and acquiring a 
uniform and general reputation as, husband and 
wife. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-l-4.5(l)(a)- (e) 
(1998). One commentator has noted "the success 
of the common law marriage doctrine, and 
especially of the requirement of 'holding out,' in 
distinguishing between cases in which the parties' 
intent was marriage and those in which they 
cohabited without any such intent." Cynthia Grant 
Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back 
Common Law Marriage, 1996 Or. L.Rev. 709, 749 
(1996). At trial, the court will have to determine 
whether Ms. Gonzalez meets this standard. The 
dispute regarding the existence of a "uniform" 
reputation is a material fact in this case and to the 
extent that the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment was based on that ground, it may not 
stand. 
**44 Although not discussed by any party to this 
appeal, we note a point that may assist in the 
disposition of the case on remand. On March 26, 
1999, after the entry of summary judgment in this 
case, Gonzalez filed an action in federal district 
court against Metropolitan, alleging various 
contractual and tortious causes of action related to 
its insurance policy. It is not clear from *1084 the 
complaint in that case whether the claim therein 
relies on the case of Proctor v. Insurance Co. ofN. 
Am., 714 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1986), but it appears that 
this case is highly instructive. In Proctor, two 
claimants disputed the disbursement of the proceeds 
of two insurance policies. See id. at 1157. The 
policies did not name a beneficiary by name, but 
they both insured the "member and spouse." Id. At 
the time the policies were purchased, the insured 
was married to his second wife. His divorce, 
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however, from his first wife was not finalized until 
nine months after his ceremony of marriage to his 
second wife. Thus, the second marriage was 
illegal. See id. at 1158. 
**45 In response to the first wife's contention that 
her minor daughter was the rightful claimant under 
the policy, the court held that the principles of 
contract and insurance governed in this instance, 
and since the second wife was clearly the intended 
beneficiary, she should receive the proceeds of the 
policy. See id. The court in Proctor noted, among 
other things, that the insured was required to pay 
additional premiums for coverage for his "spouse." 
See id. at 1159. Proctor was not cited by either 
party in the case before us, but we note that it has a 
direct bearing on Metropolitan's obligation to 
Gonzalez under its policy, and further that, while a 
successful adjudication of marriage in state court 
would presumably determine her federal court 
claims, it would also not be a sine qua non for such 
a determination. Proctor appears to stand for the 
proposition that in some circumstances one who is 
not legally married may nevertheless be a "spouse" 
for purposes of coverage in an insurance policy, 
depending on the language of the policy and the 
intent of the parties. See id. at 1158-59. 
CONCLUSION 
**46 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in 
part, but reversed on the statute of limitations issue, 
and the matter is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
**47 Justice STEWART concurs in Associate 
Chief Justice DURHAM'S opinion. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice, concurring: 
**48 I concur in that portion of the opinion of 
Associate Chief Justice Durham that holds that a 
proceeding for the determination of marriage must 
be commenced within a year, but not completed. 
That is a more reasonable interpretation of the 
statute, and it seemingly protects the state's interest 
in avoiding fraud. 
[8] **49 I concur in that portion of Justice 
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Russon's opinion to Ihe extent it holds that 
intervention pursuant to the stipulation was properly 
permitted. Justice Durham looks to cases from 
other jurisdictions concerning interventions in 
divorce proceedings for guidance, and then applies 
those rules and policies to a proceeding to 
determine a marriage, labeling the situations 
"analogous." She would hold that a party in 
Metropolitan's situation cannot be permitted to 
intervene, even on stipulation, because it would 
violate public policy. I cannot accept the easy 
public policy analogy Justice Durham draws 
between determination of marriage actions under 
the Utah statute and actions brought to end an 
existing legal marriage, particularly where the 
proceeding to determine a marriage appears to have 
been commenced solely to give Gonzalez legal 
entitlement to claim under the insurance policy and 
to sue Metropolitan. In such a situation, I would 
hold that the company's interest is not so speculative 
that Gonzalez cannot be permitted to agree to have 
the company's challenges adjudicated in the 
determination proceeding. It may have been 
tactically unwise for Gonzalez to have stipulated to 
the intervention in that context, but she did so. I 
see no overriding public policy against permitting 
that stipulation to be made effective. 
**50 Unlike Justice Russon, however, I would not 
address the broader question of when third parties 
may properly be permitted to intervene in 
adjudications concerning a marriage over the 
objections of a party to the actual or putative 
marriage in question. Therefore, I do not join in 
that portion of Justice Russon's opinion. 
RUSSON, Justice, dissenting: 
**51 I dissent from Justice Durham's lead 
opinion. 1 would affirm all of the trial court's 
rulings. 
*1085 **52 First, the trial court did not err in 
dismissing Gonzalez's petition for failure to meet 
the jurisdictional time limitation set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. Justice Durham's opinion 
does not even attempt to read the statute on the 
basis of its plain language, but instead simply 
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rewrites its provisions by attributing motives to the 
legislature. Although the requirement relating to 
conclusion, rather than commencement, of legal 
proceedings is unusual and could potentially raise 
constitutional concerns in certain hypothetical 
scenarios, this case is not one of them. Gonzalez 
had thirteen years in which to commence a petition 
for adjudication and failed to do so. Moreover, 
after filing her petition, she made no attempt to 
obtain an adjudication within the time limit. The 
trial court specifically found that an accelerated 
schedule could have been arranged if Gonzalez had 
sought one. This is not a case where petitioner was 
prevented from meeting the statutory deadline by 
events wholly beyond her control. Rather, it is 
evident from the record that Gonzalez simply failed 
to recognize the nature of the time limitation and 
falsely assumed it functioned as a traditional statute 
of limitations that had been satisfied at the time the 
petition was filed. It is not the constitutional duty 
of this court to rescue parties from their inability to 
read the plain language of a statute. I would affirm 
the court's decision in view of the particular facts of 
this case. 
**53 Second, as recognized by Justice 
Zimmerman's opinion, the trial court correctly 
denied Gonzalez's motion to dismiss Metropolitan's 
complaint. Although Justice Durham undertakes an 
analysis of the standard of review relating to 
contested motions to intervene as of right, she fails 
to correctly reference the standard of review for the 
only question properly brought to us on appeal: the 
court's refusal to set aside the stipulation for 
intervention. She thus attempts to establish a new 
standard of review for a question not properly 
brought before us on appeal. This purported 
establishment of a new standard of review has not 
been joined by a majority of this court. 
**54 Justice Durham implicitly relies on our 
statement in First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. 
CM. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 
1979), that a "court" is not bound by stipulations 
between parties "when points of law requiring 
judicial determination are involved." [FN1] 
Durham Op. \ 32. However, this statement in 
First of Denver (whatever it means) clearly does not 
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empower us to review de novo a trial court's 
decision to set aside a stipulation as to matters of 
law. Rather, First of Denver recognizes that the 
trial court-not the Supreme Court-is entrusted 
with the discretion whether to honor such a 
stipulation between parties. Indeed, as we further 
stated in that case, whether a stipulation involves 
issues of fact or law, "[p]arties are bound by their 
stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the [trial] 
court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation 
entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause." 
Id.; see also 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 13, at 548 
(1974) ("It is generally recognized that it is within 
the discretion of the court to set aside a stipulation 
of the parties relating to the conduct of a pending 
cause."). As a result, a stipulation not set aside 
below will be reversed on appeal only if the trial 
court abused its discretion. The well-established 
abuse of discretion standard of review requires us to 
"presume that the discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows 
the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 
534-35 (Utah 1984). [FN2] 
FN1. I must confess that the scope and 
import of this statement, as quoted in 
isolation by Justice Durham, utterly 
escapes me. So far as I am aware, all 
disputed cases brought before courts 
involve "points of law requiring judicial 
determination." Hence, a literal reading 
of this passage would require all courts 
everywhere to disregard all stipulations for 
the sake of rendering a full-blown 
independent determination of the legal 
soundness of the parties' choices. 
FN2. In this regard, Justice Durham states 
that the trial court failed to consider 
whether Metropolitan had standing to 
intervene in this action. Durham Op. % 
32. But Gonzalez did not appeal any 
alleged failure of the trial court to enter 
specific findings that Metropolitan had 
standing to intervene at the time it 
approved the stipulation, nor is there any 
indication that the trial court was obligated 
to do so. Rather, Gonzalez appeals the 
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later denial of her motion to dismiss 
Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. 
With respect to that motion, the court 
received extensive briefing on Gonzalez's 
motion, heard oral argument, and entered 
findings of fact and rulings of law that 
specifically treated Metropolitan's standing 
to intervene. There is no basis in those 
careful and correct findings for us to 
attribute an abuse of discretion. 
*1086 **55 Employing the correct standard of 
review, I would uphold the trial court's ruling 
denying Gonzalez's petition to dismiss 
Metropolitan's complaint. In this case, the trial 
court carefully reviewed the particular facts and 
circumstances before it and rendered a reasoned 
opinion refusing to set aside the stipulation. It 
found there was a sound legal basis for 
Metropolitan's intervention and that Gonzalez had 
failed to meet her burden of showing why the 
stipulation should be set aside. [FN3] 
FN3. Gonzalez's primary argument in her 
motion was that she had been misled by 
Metropolitan's counsel into believing there 
were no other potential bases in the 
insurance contract for denying her claims. 
The trial court correctly found that 
Metropolitan had reserved its right to deny 
coverage under other provisions of the 
contract and had notified Gonzalez that it 
reserved the right to do so from the outset. 
**56 Finally, I would hold that Metropolitan has a 
right to intervene in this action. Contrary to Justice 
Durham's assertion, this case is not "analogous to 
cases where a third party attempts to intervene in a 
divorce action." Durham Op. f 34. In a divorce 
action, the status of the marriage relationship (and 
the attendant legal and personal interests that attach 
to that relationship) have already been established. 
Because divorce constitutes such a fundamental 
alteration in the lives of a husband and a wife, the 
law justifiably presumes that a divorce will be 
sought for legitimate personal reasons. 
Intervention in divorce cases is typically sought by 
creditors who claim that their interests are 
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implicated by the disposition of the spouses' 
financial assets. Such interventions are disfavored 
because they present a substantial risk of confusing 
the central issues relating to the parties' 
already-established private relationship. Moreover, 
the likelihood that parties to a marriage will seek a 
divorce for the sole or primary purpose of 
defrauding or damaging a creditor is small. [FN4] 
Hence, courts properly impose more stringent 
standards when entertaining applications for 
intervention in divorce cases. 
FN4. It was suggested at oral argument 
that annulments might present a closer 
analogy and could be affected by our 
decision here. Whether or not annulment 
is an adequate analogy, it does not alter the 
fundamental policies governing 
intervention in the particular circumstances 
of this case. To the extent there is a 
properly supported allegation that parties 
to a relationship are attempting to alter 
their legal status, where that status (and 
the attendant privacy rights it entails) is in 
doubt, and they are attempting the 
alteration for the sole or primary purpose 
of deceit or fraud (and the other criteria of 
rule 24 are met), a right of intervention 
should be granted. Moreover, to the 
extent we find it necessary to craft 
particular rules to meet new circumstances, 
we may do so when the proper case arises. 
**57 The reasons for denying intervention in most 
divorce cases manifestly do not apply to the facts of 
this particular case. In this case, Metropolitan 
specifically alleged a fraudulent basis for the 
marriage petition. In its complaint in intervention, 
Metropolitan asserts theit "Juanita Gonzalez's sole 
purpose in filing this petition is to attempt to create 
a relationship of husband and wife between herself 
and Martin Briceno for the sole purpose of 
obtaining insurance coverage under a policy issued 
by Metropolitan to Martin Briceno." In other 
words, Metropolitan contends that Gonzalez and 
Briceno had not actually met the criteria of the 
unsolemnized marriage statute at the time of the fire 
and that they did not actually believe they met the 
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criteria. If this contention is proven correct, 
Gonzalez's attempt to retroactively establish a legal 
status for the sole purpose of obtaining insurance 
benefits would constitute fraud and manipulation of 
a state statute. I submit that where there is a good 
faith assertion that a petition to validate an 
unsolemnized marriage is filed for fraudulent 
purposes, the principles governing permissive 
intervention and the statutory policies underlying 
the marriage statute grant a right of intervention. A 
party clearly has a right of intervention in an action 
that was brought for the sole purpose of defrauding 
that party. [FN5] 
FN5. It is no answer to state, as does 
Justice Durham, Durham Op. supra note 9, 
that Metropolitan may litigate its concerns 
in the context of a separate contract action 
on the insurance policy. Metropolitan 
obviously cannot litigate, in the context of 
a separate contract dispute, a decision 
regarding marital status that has been 
established and recognized by another 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
*1087 **58 Given the fact that Metropolitan is 
alleging a fraudulent basis for the petition, and 
because the retroactive establishment of an 
unsolemnized marriage does not proceed from the 
same presumptions of the established legal status 
inherent in any divorce action, no special 
heightened burden applies to Metropolitan's 
application for intervention. Consequently, the 
issues regarding the right of intervention are 
governed by the traditional standards of Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 24(a). 
**59 According to that rule, the four traditional 
requirements for intervention are met. First, there 
is no dispute that the application was 
timely; second, Metropolitan has a clear interest in 
avoiding the payment of fraudulent insurance 
claims; third, Gonzalez's petition may impair that 
interest if Metropolitan does not have the 
opportunity to demonstrate that the petition has 
been brought for fraudulent purposes; and fourth, 
no party other than Metropolitan has a clear interest 
or opportunity to present evidence demonstrating 
that Gonzalez's petition is fraudulent. 
**60 The trial court correctly dismissed 
Gonzalez's petition for failure to meet the time 
limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5; it did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez's request to 
ignore her stipulation; and it correctly refused to 
dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. I 
would affirm the trial court on all grounds. 
**61 Finally, I write to express my disapproval of 
Justice Durham's apparent attempt to give legal 
advice to one of the parties. She states in her 
section titled "Procedure on Remand" that 
"[although not discussed by any party to this 
appeal, we note a point that may assist in the 
disposition of the case on remand." Durham Op. | 
44. However, the issue she thereafter discusses 
has nothing to do with any disputed legal question 
this court believes is likely to occur on remand to 
the district court. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 795 (Utah 1991). Rather, she provides an 
advisory opinion that is apparently exclusively 
related to collateral and factually distinct 
proceedings in federal court. She does so under 
the apparent presumption that petitioner's counsel 
has failed to locate relevant, perhaps even 
dispositive, authority relating to petitioner's federal 
claim. This court has no business giving such 
advice to parties represented by counsel. Nor can 
we provide such advice to a federal court when no 
questions have been properly certified from that 
court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2( 1) (1996). 
**62 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Justice 
RUSSON's dissenting opinion. 
**63 Justice STEWART acted on this opinion 
prior to his retirement. 
1 P.3d 1074, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 89, 2000 UT 28 
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1391(b)(1); D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 
13-423(a)(l). 
[15] Federal Civil Procedure 170A €=^673 
170A Federal Civil Procedure 
170A VII Pleadings and Motions 
170AVII(B) Complaint 
170AVII(B)1 In General 
170Ak673 k. Claim for Relief in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Under the notice pleading requirement, a plaintiffs 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw com/nrint/nrintctr^am aorw9*-o=Yirr 
239 F.Supp.2d 34 
239 F.Supp.2d 34 
(Cite as: 239 F.Supp.2d 34) 
complaint need only contain a short and plain 
statement of the claim and the grounds on which it 
is based, and need not plead law or match facts with 
each element of a legal theory. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 8(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
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While plaintiff ultimately has the burden of proving 
a prima facie case in an employment discrimination 
case, plaintiff is not required to set forth the 
elements of a prima facie case at the initial pleading 
stage. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 8(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A 
[17] Civil Rights 78 €==>1395(8) 
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78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 1392 Pleading 
78k 13 95 Particular Causes of Action 
78k 1395(8) k. Employment Practices. 
Most Cited Cases 
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Allegation by African-American female former 
employee that employer's refusal to transfer her on 
the basis of her race constituted a violation of her 
rights under § 1981 and caused her to be 
constructively discharged properly put defendants 
on notice as to nature and basis of her claims and 
thus adequately stated claim under § 1981 for 
employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 8(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
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*36 Michael G. Ka.ne,Meredith S. Francis, 
Cashdan, Golden & Kane, P.L.L.C, Washington, 
DC, for plaintiff. 
Joseph Yenouskas, Douglas P. Lobel, Morgan, 
Lewis & Bockius, McLean, VA, for defendants. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge. 
This action was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as 
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, seeking 
injunctive relief and monetary damages for 
allegedly unlawful employment discrimination 
based on race. Plaintiff alleges that First Cash 
Financial Services, Inc. and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Famous Pawn, Inc., refused to laterally 
transfer the plaintiff, allegedly causing her 
constructive discharge. This matter comes before 
the Court on defendants' motions to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and failure 
to state a claim.™1 For the reasons that follow,*37 
this Court denies defendants' motions to dismiss. 
FN1. First Cash's motion to dismiss 
includes defenses under Rules 12(b)(2), 
12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Famous Pawn's 
motion to dismiss does not raise the Rule 
12(b)(2) lack of personal jurisdiction 
defense. Given the similar nature of the 
defendants' separately filed motions for 
dismissal, the Court will address both 
motions together. 
I. BACKGROUND 
From June 1997 to September 1998, plaintiff 
Monique Johnson-Tanner, a resident of the District 
of Columbia and an African American female, was 
employed as a salesperson by First Cash and/or by 
Famous Pawn. Plaintiff was originally hired to work 
at a pawn shop in Georgetown in the District of 
Columbia but, after several transfers, she ended up 
working at a Silver Spring, Maryland pawn shop. 
After being twice denied a transfer back to the 
Georgetown store, allegedly because of her race, 
plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on May 8, 
2001. 
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First Cash is a Delaware Corporation with its 
prmcipal place of business in Arlington, Texas 
Famous Pawn is a Maryland Corporation that 
operates pawn shops in Maryland, Virginia and the 
District of Columbia First Cash previously was 
the subject of a similar employment discrimination 
suit, the testimony from which plaintiff relies on 
heavily m the instant case FN2 
FN2 See Williams v First Cash, Inc, Civ 
Action 98-3567 (DC Superior Court 
1998) 
II PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
[1][2][3][4][5] District of Columbia law controls 
the extent to which the Court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant See 
Crane v Carr, 814 F 2d 758, 762 (DC Or 1987) 
DC Code Section 13-423(a)(l) provides that the 
Court "may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
person, who acts directly or as an agent, as to a 
claim for relief arising from the person's 
transacting any busmess in the District of Columbia 
" This long-arm provision allows for jurisdiction 
to the fullest extent permissible under the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
See Crane v New York Zoological Soc'y, 894 F 2d 
454, 455 (DCCirl990) Due Process is satisfied 
where a defendant has "minimum contacts" with the 
District of Columbia such that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction will not offend "traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice" 
International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 U S 
310, 316, 66 SCt 154, 90 L Ed 95 (1945) Such 
minimum contacts are established where a 
defendant "purposefully avails" itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities withm the forum 
jurisdiction such that the defendant "should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court" there 
Hanson v Denckla, 357 U S 235, 253, 78 SCt 
1228, 2 LEd2d 1283 (1958) S ee World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 U S 286, 297, 
100 SCt 559, 62 LEd2d 490 (1980) The 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving a prima facie 
case of personal jurisdiction by alleging specific 
acts linking a defendant with the forum See Crane 
v New York Zoological Soc'y, 894 F2d at 456, 
© 2006 Thomson/West No 
United States v Philip Morris, Inc, 116 F Supp 2d 
116, 121 (DDC2000) In deciding whether a 
basis for personal jurisdiction exists, factual 
discrepancies in the record must be resolved m the 
plaintiffs favor See United States v Philip 
Morris, Inc, 116 F Supp 2d at 121 
In an effort to establish that First Cash transacts 
business in the District of Columbia and possesses 
the necessary minimum contacts, plaintiff lists 
numerous facts indicating that Famous Pawn is "not 
its own business, but that of the parent corporation 
[First Cash] " Plaintiffs Opposition at 6 ("PI Opp " 
) In opposition, First Cash argues that it and 
Famous Pawn are in fact separate companies 
maintaining all corporate formalities First Cash 
further states that it owns no property m the District 
of Columbia, is not licensed to do *38 business in 
the District and transacts no busmess m the District 
This Court finds no genumely separate identity 
between First Cash and Famous Pawn, and the 
Court therefore has personal jurisdiction over First 
Cash (not just over Famous Pawn) 
A Alter Ego Analysis 
[6][7][8] Ordinarily, a defendant corporation's 
contacts with a forum may not be attributed to 
affiliated corporations See El-Fadl v Central 
Bank of Jordan, 75 F 3d 668, 675-76 
(DCCirl996), Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, PC 
v Hazard, 90 F Supp 2d 15, 22 (D DC 2000), 
Material Supply Int'l, Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co, 
62 F Supp 2d 13, 19 (DDC 1999) An exception 
exists, however, when the party contesting 
jurisdiction is found to be nothing more than the 
alter ego of an affiliated corporation over which the 
court does have jurisdiction, in that case the 
affiliated corporation's jurisdictional contacts may 
be extended to reach the other corporate entity 
See El-Fadl v Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F 3d at 
676 ("if parent and subsidiary 'are not really 
separate entities,' or one acts as an agent of the 
other, the local subsidiary's contacts can be 
imputed to the foreign parent"), Material Supply 
Int'l, Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co, 62 F Supp 2d at 
20 (same, where parent corporation so dommates 
subsidiary as "to negate its separate personality") " 
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In such cases, the foreign parent will be found to be 
transacting busmess in the forum state through the 
activities of its subsidiary" Color Sys, Inc v 
Meteor Photo Reprographic Sys, Inc, 1987 WL 
11085, *4 (DDC 1987) Whether one corporation 
is the alter ego of another is a question of law to be 
decided by the court See Shapiro, Lifschitz & 
Schram, PC v Hazard, 90 F Supp 2d at 22, 
Material Supply Int'l, Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co, 
62 F Supp 2d at 19-20 
[9] [10] The defendants concede that the Court has 
personal jurisdiction over Famous Pawn which 
admittedly operates pawn shops in the District of 
Columbia The question is whether the Court also 
has personal jurisdiction over First Cash as the alter 
ego of Famous Pawn To determine whether 
Famous Pawn is a separate corporate entity distinct 
from First Cash or merely the alter ego of first 
Cash, the Court must evaluate (1) whether there is 
such a unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of First Cash and Famous 
Pawn effectively no longer exist, and (2) whether 
an inequitable result would follow if the Court treats 
Famous Pawn's allegedly wrongful acts as those of 
Famous Pawn alone and not also those of First 
Cash See Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P C v 
Hazard, 90 F Supp 2d at 23, Material Supply Int'l, 
Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co, 62 F Supp 2d at 20 
Ultimately, the question is whether the parent 
corporation "so dominated the [subsidiary] 
corporation as to negate its separate personality," 
making the exercise of jurisdiction over the absent 
parent fair and equitable Material Supply Int'l, Inc 
v Sunmatch Indus Co, 62 F Supp 2d at 20 ( 
quoting Hart v Department of Agriculture, 112 
F 3d 1228, 1231 (D C Cir 1997)) 
1 Unity of Interest and Ownership 
[11][12][13] Unity of interest is established if First 
Cash had active and substantial control of Famous 
Pawn at the time of the alleged racial 
discrimination, see Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, 
PC v Hazard, 90 F supp 2d at 23, but this control 
does not have to amount to actual day-to-day 
control or supervision See Material Supply Int'l, 
Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co, 62 F Supp 2d at 20 
© 2006 Thomson/West No 
Among the factors the Court is to consider in 
making this determination are whether there was a 
failure to maintain separate corporate minutes or *39 
records, a iailure to maintain corporate formalities, 
a commingling of funds or other assets, a diversion 
of one corporation's funds to the other's uses, the 
use of the same office or business location, and/or 
a joint accounting and payroll system Id It is also 
relevant whether the subsidiary is operated as a 
mere division of the parent and/or whether the 
subsidiary is operated exclusively in the interest of 
the parent See id The transfer of personnel back 
and forth between the parent corporation and its 
subsidiary or affiliate is another relevant factor 
See Color Sys, Inc v Meteor Photo Reprographic 
Sys, Inc, 1987 WL 11085 at *5 In this case, a 
number of these factors lead the Court to conclude 
that there is sufficient unity of interest and 
ownership to blur any distinction between the two 
companies' respective personalities and to permit 
the Court reasonably to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over First Cash Fmancial Services 
First, First Cash and Famous Pawn share at least 
three key common officers and directors Rick 
Powell, Alan Barron and Rick Wessel See PI 
Opp, Exhibit 22, First Cash Responses to Plaintiffs 
Interrogatones at 6, 8F N 3 Rick Powell is both 
Chairman/CEO of First Cash and a Director of 
Famous Pawn Alan Barron serves as the Chief 
Operatmg Officer of First Cash and as the President 
of Famous Pawn Rick Wessel handles the duties of 
Chief Financial Officer for both First Cash and 
Famous Pawn, he also fills the roles of Director, 
Secretary and Treasurer of First Cash Sharing 
officers between the parent and the subsidiary or the 
presence of "interlocking directorates" are 
indicative of common corporate ownership and 
control See Color Sys, Inc v Meteor Photo 
Reprographic Sys, Inc, 1987 WL 11085 at **5, 6 
(finding alter ego test satisfied in part where parent 
and subsidiary shared two of three members of 
board of directors and where one co-manager of 
parent was also president of subsidiary), Shapiro, 
Lifschitz & Schram, PC v Hazard, 90 F Supp 2d 
at 26 (suggestmg operational nexus where two 
seemingly separate construction-related companies 
shared the sole employee of one of the companies), 
Material Supply Int'l, Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co, 
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62 F.Supp.2d at 22 (strong evidence of control 
where president of parent makes all final business 
and financial decisions regarding subsidiary). 
FN3. Unless otherwise noted, all exhibits 
cited herein are Exhibits to Plaintiffs 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
Second, according to Rick Wessel, none of the 
common executives/directors maintains separate 
phone or fax lines for their respective dual roles. 
See Exhibit 19, September 21, 2001 Deposition of 
Rick Wessel at 127-28 ("Wessel Dep"). This is 
another indicator that there is a unity of interest and 
operations. See Shapiro, Lifschitz <£ Schram, P.C 
v. Hazard, 90 F.Supp.2d at 26 n. 11 
(undifferentiated use of office equipment such as 
phones, faxes, copiers and computers by dual 
employees is relevant factor in assessing nature of 
corporate ownership and control). 
Third, the joint executives/directors listed above 
ordered the transfer of at least one employee, Chris 
Lee, from First Cash in Texas to the Washington, 
D.C. metropolitan region to serve as First Cash or 
Famous Pawn's Regional Vice President, with 
responsibility for overseeing District of Columbia 
stores. See Wessel Dep. at 24; Exhibit 9, 2001 
Deposition of Chris Lee at 32. The only stores in 
the District of Columbia, it should be noted, were 
Famous Pawn shops.FN4 As First Cash's Regional 
*40 Vice President, Lee had responsibility for store 
operations in Washington, D.C, which included the 
responsibility to terminate employees from District 
of Columbia-that is, Famous Pawn-stores. See 
Exhibit 8, 1998 Deposition of Chris Lee at 16-17. 
One of the employees whom Lee terminated was 
Cynthia Williams, who worked in a pawn shop 
located in Georgetown. Id. 
FN4. Lee, who testified that he was 
employed by First Cash during his 1998 
deposition in Williams v. First Cash, Inc., 
now states that he erroneously labeled 
himself a First Cash employee when in fact 
he worked for Famous Pawn. See First 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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Cash's Reply in Support of its Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
at 12-13 ("First Cash's Reply"). If this is 
true, this only provides farther evidence 
that at least one employee was transferred 
between the parent and the subsidiary. 
Another employee, Karie McBride, testified that 
she was hired as First Cash's Regional Human 
Resource Director by Scott Williamson, a First 
Cash Senior Vice President who subsequently 
served as McBride's supervisor. In this position, 
McBride had hiring authority, which she exercised 
during visits to District of Columbia stores. See 
Exhibit 11, 1998 McBride Deposition at 7-8, 13 (" 
McBride Dep. I"); Exhibit 34, McBride Trial 
Testimony at 3. This statement was made during 
McBride's deposition in Williams v. First Cash, Inc. 
During McBride's deposition three years later in the 
instant case, Ms. McBride claimed to have 
mistakenly identified herself as a First Cash 
employee during her Williams deposition, and 
testified that she-like Chris Lee-was in fact a 
Famous Pawn employee. See First Cash's Reply at 
13. If McBride was actually a Famous Pawn 
employee, hired and supervised by a First Cash 
employee, this only further demonstrates First 
Cash's exercise of management control and 
authority over Famous Pawn employees. 
Since the primary focus of the alter ego analysis is 
to ascertain whether the parent corporation "so 
dominated the [subsidiary] corporation as to negate 
its separate personality," see Material Supply Int'l, 
Inc. v. Sunmatch Indus. Co., 62 F.Supp.2d at 20, 
First Cash's control of Famous Pawn supervisory 
employees and its high degree of oversight and 
management activity-including the hiring and firing 
of First Pawn employees-is an extremely relevant 
factor, independent of the actual sharing of officers. 
See Color Sys., Inc. v. Meteor Photo 
Reprographic Sys., Inc., 1987 WL 11085 at *5 
(transfer of personnel between parent and 
subsidiary is factor for consideration); cf. Richard 
v. Bell Atlantic Corp., Inc., 976 F.Supp. 40, 44, 
47-48 (D.D.C.1997) (common management of 
human resources functions probative of whether 
parent controls employment decisions of 
subsidiaries; evidence of " 'consultative 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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involvement' with respect to decisions concerning 
hiring, promotion, evaluation, work assignments, 
training, and discharge" of subsidiary's employees 
also relevant factor). 
Fourth, according to Ms. McBride, First Cash 
headquarters in Arlington, Texas inputs, stores and 
maintains nearly all records concerning Famous 
Pawn employees, including those employed in the 
District of Columbia. See McBride Dep. I at 
16-17; see also Wessel Dep. at 66-67, 87. These 
personnel files include employment applications, 
performance reviews, background checks, 
separation (termination) forms-all of which are 
supplied by First Cash directly-and information on 
employee demographics. See Exhibit 12, 2001 
McBride Deposition at 135, 156-57, 161-62 (" 
McBride Dep. II"). Ms. McBride forwarded some 
of the human resources materials to First Cash in 
Texas for processing and storage and regularly 
contacted the First Cash employee in charge of 
payroll, Phyllis Christian, in order to gain access to 
the information contained in the *41 personnel files. 
See id. at 158, 180-81; McBride Dep. I at 16-17. 
In addition, the First Cash job application telephone 
hotline and the employment page on the First Cash 
website-both advertised at the Georgetown Famous 
Pawn shop-put prospective employees in touch with 
John Hamilton, the First Cash human resources 
recruiter. See Exhibit 43, Affidavit of Michael 
Marra ffi[ 3-5. 
Fifth, First Cash and Famous Pawn also maintain 
joint payroll and accounting systems. See Wessel 
Dep. at 90-91, 110. Employees at First Cash's 
Texas headquarters provide "accounting [services], 
payroll processing, accounts payable processing 
[and] financial statement generation" for Famous 
Pawn's District of Columbia stores. Id. at 110 In 
fact, Famous Pawn pay stubs bear the name of First 
Cash along with its Texas address. See, e.g., 
Exhibit 31 (Monique Tanner Pay Stub). First Cash 
also supplies Famous Pawn with income tax 
services, including processing "of Famous Pawn's 
property taxes, ... sales tax payments and state 
income tax filings." Id. Health benefits, 401(k) 
account administration, worker's compensation 
insurance, an integrated computer network, 
computer support and e-mail services also are 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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provided by First Cash to Famous Pawn and First 
Cash's other subsidiaries. See Wessel Dep at 44, 
47-48,68,91,112. 
Although First Cash asserts that these services are 
provided through contract, there is no evidence that 
First Cash bills Famous Pawn directly for these 
services. It appears that First Cash merely 
calculates an amount owed by Famous Pawn based 
upon Famous Pawn's revenues vis-a-vis the total 
revenues from the First Cash family of companies 
and then simply deducts that amount from Famous 
Pawn accounts-another indicator of a unity of 
interest, ownership and control. See Shapiro, 
Lifschitz & Schram, P.C v. Hazard, 90 F.Supp.2d 
at 24 (unity of financial transactions and no written 
documentation showing separate corporate 
identities when monetary exchanges are at issue 
important factors); cf MCI Communications Corp. 
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1983 WL 1881, ** 10, 
12-13 (D.D.C.1983) (common employee insurance 
and stock benefit plans are factors for consideration 
in analysis of transacting business venue provision). 
Based on all of these factors, the Court concludes 
that First Cash exercised a sufficient degree of contr 
ol over Famous Pawn and there was a sufficiently 
clear unity of interest and ownership that the two 
companies cannot be treated as separate and distinct 
corporate identities. This Court therefore may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over First Cash as 
well as Famous Pawn. 
2. Inequitable Result 
This Court finds that it would create an injustice to 
permit First Cash to escape the consequences of its 
substantial connection to Famous Pawn's 
employment practices and procedures in the District 
of Columbia. It is evident from the record that 
there is a unity of interest between the two entities. 
First Cash has sufficient ownership and control over 
all aspects of Famous Pawn's business to establish 
that First Cash is transacting business in the District 
of Columbia, and thus to satisfy the minimum 
contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction. See 
International Shoe Co v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 
316, 66 S.Ct. 154. There is nothing unfair or 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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inequitable in treating the wrongful acts of Famous 
Pawn (if proven) as those of First Cash as well. 
Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 90 
F.Supp.2d at 26. 
*42 III. VENUE 
[14] Defendants also argue that venue is improper 
in this district. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), this 
district is an appropriate venue if both First Cash 
and Famous Pawn reside here. As corporations, 
defendants are "deemed to reside in any judicial 
district in which [they are] subject to personal 
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Famous Pawn has never 
contested personal jurisdiction because it operates 
pawn shops in the District of Columbia. As 
discussed above, the Court finds that First Cash is 
subject to personal jurisdiction under the D.C. 
long-arm statute by virtue of its inextricable links to 
and control over Famous Pawn. Thus, venue is 
proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 
IV. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 
Plaintiff brings her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
which prohibits racial discrimination in the " 
making, performance, modification, and termination 
of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, 
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed 
to state a claim because she has not alleged an 
adverse employment action in her complaint, an 
essential element of a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination. See, e.g., Brown v. 
Brody, 199 F.3d 446,452 (D.C.Cir.1999). 
[15][16] Defendants' argument is of no avail. This 
Court need not determine at this stage whether the 
denial of plaintiffs lateral transfer constitutes an 
adverse action. More to the point, plaintiff is not 
required to allege an adverse action in her 
complaint. Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs complaint need 
only contain a short and plain statement of the claim 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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and the grounds on which it is based, and need not 
plead law or match facts with each element of a 
legal theory. Therefore, a complaint may be 
dismissed for failure to state claim only if "it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of [her] claim which would 
entitle [her] to relief." Sparrow v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1114 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quoting 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 
2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Furthermore, in deciding a 
motion to dismiss, the Court must accept plaintiffs 
allegations as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in plaintiffs favor. Glymph v. District of 
Columbia, 180 F.Supp.2d 111, 114 (D.D.C.2001). 
While plaintiff ultimately has the burden of proving 
a prima facie case in an employment discrimination 
case, she "is not required to set forth the elements 
of a prima facie case at the initial pleading stage." 
Glymph v. District of Columbia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 
114; see Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 
F.3d at 1114 ("[n]one of this, however, has to be 
accomplished in the complaint itself."). 
[17] Furthermore, Count I of plaintiffs First 
Amended Complaint expressly states: "First 
Cash/Famous Pawn's refusal to transfer Ms. 
Johnson-Tanner on the basis of her race constituted 
a violation of her rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 
1981 and caused her to be constructively discharged. 
" First Amended Complaint H 20 ("Comp."). 
This statement clearly puts defendants on notice of 
the nature and basis of plaintiffs claim. See 
Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d at 1115 
. Plaintiff identifies herself as a member of a 
minority class, effectively asserts that she requested 
and was denied a transfer, and cites three separate 
statements that implicate race as a deciding factor in 
denying*43 the transfer. See Compl. ff 3, 10, 
12, 13, 15-16. Taking these allegations as true, it is 
apparent that plaintiffs complaint properly puts 
defendants on notice as to the nature and basis of 
plaintiffs claims and thus adequately states a claim. 
See Glymph v. District of Columbia, 180 
F.Supp.2d at 114. Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED that defendants' motions to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and 
failure to state a claim are DENIED; and it is 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for all parties 
shall appear for a status conference on January 29, 
2003 at 9:30 a.m. 
SO ORDERED. 
D.D.C.,2003. 
Johnson-Tanner v. First Cash Financial Services, 
Inc. 
239 F.Supp.2d 34 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
LUCKY SEVEN RODEO CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Pat CLARK, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 880079-CA. 
June 9, 1988. 
On appeal from summary judgment by the District 
Court, Washington County, terminating easement in 
property, the Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held 
that: (1) language of stipulated court order granting 
easement did not clearly and unambiguously require 
that dike and reservoir be preserved and area used 
for irrigation purposes, and (2) removal of portion 
of dike and reservoir did not conclusively result in 
abandonment of easement, particularly in light of 
ten-year nonuse provision delineated for 
termination thereof. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error €==>863 
30k863 Most Cited Cases 
[1] Appeal and Error €=^934(1) 
30k934(l) Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing summary judgment, Court of Appeals 
applies analytical standard required of trial court 
and liberally construing facts and viewing evidence 
in light most favorable to party opposing motion. 
[2] Appeal and Error €=>863 
30k863 Most Cited Cases 
Because summary judgment is granted as matter of 
law rather than fact, Court of Appeals is free to 
reappraise trial court's legal conclusion. 
[3] Appeal and Error C=>934(1) 
30k934(l) Most Cited Cases 
[3] Appeal and Error €=>1024.4 
30k 1024.4 Most Cited Cases 
After reviewing facts in light most favorable to 
appellant, if Court of Appeals concludes there is 
dispute as to material issue of fact it must reverse 
trial court's summary judgment and remand for trial 
on that issue. 
[4] Judgment €=>185(6) 
228kl85(6) Most Cited Cases 
[4] Judgment €=>186 
228k 186 Most Cited Cases 
It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed 
material facts in ruling on summary judgment, and 
it matters not that evidence on one side may appear 
to be strong or even compelling; one sworn 
statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute 
averments on other side of controversy and create 
issue of fact, precluding entry of summary judgment. 
[5] Judgment €^181(15.1) 
228kl81(15.1) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 228kl 81(15)) 
Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether 
stipulated court order granting easement required 
that dike and reservoir be preserved and area used 
for irrigation purposes, precluded summary 
judgment terminating easement after portion of dike 
was removed and ground was leveled in preparation 
for planting. 
[6] Judgment €=>91 
228k91 Most Cited Cases 
Ambiguous stipulated judgment is subject to 
construction according to rules that apply to all 
written contracts. 
[7] Judgment €=^181(8) 
228kl81(8) Most Cited Cases 
If stipulated judgment is ambiguous and there are 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/Drint/Drintstream asnx^rs=WT Wfi Of^Hpetinatirm^tr^rn/t^zO c\sr £/i CHAA/: 
755 P.2d 750 
755 P.2d 750 
(Cite as: 755 P.2d 750) 
disputed issues of fact as to what parties intended, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. 
[8] Contracts €==>256 
95k256 Most Cited Cases 
"Abandonment" of contract means intentional 
relinquishment of one's rights therein, and in order 
to nullify such rights there must be clear and 
unequivocal showing of such abandonment. 
[9] Contracts €==>256 
95k256 Most Cited Cases 
When there is dispute as to whether "abandonment 
of contract" has occurred, it is usually question of 
fact to be determined from all facts and 
circumstances of particular case, including 
expressions of intent and other actions of parties. 
[10] Waters and Water Courses €=^165 
405k 165 Most Cited Cases 
Removal of portion of dike and reservoir did not 
conclusively result in abandonment of easement, 
particularly in light of ten-year nonuse provision 
delineated for termination of easement. 
*751 Timothy B. Anderson (argued), Dale R. 
Chamberlain, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough, St. George, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for defendant 
and respondent. 
Before BENCH, JACKSON and BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation 
("Lucky") appeals from a summary judgment which 
terminated Lucky's easement in property owned by 
respondent Pat Clark. Lucky contends that the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment, arguing 
that the court misconstrued the unambiguous order 
establishing the easement or that the order granting 
the easement was ambiguous, and, thus, summary 
judgment was inappropriate. We reverse and 
remand. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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In March of 1981, Lucky filed suit against Pat 
Clark to quiet title to a parcel of land, hereinafter 
referred to as the reservoir and dike area, bordering 
their respective properties. On the third day of 
trial, the parties negotiated a settlement. The 
stipulation was reduced to writing and signed by the 
parties and their counsel. An order and judgment 
incorporating the stipulation was signed by the 
judge on February 13, 1984. 
The stipulation and order granted title to the 
reservoir and dike area to Pat Clark and Tex Gates, 
and granted an easement to Lucky. The easement 
relevant to this action is contained in the following 
paragraphs, with our emphasis added: 
3. Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and 
its successors and assigns (hereinafter "Plaintiff) 
shall have an exclusive and perpetual easement to 
use, maintain and operate the reservoir and dyke 
arefaj which are described in paragraph 2 above 
for irrigation, stock watering, corralling of 
animals and agricultural purposes, together with 
the obligation that plaintiff shall maintain the 
fences enclosing the area hereinabove described. 
* * * 
6. In the event the reservoir and Dyke [sic] area 
described in paragraph 2 above were to fall into 
non-use for a period of Ten (JO) consecutive 
years, the easement granted in paragraph 3 
above would expire automatically without notice. 
In 1985, Lucky removed from the easement a 
portion of a dike located on the property, and began 
to level the ground in preparation for planting. Pat 
Clark, the fee owner, filed this action to terminate 
Lucky's easement in the property, alleging Lucky's 
removal of the reservoir and dike destroyed the 
need for the easement, and indicated Lucky's intent 
to abandon it. Clark further alleged that Lucky had 
failed to maintain the fences on the property and 
had in fact destroyed the fences, contrary to the 
agreement of the parties, and the consequent court 
order. 
It is undisputed that Lucky removed the dike, but 
there is disagreement as to whether Lucky removed 
fences that were part of the easement agreement, or 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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other fences with no relevance to the easement. 
Lucky filed an affidavit of its president, Russel 
Walter, stating that he understood the easement 
agreement to grant alternative uses of the property 
and that Lucky had elected to use the property for 
agricultural purposes as provided for in the 
agreement. Lucky denied any intent to abandon the 
easement, and believed that its removal of the dike 
and reservoir was consistent with the language of 
the easement and the intent of the parties in 
allowing use of the property for agricultural 
purposes. 
The court granted Clark's motion for summary 
judgment and terminated Lucky's easement. The 
court indicated that there was ambiguity in the 
agreement, but stated that it had "a clear memory in 
this case" and, in making its decision, had relied 
upon its recollection of the previous trial. In 
making his ruling, the judge stated: 
*752 It is my direct impression that the purpose 
of the lawsuit with respect to the area was for a 
reservoir and dike. That's my view. I believe 
that the purpose of the settlement, the purpose of 
the order and judgment of the Court, the purpose 
of resolving all of the law suit, was to maintain a 
reservoir and dike use. That's not done. Motion 
granted. 
Lucky appeals the court's entry of summary 
judgment, claiming that the court erroneously relied 
on its own pre-stipulation recollection of the facts 
and claims the stipulation and court order clearly 
grant an easement for the use of the property for 
agricultural purposes. Lucky further claims that, if 
the language is ambiguous, the court erred in 
granting Clark's motion for summary judgment 
because there was a clear factual dispute as to the 
intent of the parties and Lucky's intent to abandon 
the easement. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3][4] In reviewing a summary judgment, we 
apply the analytical standard required of the trial 
court. Oberhansly v. Sprouse, 751 P.2d 1155, 1156 
(Utah Cr.App.1988). We liberally construe the 
facts and view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 3 
Moreover, because a summary judgment is granted 
as a matter of law rather than fact, we are free to 
reappraise the trial court's legal conclusion. Atlas 
Corp. v. Clovis Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987); Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 1156; K.O. 
v. Denison, 748 P.2d 588, 590 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a 
material issue of fact, we must reverse the trial 
court's determination and remand for trial on that 
issue. Atlas, 131 P.2d at 229; Denison, 748 P.2d at 
590. It is inappropriate for courts to weigh 
disputed material facts in ruling on a summary 
judgment. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987); WM Barnes 
Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 
59 (Utah 1981); Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 1156. It 
matters not that the evidence on one side may 
appear to be strong or even compelling. Spor, 740 
P.2d at 1308; Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 1156. One 
sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to 
dispute the averments on the other side of the 
controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding 
the entry of summary judgment. W.M. Barnes, 627 
P.2d at 59; Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1975). 
ORDER GRANTING EASEMENT 
[5] After an independent review, in a light most 
favorable to Lucky, we cannot conclude, as a matter 
of law, that the language of the stipulated court 
order granting the easement clearly and 
unambiguously requires that the dike and reservoir 
be preserved and the area used for irrigation 
purposes. The determinative paragraphs of the 
stipulation and order are paragraphs 3 and 6 which 
provide with our emphasis: 
3. Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and 
its successors and assigns (hereinafter "Plaintiff) 
shall have an exclusive and perpetual easement to 
use, maintain and operate the reservoir and dyke 
arefa] which are described in paragraph 2 above 
for irrigation, stock watering, corralling of 
animals and agricultural purposes, together with 
the obligation that plaintiff shall maintain the 
fences enclosing the area hereinabove described. 
* * * 
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6. In the event the reservoir and Dyke [sic] area 
described in paragraph 2 above were to fall into 
non-use for a period of Ten (10) consecutive 
years, the easement granted in paragraph 3 above 
would expire automatically without notice. 
The stipulation and order create an easement to 
use, maintain and operate the reservoir and dike 
area for irrigation, stock watering, corralling of 
animals and agricultural purposes. The language 
creates an easement which terminates only if the 
property falls into non-use, for a period of 10 
consecutive years. For the trial court's entry of 
summary judgment to be correct, this court must 
read the stipulation as unambiguously providing 
that all uses of the *753 easement must continue or 
the easement is terminated or that the failure of 
Lucky to maintain the reservoir and dike located on 
the land terminated the easement. We agree with 
the trial court that this order is ambiguous. It is 
ambiguous as to what is meant by "maintain" and 
whether the uses of the easement are alternative. 
This is further confused by the language that, in any 
event, any non-use must continue for 10 years 
before the easement expires. 
AMBIGUITY OF SETTLEMENT ORDER 
[6] [7] An ambiguous judgment is subject to 
construction according to the rules that apply to all 
written contracts. Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign 
Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978). If the 
judgment is ambiguous, and if there are disputed 
issues of fact as to what the parties intended, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); 
Amjacs Interwest Inc. v. Design Assoc, 635 P.2d 
53, 55 (Utah 1981). [FN1] Extrinsic evidence as to 
the intent of the parties must be received and 
considered in an effort to glean what the parties 
actually agreed to. Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 748 
P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
FN1. The trial judge seemed to rely on his 
independent recollection of the 
pre-settlement hearing to interpret the 
ambiguity in the settlement order. This is 
clearly inappropriate. See Carr v. 
Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 23 Utah 2d 415, 
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464 P.2d 580, 581 (1970). 
In the instant case, the facts as to what the parties 
intended are vigorously disputed. There was 
competent evidence before the court that the parties 
intended alternative uses for the dike and reservoir 
area and that the reservoir was not required to be 
preserved. Lucky's president filed a sworn 
affidavit stating that he understood the stipulated 
order to provide alternative uses for the property 
and that the water pipe line installed eliminated the 
need for a reservoir. Clark filed a conflicting 
affidavit stating the removal of the dike and 
reservoir destroyed the intended purpose of the 
easement. Thus, summary judgment is 
inappropriate and the trial court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing to determine the scope and 
purpose of the easement. 
ABANDONMENT 
[8] [9] The trial court determined that Lucky 
abandoned the easement by its removal of the dike 
and reservoir. Abandonment means the intentional 
relinquishment of one's rights in the contract; and 
in order to nullify such rights, there must be a clear 
and unequivocal showing of such abandonment. 
Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 
481, 484 (Utah 1975). When there is dispute as to 
whether abandonment has occurred, it is usually a 
question of fact to be determined from all the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case, including 
the expressions of intent and other actions of the 
parties. Id.; Thermo-Kinetic Corp. v. Allen, 16 
Ariz.App. 341, 493 P.2d 508, 512 (1972). 
[10] Based on the record before us, we cannot say 
what the intended purpose of the easement was, and 
thus cannot find, as a matter of law, that Lucky's 
removal of the dike and reservoir resulted in an 
abandonment of the easement, particularly in light 
of the 10 year non-use provision delineated for 
termination of the easement. 
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and 
remand for a hearing in conformance with our 
opinion. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Leo W. HARDY, M.D., Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20000501. 
Aug. 30, 2002. 
Doctor brought action against county hospital after 
hospital's board of trustees voided contract under 
which doctor was to provide pathological services 
to hospital. The District Court, Eighth District, 
Duchesne County, John R. Anderson, J., granted 
hospital's motion for summary judgment. Doctor 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durrant, Associate 
C.J., held that: (1) contract involved a proprietary 
function and therefore was enforceable against 
successor boards of trustees if of a reasonable 
duration; (2) issue of whether contract was of a 
reasonable duration required remand; and (3) term 
of length could not be read into contract. 
Remanded with instructions. 
Russon, J., concurred in part and dissented in part 
with opinion in which Howe, J., concurred. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error €=>863 
30k863 Most Cited Cases 
In deciding whether the trial court correctly granted 
summary judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme 
Court gives no deference to the trial court's view of 
the law; it is reviewed for correctness. 
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[2] Municipal Corporations €==>232 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Government contracts that extend beyond the term 
of the governing body that originally entered into 
the contract represent a public policy concern, as 
such contracts, if enforced, potentially allow a 
former governing body to perpetuate its policies 
beyond its term and thereby limit a successor 
governing body's ability to respond to the public's 
changing needs. 
[3] Municipal Corporations €==>232 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Under the governmental/proprietary test to 
determine whether a government contract should be 
enforced against a successor governing body, a 
contract is (1) unenforceable against successor 
governing bodies if it involves a governmental 
power or function, but (2) enforceable against 
successor governing bodies if it involves a 
proprietary power or function and is of a reasonable 
duration. 
[4] Municipal Corporations 4^*7 I1 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court declined to repudiate the 
governmental/proprietary test, used to determine 
whether a government contract should be enforced 
against a successor government body. 
[5] Counties €=^114 
104kl 14 Most Cited Cases 
Contract for pathology services between doctor and 
county hospital involved a proprietary function and 
therefore was enforceable against successor boards 
of trustees if it was of a reasonable duration; 
services provided were not indispensable to the 
proper functioning of government, and doctor 
merely recommended policies related to hospital's 
pathology laboratory, while the board of trustees 
retained ultimate decision making authority. 
[6] Appeal and Error €=^172(1) 
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Doctor failed to raise argument in trial court that the 
county hospital's successor board of trustees was 
precluded from terminating his personal services 
contract with hospital because the board earlier 
ratified it, and thus Supreme Court declined to hear 
argument on appeal. 
[7] Appeal and Error €=>1178(1) 
30k 1178(1) Most Cited Cases 
Issue of whether contract between doctor and 
county hospital for doctor to provide pathological 
services was of a reasonable duration at the time 
they entered into the contract, and thus whether 
contract was an enforceable 
proprietary contract under the 
governmental/proprietary test, required remand. 
[8] Municipal Corporations €=^232 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Whether a contract's duration is reasonable for 
purposes of governmental/proprietary test to 
determine whether a government contract is binding 
on successor governing bodies depends on the 
circumstances of each case. 
[9] Municipal Corporations €=^232 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Depending on the circumstances, a lengthy or 
indefinite contractual duration is not necessarily an 
unreasonable duration under the 
governmental/proprietary test for a public contract 
to exist. 
[10] Counties €==>126 
104k 126 Most Cited Cases 
Term of length could not be read into personal 
services contract between doctor and county 
hospital; contract did not specify a duration, 
contract provided for termination for "just cause," 
parties agreed in their appellate briefs that the 
contract was of indefinite length, and term was not 
necessary to determine prospective damages for 
breach of the contract. 
[11] Contracts €=>9(3) 
95k9(3) Most Cited Cases 
Parties have the right to enter into indefinite length 
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contracts terminable for cause. 
[12] Labor and Employment C=?47 
23 lHk47 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant) 
[12] Reformation of Instruments €==>16 
328k 16 Most Cited Cases 
When a contract for employment or personal 
services does not recite a fixed term, the law does 
not call for the judicial reformation of the contract 
to impose a term, especially when neither party 
disputes the contract was of indefinite duration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
**1 This appeal concerns the voidability of certain 
government contracts. Specifically, we consider 
the question of when a contract entered into by a 
predecessor governing body is voidable by a 
successor governing body. Throughout the 
country, substantial case law has developed to 
distinguish between those government contracts that 
may be voided and those that may not be voided by 
a successor governing body. Various common law 
tests have been articulated, all designed to balance 
the tension between the right of a successor 
governing body to implement its own policies and 
not be bound by those of a former body, and the 
interest in providing some certainty to parties who 
contract with governing bodies. Utah courts have 
relied on the governmental/proprietary test, a test 
under which contracts involving proprietary 
functions and having reasonable durations are 
enforceable against successor governing bodies. 
**2 In this case, the district court granted 
summary judgment to a county hospital on the 
theory that the particular contract at issue, a 
contract for the provision of pathological services to 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
h t tn : / /web2 .wes t l awxom/Dr in^ 6/15/2006 
54 P 3d 1165 
54 P 3d 1165,19 IER Cases 9,455 Utah Adv Rep 36, 
(Cite as: 54 P.3d 1165,2002 UT 92) 
the hospital by a doctor, was voidable by the 
hospital's governing body-its board of trustees 
The district court held that the contract had been 
entered into by a predecessor board and thus was 
voidable by successor boards 
**3 Because we conclude that the contract for 
pathological services involves a proprietary 
function, we remand with instructions that the 
district court determine whether the contract's 
duration was reasonable 
BACKGROUND 
**4 The following facts are undisputed On 
November 29, 1994, Dr Leo Hardy entered into a 
contract with Uintah Basin Medical *1167 Center 
("UBMC"), a hospital owned by Duchesne County 
and operated by a board of trustees Under the 
terms of the contract, Dr Hardy received $400 per 
month for providmg UBMC pathological services 
on a part-time basis and serving as the director of its 
pathology laboratory The contract did not recite a 
termination date, but provided that either party 
could terminate the contract for "just cause" 
following ninety days' notice 
**5 Although Dr Hardy performed his contractual 
obligations satisfactorily and received no 
complaints from UBMC or its medical staff, on July 
18, 1996, the UBMC board of trustees voted to give 
Dr Hardy ninety days' notice and invite another 
doctor to join its medical staff as a pathologist and 
emergency room physician When Dr Hardy's 
termination became effective, UBMC sought a 
declaratory judgment that it had "just cause" to 
terminate the contract Dr Hardy counterclaimed, 
contending that UBMC materially breached the 
contract by terminating him because UBMC did not 
have "just cause" The district court initially 
denied the parties' respective motions for summary 
judgment, ruling that the jury would decide whether 
UBMC had "just cause" 
**6 Following this ruling, the district court 
accepted supplemental briefing from the parties on 
an issue UBMC had raised for the first time in its 
answer to Dr Hardy's counterclaim whether the 
contract violated common law rules against 
© 2006 Thomson/West No 
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government contracts that bind successor governing 
bodies After hearing from the parties, the court 
granted UBMC summary judgment on the ground 
that the contract was voidable even without " 'just 
cause' simply because it could not bind successor 
Boards" In reachmg this conclusion, the district 
court explained, "Due to the rapid advance of 
science, medicme [sic] changes and needs of 
patients there should be no reason for such an 
agreement to continue into the future or be binding 
on successor [b]oards where the governing [b]oard 
is a governmental entity" Dr Hardy appeals 
Section 78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code gives us 
appellate jurisdiction over this case Utah Code 
Ann § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp 2001) 
AINAL¥S1S 
I STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] **7 "In decidmg whether the trial court 
correctly granted [summary] judgment as a matter 
of law, 'we give no deference to the trial court's 
view of the law, we review it for correctness' " 
SME Indus, Inc v Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback 
& Assocs, 2001 UT 54, f 9, 28 P 3d 669 (quoting 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, lnc v 
Blomquist, 173 P 2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989)) 
II RATIONALE BEHIND COMMON LAW 
RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS THAT BIND 
SUCCESSOR GOVERNING BODIES 
**8 Before addressing Dr Hardy's specific claims 
on appeal, we briefly discuss the rationale behind 
the common law rules regarding contracts that bind 
successor governing bodies 
[2] **9 Government contracts raise public policy 
concerns beyond those involved with private 
contracts See, eg, Mitchell v Chester Hous 
Auth, 389 Pa 314, 132 A 2d 873, 876 (1957) 
One such concern involves contracts that extend 
beyond the term of the governing body that 
originally entered into the contract Such contracts, 
if enforced, potentially allow a former governing 
body to perpetuate its policies beyond its term and 
thereby limit a successor governing body's ability to 
respond to the public's changing needs See 
generally Figuly v City of Douglas, 853 F Supp 
i to Ong U S Govt Works 
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381,384(D.Wyo.l994). 
**10 While such concerns militate against 
enforcing a predecessor governing body's contracts 
against its successors, the common law also 
recognizes a countervailing concern: that 
permitting successor governing bodies to 
indiscriminately terminate government contracts 
may make private parties hesitant to contract with 
government entities, thereby reducing the viability 
of contracts as a means of solving public 
problems. See Plant Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 
214 N.C. 518, 199 S.E. 712, 714 (1938). 
[3][4] **11 A desire to accommodate these 
competing concerns animates the various common 
law tests for determining whether a *1168 contract 
should be enforced against a successor governing 
body. The test on which Utah courts rely is known 
as the governmental/proprietary test. See Bair v. 
Layton City Corp., 6 Utah 2d 138, 147-48, 307 
P.2d 895, 902 (1957); see also Salt Lake City v. 
State, 22 Utah 2d 37, 42, 448 P.2d 350, 354 (1968) 
(holding that contract for providing water to state 
capitol grounds was enforceable under the 
governmental/proprietary test). [FN1] Under the 
governmental/proprietary test, a contract is (1) 
unenforceable against successor governing bodies if 
it involves a governmental power or function, but 
(2) enforceable against successor governing bodies 
if it involves a proprietary power or function and is 
of a reasonable duration. Bair, 6 Utah 2d at 
147-48, 307 P.2d at 902. 
FN1. Citing various criticisms of the 
governmental/proprietary test, both parties 
urge us to repudiate it in favor of other 
common law tests. However, because the 
parties have failed to show that any of their 
suggested tests is clearly better than the 
governmental/proprietary test, we decline 
to repudiate it at this time. See State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) 
(noting that because of stare decisis, 
"[t]hose asking us to overturn prior 
precedent have a substantial burden of 
persuasion"). 
**12 Having set forth the 
governmental/proprietary test, we next apply it to 
Dr. Hardy's contract to determine whether the 
contract may be validly enforced against successor 
hospital boards of trustees. 
III. WHETHER DR. HARDY'S CONTRACT IS 
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST SUCCESSOR 
BOARDS OF 
TRUSTEES 
[5][6] * *13 Dr. Hardy maintains the district court 
erred in concluding that his contract was voidable 
because it bound successor boards. [FN2] Relying 
on the governmental/proprietary test, Dr. Hardy 
argues that his contract for pathological services 
involves a proprietary function and therefore was 
enforceable against successor boards provided it is 
of a reasonable duration. We agree. 
FN2. Dr. Hardy also argues that the 
rationale behind the common law rules 
does not apply (1) to appointed, staggered 
boards like the UBMC board of trustees, 
or (2) until a majority of the nine voting 
members of the board are replaced. These 
arguments are without merit. First, the 
rationale behind the common law rules 
applies to appointed, staggered governing 
bodies because preexisting contracts may 
also unduly inhibit these bodies in the 
performance of their public duties. See 
Mitchell, 132 A.2d at 877-78; Piedmont 
Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 319 S.C. 124, 
459 S.E.2d 876, 882 (App.1995). 
Second, there is inadequate support in the 
law for the contention that a majority 
turnover in the UBMC board is required 
before the board can challenge the 
contract. See Mariano & Assocs., P.C v. 
Bd of County Comm'rs, 131 P.2d 323, 331 
(Wyo.1987) (concluding that precedent did 
not support argument that turnover in 
board was required before it could 
challenge validity of contract). 
In addition, Dr. Hardy argues that the 
successor UBMC board was precluded 
from terminating his contract because the 
board earlier ratified it. Since this issue 
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was not raised below, we decline to 
address it. See Monson v. Carver, 928 
P.2dl017, 1022 (Utah 1996). 
A. Dr. Hardy's Contract Was Proprietary in 
Nature 
k
* 14 The factors on which courts have relied to 
distinguish between governmental and proprietary 
contracts strongly support the conclusion that Dr. 
Hardy's contract for pathological services involves a 
proprietary function. First, UBMC has not 
demonstrated that the services Dr. Hardy provides 
under the contract are "indispensable to the proper 
functioning of government." County Council v. SHL 
Systemhouse Corp., 60 F.Supp.2d 456, 465 
(E.D.Pa.1999). To the contrary, consistent with the 
view that Dr. Hardy's contract did not involve 
functions essential to governance, Duchesne County 
conveyed the hospital to a non-profit organization 
on July 3, 2000. 
**15 Moreover, under the terms of the contract, 
Dr. Hardy merely recommended, but did not have 
authority to set, policies related to UBMC's 
pathology laboratory. The board's retention of this 
policymaking discretion weighs heavily in favor of 
deeming the contract proprietary. See Rhode 
Island Student Loan Auth. v. NELS, Inc., 550 A.2d 
624, 627 (R.I. 1988) (concluding contract was 
proprietary because contracting party "could neither 
exercise discretion nor set policy in performance of 
its duties"). 
**16 Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Hardy's 
contract involves a proprietary function. 
*1169 B. Whether Dr. Hardy's Contract Was of 
Reasonable Duration Depends on 
the Scope of the Contract's "Just Cause" Provision 
[7][8][9] **17 Under the 
governmental/proprietary test, Dr. Hardy's 
proprietary contract is enforceable if its duration 
was reasonable at the time the parties executed the 
contract. Bair, 6 Utah 2d at 148, 307 P.2d at 902. 
Whether a contract's duration is "reasonable" 
depends on the circumstances of each case. See, 
e.g., id, 6 Utah 2d at 143, 148, 307 P.2d at 899, 903 
(holding that a fifty-year sewage treatment contract 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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was valid because its lengthy duration allowed city 
to obtain treatment facilities without undue delay 
and expense, and also facilitated long-term 
planning). Depending on the circumstances, a 
lengthy or indefinite contractual duration is not 
necessarily unreasonable. See id.; see also Salt 
Lake City, 22 Utah 2d at 42, 448 P.2d at 354 
(validating contract that required city to provide 
free water to land as long as the land served as the 
state capitol grounds, noting that city derives 
continuing economic benefit from capitol's 
presence). 
**18 As the record has been inadequately 
developed on the issue of the reasonableness of the 
contract's duration, we remand to permit the district 
court to allow further development of the record 
and to then make this determination. On remand, 
as a preliminary matter, the district court should 
interpret the intended scope of the contract's "just 
cause" provision, [FN3] since the reasonableness of 
the contract's duration depends in large part on the 
amount of discretion this provision gives to 
successor boards. For example, if the "just cause" 
provision gives successor boards broad discretion to 
terminate Dr. Hardy (e.g., to improve patient care, 
for fiscal considerations), the contract is more likely 
to be of a reasonable duration than if the "just 
cause" provision permitted termination only for 
deficient job performance. In evaluating whether 
the duration is reasonable, the district court may 
also find it useful to compare Dr. Hardy's contract 
to the agreements UBMC typically enters into with 
medical professionals. For example, UBMC's 
bylaws concerning its medical staff suggest that 
UBMC routinely enters into agreements under 
which the only practical durational limit is a 
liberally-construed "just cause" provision. [FN4] 
The extent to which the durational limitations in Dr. 
Hardy's contract conform to UBMC's usual 
practices in similar situations may factor into the 
district court's reasonableness assessment. 
FN3. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 
2002 UT 6, f 64, 44 P.3d 663 (noting that 
determination of scope of contractual 
"clause is a question of law for 
determination by the district court because 
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it is a matter of contract interpretation"). 
FN4. Under UBMC's bylaws, although 
appointments to the medical staff are 
ostensibly limited to two years, staff 
members are reappointed unless there is 
"just cause." Under the bylaws, "just 
cause" appears to have a broad scope: for 
instance, the board may terminate a 
member of the medical staff for any reason 
"reasonably related to the delivery of 
quality patient care." 
**19 If the district court determines that the 
contract's duration is reasonable, the contract is 
enforceable. The court should then determine 
whether the UBMC board had "just cause" to 
terminate Dr. Hardy. On the other hand, if the 
district court determines that the contract's duration 
is unreasonable, the court should not enforce the 
contract. 
[10][11] **20 The dissent maintains that a term 
should be implied into Dr. Hardy's contract. In 
support of its argument, the dissent relies on canons 
of construction that have been developed to aid 
courts in discerning the parties' intent when a 
contract fails to specify a duration. We reject the 
dissent's position for several reasons. First, and 
most importantly, neither party has argued in their 
briefs in favor of implying a term. To the contrary, 
both parties maintain that the contract should be 
evaluated as an indefinite-length contract whose 
duration is limited only by the "just cause" 
provision. [FN5] In effect, *1170 then, the parties 
have implicitly stipulated that the contract has an 
indefinite term. [FN6] Implying a term would 
therefore result in a contract that is contrary to the 
intent of either party and violate the preeminent 
goal of contractual interpretation (i.e., to give effect 
to the intent of the parties). Buehner Block Co v. 
UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
Accordingly, because the parties agree that the 
contract should be treated as an indefinite-length 
contract, there is no need to rely on canons of 
construction for resolving ambiguities over whether 
the parties intended the contract be of indefinite 
duration. [FN7] 
FN5. Dr. Hardy asserts the following in his 
appellate brief: 
To entice excellent physicians to move to 
and remain in rural areas, hospitals often 
add perks to the contracts, including "just 
cause" termination provisions, or even 
"lifetime" contracts... Given the 
necessities of the situation, such contracts 
are of reasonable duration. Thus, [Dr. 
Hardy's contract | passes the second part of 
the Bair test... 
Appellant's Br. at 21. 
Despite disagreeing with Dr. Hardy on the 
ultimate conclusion of whether an 
indefinite-length contract with a "just 
cause" provision is of reasonable duration, 
UBMC clearly agrees that the contract was 
of indefinite duration: 
The potentially perpetual duration of Dr. 
Hardy's contract with UBMC was limited 
only by the "just cause" provision.... [Dr. 
Hardy's] contract bound Duchesne County 
indefinitely.... 
Appellee's Br. at 28-29. 
FN6. The dissent acknowledges that 
parties may enter into an indefinite-length 
contract. 
FN 7. The dissent acknowledges that "both 
parties contend that the contract should be 
evaluated as an indefinite-length contract 
limited only by just cause," yet nonetheless 
argues for the imposition of a fixed 
duration. The dissent has cited no cases, 
nor are we aware of any, in which we 
rejected parties' mutual concessions that 
are in harmony and clearly expressed. 
Given that the goal in interpreting 
contracts is to give effect to the intent of 
the parties, we should be particularly 
reluctant to reject the parties' stipulations 
or concessions in this case. 
The clear import of the parties' concessions 
is that the parties intended the contract to 
be of indefinite duration. The imposition 
of a fixed duration is therefore 
incompatible wilh the parties' concessions. 
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Moreover, the law in Utah and numerous 
other jurisdictions recognizes the right of 
parties to enter into indefinite length 
contracts terminable for cause. Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 
1000-01 & n. 9 (Utah 1991); e.g., Shah v. 
Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 
489, 491-92 (Ky.1983). In short, the 
imposition of a term would contradict the 
parties' stated intent, disregard their legal 
arguments, and impede their freedom to 
contract. This we decline to do. 
Significantly, the dissent also 
acknowledges that the parties have not 
argued in their appellate briefs that a term 
should be implied into the contract. In the 
absence of adequate briefing, it would be 
ill-advised for the court to raise this issue 
sua sponte, especially if the dissent is 
correct in asserting that this issue presents 
a question of first impression. Prince v. 
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, f 
59, 56P.3d 524, 2002 WL 1610562 ("On 
myriad occasions, we have held that we 
will not address issues inadequately 
briefed."). 
[12] **21 Second, conspicuously absent from the 
dissent's analysis is any citation to Utah precedent 
that supports its position. Contrary to the dissent's 
position, when a contract for employment or 
personal services does not recite a fixed term, the 
law in Utah does not call for the judicial 
reformation of the contract to impose a term, 
especially where, as here, neither party disputes the 
contract was of indefinite duration. Indeed, in a 
case in which we traced the historical development 
of the law associated with employment contracts, 
we specifically noted that courts long ago 
repudiated a common law rule under which a term 
was implied when an employment contract did not 
specify a duration. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 
Ill P.2d 1033, 1040-41 (Utah 1989). [FN8] In its 
place, courts in Utah and elsewhere adopted the 
at-will employment rule, under which employment 
contracts that did not specify a duration were 
generally presumed to be terminable at will. Id. at 
1041. In time, Utah recognized an exception under 
which an employee could rebut the at-will 
presumption associated with indefinite-length 
contracts by showing the parties intended the 
contract be terminable for cause. Johnson, 818 P.2d 
at 1000-01 & n. 9; see also Brehany v. Nordstrom, 
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1991). Significantly, 
nothing in Johnson, Brehany, or Berube suggests 
that a court should sua sponte impose a term on an 
indefinite-length employment contract that provides 
for termination for cause. 
FN8. Although Berube was a plurality 
opinion, a majority of the court concurred 
in the portion of the opinion that traced the 
historical development of the common law 
of employment contracts. 
**22 Applying Utah precedent It) I)? Hardy's 
contract confirms our view that a term should not be 
read into the contract. First, because Dr. Hardy's 
contract does not specify a duration, under Utah law 
we initially presume it is of indefinite duration but 
terminable at will. Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040-41. 
We do not apply the long-since rejected rule *1171 
that previously required the implication of a term. 
Id. Second, we consider whether any of the 
exceptions to the at-will rule applies. In this 
regard, we note that the parties expressly provided 
the contract was terminable for "just cause." We 
further note that the parties agree in their appellate 
briefs that the contract is of indefinite length and 
terminable only for "just cause." Accordingly, we 
conclude that the at-will presumption has been 
rebutted and Dr. Hardy's indefinite-length contract 
is terminable for "just cause." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 
1000-01 & n. 9; see also Brehany, 812 P.2d at 54. 
[FN9] 
FN9. The cases cited by the dissent are (1) 
from other jurisdictions and therefore not 
binding and (2) are either distinguishable 
from, or inapposite to, the present case. 
In reaching its conclusion, the dissent 
relies heavily on cases not involving 
employment contracts. This reliance is 
tenuous given the fact that courts have 
developed a unique set of rules for 
employment and personal service 
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contracts. See generally Berube, 111 P.2d 
at 1040-41; Consol Theatres, Inc. v. 
Theatrical Stage Employees Union, Local 
16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 
P.2d 325, 335 & n. 12 (1968) (noting that 
due to special policy considerations 
associated with employment contracts, 
such contracts are exempt from rule 
applicable to other contracts under which 
courts imply a term when a contract is 
silent as to duration). 
For example, the dissent cites 
Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's 
Imports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 544, 549 
(Ky.1970) in support of its position. That 
case did not involve an employment 
contract, however, and, moreover, when 
faced with an employment contract, the 
relevant jurisdiction (Kentucky) relies on 
rules of interpretation specifically tailored 
to employment contracts. Shah v. Am. 
Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489, 
491-92 (Ky.1983) (confirming parties' 
right to enter into contracts under which 
person is employed for an indefinite period 
of time and may be terminated only for 
cause). Accordingly, the more pertinent 
case from the cited jurisdiction is 
consistent with the view that when an 
employment contract is silent as to 
duration, courts generally do not imply a 
fixed term of years. See id. Instead, as in 
Johnson, Kentucky courts presume such a 
contract is terminable at will unless the 
parties clearly express another criterion for 
termination (e.g., for cause). Id. 
The cases cited by the dissent that involve 
employment contracts provide little 
support for its conclusion that a term must 
be imposed on Dr. Hardy's contract. For 
example, when faced with an 
indefinite-length employment contract, ihQ 
court in Paisley v. Lucas did not impose a 
term but rather applied rules of 
construction specific to employment 
contracts. 346 Mo. 827, 143 S.W.2d 262, 
271 (1940). 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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**23 Finally, we disagree with the dissent's 
contention that the imposition of a term is justified 
as a means of easing the calculation of prospective 
damages. [FN 10] The dissent itself concedes that 
parties can contract for an indefinite term. In 
making this concession, the dissent implicitly 
acknowledges that, to give effect to the parties' 
intent, courts inevitably and routinely need to 
determine damages associated with a breach of an 
indefinite employment contract. In making such 
determinations, courts have relied on various factors 
in addressing the kinds of concerns raised by the 
dissent: 
FN 10. The dissent asks the following: 
[If hospital breached the contract], how 
would Dr. Hardy's damages be 
calculated? Would Dr. Hardy be entitled 
to all of his loss of earnings under the 
indefinite contract? [W]ould he be entitled 
to compensation ... to the date of his 
death? To the date of his retirement? To 
the date of his inability to perform his job 
responsibilities . . ? 
While a district court has considerable experience 
in calculating future earnings, some basis must 
appear in the record for such an award. Some of 
the factors which district courts have employed to 
alleviate the speculative nature of future damage 
awards include an employee's duty to mitigate, 
"the availability of employment opportunities, the 
period within which one by reasonable efforts 
may be re-employed, the employee's work and 
life expectancy, the discount tables to determine 
the present value of future damages and other 
factors that are pertinent on prospective damage 
awards." 
Shore v. Fed. Express Corp., Ill F.2d 1155, 1160 
(6th Cir.1985) (quoting Koyen v. Consol. Edison 
Co., 560 F.Supp. 1161, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y.1983)). 
"It is not difficult to determine the ... factors that are 
pertinent on prospective damage awards." Koyen, 
560 F.Supp. at 1168-69. Regardless, while the 
determination of damages presents challenges, so 
would the determination of a "reasonable" duration, 
especially when both parties on appeal appear 
resistant to the imposition of a term. 
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CONCLUSION 
**24 We conclude that Dr. Hardy's contract for 
pathological services is a proprietary *1172 
contract, and thus is enforceable against successor 
UBMC boards of trustees if it is of a reasonable 
duration. Accordingly, we remand to the district 
court to permit it to determine whether the 
contract's duration is reasonable. 
**25 Remanded. 
**26 Chief Justice DURHAM and Judge BENCH 
concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion. 
RUSSON, Justice, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
**27 I concur with the majority opinion that the 
contract in question is proprietary in nature and 
could therefore bind the successor trustees of the 
hospital. However, I differ with the analysis of the 
opinion as to how the trial court is to determine the 
reasonableness of the duration of the contract on 
remand. 
**28 Well-settled canons of contract construction 
and interpretation dictate that the trial court, when 
faced with a contract of employment that is silent as 
to its duration, and thus indefinite in length, but 
expressly terminable only for just cause, should 
determine by implication a reasonable term of 
duration under the circumstances and then imply 
that reasonable term into the contract as a matter of 
law. Once the trial court determines a reasonable 
term and implies it into the contract as a matter of 
law, the trial court then should evaluate the implied 
duration of the contract to determine if the duration 
of the contract was reasonable for purposes of 
deciding whether the successor trustees of the 
hospital are bound by the contract. 
**29 The employment contract between Uintah 
Basin Medical Center and Dr. Hardy did not 
include a specific term of duration and therefore 
was of indefinite duration or perpetual in nature. It 
did, however, expressly indicate that the contract 
could be terminated only for just cause. Corbin on 
Contracts provides guidance on how to treat such a 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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contract and indicates what legal effect such a 
contract is to be given when it states: 
When parties make a contract of employment 
without specifying the length of service, but 
indicate that it is not terminable at will, the legal 
effect is that the parties are bound for a 
"reasonable time." This is based upon 
"implication" [i.e., the implication of a reasonable 
term of duration]. 
Catherine M.A. McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts 
§ 34.11, at 262 (revised ed.1999) (emphasis added); 
see also Consol Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage 
Employees Union Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 73 
Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 325, 335 (1968) (en banc); 
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp. v. Miller Chem. Co., 137 
Neb. 142, 288 N.W. 538, 541 (1939); Tavel v. 
Olsson, 91 Nev. 359, 535 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1975); 
Smith v. Knutson, 76 N.D. 375, 36 N.W.2d 323, 
328 (1949), overruled on other grounds by 
Neibauer v. Well, 319 N.W.2d 143 (N.D.1982); 
Hall v. Hall, 158 Tex. 95, 308 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1957) 
("Now it is doubtless true that, in contracts of the 
general type of the instant one [an employment 
contract for services], a term of reasonable duration 
may be implied, with the result that they are not 
void for lack of an essential provision and are not 
terminable at will."); Edwards v. 
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 61 Wash.2d 593, 379 P.2d 
735, 738 (1963); 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment 
Relationship § 38 (1996) (citing Shah v. Am. 
Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky.1983) 
). [FN1] *1173 This is precisely the situation 
presented in the instant case. 
FN1. The majority opinion criticizes this 
dissent for its citation to applicable, 
persuasive authority from the highest 
courts of our kindred states and dismisses 
that authority as nonbinding. Where this 
court has not addressed a particular 
question of law and where authoritative 
precedent from our own jurisdiction is 
absent, this court has not been reluctant to 
seek out the experience, reasoning, and 
counsel of the decisions of other high 
courts as persuasive guidance in our 
deliberations. 
The majority opinion also criticizes the 
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dissent for its citation to certain cases 
involving contracts other than for the 
provision of employment or personal 
services However, all of the cases cited 
in this paragraph involve contracts ior 
employment or personal services 
This dissent does cite to other 
nonemployment contract cases later in % 
32 for the additional proposition that 
courts generally will imply a term of 
duration into indefinite-length contracts 
The majority opinion mamtains that those 
nonemployment cases are inapposite and 
that this dissent's reliance on them is 
tenuous because the courts have developed 
"a unique set of rules for employment and 
personal services contracts" To the 
extent that the cases mentioned by the 
majority opinion as recognizmg special 
and different rules for employment 
contracts actually refer to special rules or 
policy considerations for employment 
contracts, they do so only m reference to 
the adoption of the general "at-will" 
employment doctrine and its exceptions 
Those cases do not recognize special and 
different rules with respect to the propriety 
of implying a reasonable term into an 
employment contract that is silent as to its 
duration but outside of the "at-will" 
employment doctrine because of the 
explicit inclusion of an express "just 
cause" provision, such as the contract at 
issue here In this regard, the majority 
opinion misreads Berube v Fashion 
Centre, Ltd, 771 P2d 1033 (Utah 1989), 
Consolidated Theatres, Inc, Shah, and 
Paisley v Lucas, 346 Mo 827, 143 
SW2d 262 (1940) The cases cited 
herein otherwise stand for the proposition 
for which they are cited and support the 
implication of duration for a reasonable 
period 
**30 The determination of what constitutes a 
"reasonable time" of duration of the 
indefinite-length employment contract that is not 
terminable at will is either "(1) the time that seems 
reasonable in the light of the circumstances existing 
when the contract was made [or] (2) the time that 
seems reasonable m light of the circumstances as 
they occur during the course of performance" 
McCauhff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34 11, at 262 
The reasonableness of an implied duration term is a 
question of fact and is determined in reference to 
the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the 
situation of the parties, and the subject matter of the 
contract See William B Tanner Co v Sparta 
Tomah-Broad Co, 716 F2d 1155, 1159-60 (7th 
Cirl983), Metal Assocs, lnc v E Side Metal 
Spinning & Stamping Corp, 165 F 2d 163, 165 (2d 
Cirl947), Consol Theatres, Inc, 73 Cal Rptr 
213, 447 P2d at 335, Brown Loan & Abstract Co 
v Willis, 150 Ga 122, 102 SE 814, 815 (1920), 
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp, 288 NW at 541, Tavel, 
535 P2d at 1288, Borough of W Caldwell v 
Borough oj Caldwell, 26 N J 9, 138 A 2d 402, 412 
(1958), Hall, 308 S W 2d at 16-17, 17B C J S 
Contracts § 440 (1999), Margaret N Kniffm, 5 
Corbin on Contracts § 24 29 (revised ed 1998) 
**31 Corbm on Contracts ' suggested treatment of 
contracts of this nature is based upon and supported 
by well-settled principles and rules of contract 
construction and interpretation In the instant case, 
the employment contract was silent as to its 
duration and therefore indefinite or 
perpetual Contracts of perpetual duration are 
generally disfavored by the law See Paisley v 
Lucas, 346 Mo 827, 143 SW2d 262, 270 (1940) 
("The courts are prone to hold against the theory 
that a contract confers a perpetuity of right or 
imposes a perpetuity of obligation" (quotation 
omitted)), see also Borough of W Caldwell, 138 
A 2d at 412, Farley v Salow, 67 Wis 2d 393, 227 
N W 2d 76, 82 (1975) Interpretations which avoid 
construing a contract to have an indefinite duration 
are preferable See Borough of W Caldwell 138 
A 2d at 412-13, Farley, 227 N W 2d at 82, 
Kovachik v Am Auto Ass'n, 5 Wis 2d 188, 92 
NW2d 254, 256 (1958) Because the law 
disfavors contracts of perpetual performance or 
duration, courts will interpret a contract as bemg of 
indefinite duration only where the parties to the 
contract have clearly and unambiguously indicated 
their intentions to create a contract of indefinite 
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duration through the use of express and positive 
language to that effect m the contract [FN2] See 
*1174Wilham B Tanner Co, 716 F 2d at 1159 
("Courts are reluctant to interpret contracts 
providing for some perpetual or unlimited 
contractual right unless the contract clearly states 
that that is the intention of the parties"), 
Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd v Bug's Imps, Inc, 453 
SW2d 544, 549 (Ky 1970) ("The general rule is 
that a construction conferring a right in perpetuity 
will be avoided unless compelled by the 
unequivocal language of the contract"), Paisley, 
143 SW2d at 271 ("A contract [for employment] 
for life will be upheld only where the intention, that 
the contract's duration is for life, is clearly 
expressed in unequivocal terms"), Borough of W 
Caldwell, 138 A 2d at 412-13 ("[A] construction 
affirming a [contractual performance] right in 
perpetuity is to be avoided unless given in clear and 
peremptory terms," and "[i]t is not often that a 
promise will properly be interpreted as calling for 
perpetual performance" (internal quotations 
omitted)), 17B C J S Contracts § 439 (1999) ("[A] 
construction conferring a right in perpetuity will be 
avoided unless compelled by the unequivocal 
language of the contract [and] a contract which 
purports to run in perpetuity must be adamantly 
clear that that is the parties' intent, m order to be 
enforceable") Likewise, employment contracts 
that do not explicitly express the parties' intentions 
that the contract be for lifetime or permanent 
employment have been held to be unenforceable or 
merely terminable at the will of either party See 
Chastain v Kelly-Springfield Tire Co, 733 F2d 
1479, 1482, 1484 (11th Cir 1984), Littell v 
Evening Star Newspaper Co, 120 F2d 36, 37 
(D C Cir 1941), 30 C J S Employer-Employee 
Relationship § 23 (1992) 
FN2 The majority opinion notes that the 
parties have not argued m their appellate 
briefs that a term should be implied into 
the contract and that both parties contend 
that the contract should be evaluated as an 
indefinite-length contract limited only by 
the just cause provision This incorrectly 
elevates the parties' arguments m the briefs 
to the level of an agreement between the 
© 2006 Thomson/West No Clam 
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parties on this point and treats it as a 
stipulation Nothing in the record or the 
briefs indicates that the parties have 
stipulated m the manner the majority 
opinion claims The parties do not deny 
that they did not include an explicit 
provision in the contract expressing their 
mtentions purposely to create an 
indefinite-length contract If the parties to 
a contract intend to create an 
indefinite-length contract, they must 
express their intentions to do so through 
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal 
language in the contract The parties' 
questionable "concession" in this regard in 
their briefs on appeal obviously fails to 
meet this standard and is contrary to the 
rule of law stated in the cited authority 
Both Johnson and Shah may recognize the 
rights of parties to enter into 
indefinite-length contracts, but they do not 
dispute or contradict the requirement that 
the parties do so using explicit language in 
their contract 
In any event, under normal circumstances, 
we will treat particular facts or issues as 
stipulated to by the parties only where such 
a stipulation is clear and expressed 
Rarely, if ever, do we find a stipulation of 
this nature by implication The notion of 
an implied stipulation is contrary to the 
very nature of a stipulation as a clear, 
definite, and certain agreement by the 
parties as to the truth or validity of a 
particular fact 
Finally, the majority opinion also 
admonishes the dissent that "[i]n the 
absence of adequate briefing, it would be 
ill-advised for the court to raise [the issue 
of implying a reasonable term] sua sponte, 
especially [where] this issue presents a 
question of first impression" This, 
however, ignores our settled position that 
this court has inherent authority to 
consider arguments and issues that the 
parties have not raised or recognized if it is 
necessary to a proper decision and to avoid 
bad law See Kaiserman Assocs, Inc v 
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Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 
1998) ("[A]n overlooked or abandoned 
argument should not compel an erroneous 
result [and][w]e should not be forced to 
ignore the law just because the parties have 
not raised or pursued obvious 
arguments."). Simply because the parties 
did not recognize the issue on appeal or 
because they are in supposed agreement in 
their argumentative position, erroneous as 
it may be, on appeal, we will not ignore a 
genuine legal issue or acquiesce in the 
parties' error and apply incorrect legal 
principles. 
**32 Where a contract is of indefinite or perpetual 
duration because of the lack of an explicit term, the 
law will imply into the contract a term that is 
reasonable under the circumstances. See 
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262; 
see also Metal Assocs., Inc., 165 F.2d at 165; 
Consol Theatres, Inc., 13 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 
at 335; Brown Loan & Abstract Co., 102 S.E. at 
815; Anne Arundel County v. Crofton Corp., 286 
Md. 666, 410 A.2d 228, 232 (1980); 
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp., 288 N.W. at 541; Tavel, 
535 P.2d at 1288; Borough of W. Caldwell, 138 
A.2d at 412- 13; Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 
185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706, 713-14 (1923); Harris 
v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502, 505 
(1897); Hall, 308 S.W.2d at 15; Farley, 227 
N.W.2d at 82; 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 546 
(1991); 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment Relationship § 
38 (1996) (citing Shah, 655 S.W.2d 489); 17B 
C.J.S. Contracts § 421 (1999); Kniffin, 5 Corbin 
on Contracts § 24.29. 
**33 The majority opinion criticizes this dissent 
for its lack of citation to Utah precedent in support 
of determining and implying a reasonable term of 
duration into the contract. This is empty criticism 
given that this case presents an issue of first 
impression in this jurisdiction. 
**34 The majority opinion incorrectly relies on 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989), Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 
49 (Utah 1991), and Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 
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Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), as binding Utah 
authority that purportedly rejects the dissent's 
approach in this case. While the majority is correct 
in noting "that nothing in Johnson, Brehany, or 
Berube suggests that a court should sua sponte 
impose a term on an indefinite-length employment 
contract that provides for termination for cause," 
nothing in those decisions *1175 would prohibit the 
implication of a reasonable term into the contract 
either. Those cases simply do not go as far as 
articulating a governing rule applicable to the case 
at hand and are focused on a separate and discrete 
issue not present in the instant case. 
**35 Specifically, the majority opinion's assertion 
that in Berube we noted (and purportedly endorsed) 
the notion that "courts long ago repudiated a 
common law rule under which a term was implied 
when an employment contract did not specify a 
duration" is not entirely correct and overstates 
Berube. The central issue in Berube was whether 
the termination-related provisions of an employer's 
employee handbook could be implied into the 
employment contract as implied-in-fact contract 
terms between the employer and employee such that 
the original indefinite-length employment contract 
would escape application of the "at-will" 
employment doctrine that provides an 
indefinite-length employment contract is terminable 
by either party for good cause, cause, or no cause at 
all. 
**36 In the "historical development" portion of 
Justice Durham's plurality opinion in Berube, to 
which the majority opinion in this case cites, Justice 
Durham merely traced the historical development 
and adoption of the "at-will" employment doctrine 
in the United States. 
**37 In any event, that section of Berube does not 
stand for the proposition offered by the majority 
opinion. The historical review section of the 
Berube plurality opinion simply described the 
nineteenth century English common law rule stating 
that English courts, when faced with employment 
contracts of indefinite duration, would imply an 
arbitrary one-year term into the contract. Berube, 
111 P.2d at 1040-41; see also McCauliff, 8 Corbin 
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on Contracts § 3 4.11, at 257. Berube 's historical 
review merely noted that American courts rejected 
the arbitrary one-year term implied by English 
courts in favor of the "at-will" employment 
doctrine. Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040- 41. Berube 
simply acknowledged the historical rejection of the 
implication of a term of duration in an "at-will" 
employment contract. See id. It does not, as the 
majority opinion claims, reject the notion that a 
reasonable term could or should be implied into an 
employment contract that is by its own terms 
outside the "at-will" employment doctrine because 
of a just cause provision such that the parties are 
bound for a "reasonable time." See McCauliff, 8 
Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262. In fact, 
Justice Durham's opinion in Berube notes that the 
rejection of the English common law implied 
one-year term and the adoption of the "at-will" 
employment doctrine in the United States was 
"adopted by many jurisdictions without careful or 
thorough examination." Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040. 
Thus, the most Berube can be cited for in this 
regard is the proposition that American courts 
uncritically rejected the arbitrary one-year implied 
term rule used by the English courts, but not the 
apparently unconsidered, yet supportable, notion 
that a reasonable term could or should be implied 
into an indefinite-length employment contract that 
by its own terms is not terminable at will. See 
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262. 
Therefore, the majority opinion's statement in 
applying purportedly controlling Utah precedent to 
this case that "[w]e do not apply the long-since 
rejected rule that previously required the 
implication of a term" is based on a 
misinterpretation of Berube 's historical review. 
Regardless, this portion of the plurality Berube 
opinion, despite being joined by a majority of the 
court, was at best dicta in that it was historical 
exposition. Berube and its progeny simply do not 
prohibit the implication of a reasonable term into 
the contract at hand and are not binding precedent 
that govern whether a term of duration should be 
implied into the contract at issue. 
**38 Finally, Johnson and Brehany likewise do 
not govern the present case or bar the imposition of 
an implied reasonable term of duration into the 
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contract. Brehany and Johnson, like Berube, were 
employee handbook or implied-in-fact contract term 
cases but go no further than Berube in their 
holdings and no more state an on-point or 
governing rule applicable in this case than does 
Berube. 
**39 Berube, Brehany, and Johnson all involved 
indefinite-length employment contracts and claims 
of wrongful termination. *1176 However, these 
cases merely explore and set rules for determining 
whether a plaintiff employee's claim for wrongful 
termination can escape the general "at-will" 
employment doctrine. In other words, in those 
cases, this court was asked to determine whether an 
implied-in-fact term existed which would remove 
the contract from the general "at-will" employment 
doctrine under which a plaintiff employee could not 
sustain a wrongful termination action. If such an 
implied-in-fact term was found to exist, for example 
where an employer's employee handbook specified 
exclusive reasons for termination of its employees, 
then those provisions of the employment handbook 
were treated as implied-in-fact contract terms, 
removing the employment contract from the 
"at-will" employment doctrine rules and preventing 
the employer from terminating the contract for any 
or no cause. 
**40 The case at hand involves an 
indefinite-length contract which contained an 
express "just cause" provision. Because that 
provision was expressed, the analysis and rules in 
Berube, Brehany, and Johnson are not 
applicable; we already know that the express "just 
cause" provision takes us out of the general 
"at-will" employment doctrine rule. The issue here 
is how the trial court is to determine whether the 
duration of the contract is reasonable and how it is 
to arrive at such a reasonable duration. This is a 
question not previously addressed to this court and 
to which Berube, Brehany, and Johnson are not 
instructive. The legal propositions and rules of 
contract construction and interpretation presented in 
this dissent are more appropriate for use by the trial 
court in adjudicating this controversy on remand. 
**41 Once the trial court determines the 
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reasonable term under the circumstances and that 
term is implied by law into the contract, the contract 
will necessarily be enforceable against the 
succeeding board under the second prong of the Bair 
test articulated in the majority opinion because (1) 
the activity contracted for is proprietary and (2) the 
term or duration that was implied into the contract 
is de facto reasonable under the circumstances. 
**42 Having determined the reasonable duration 
of the contract, and therefore its enforceability, the 
trial court must then determine if the hospital 
breached the contract when it terminated Dr. 
Hardy. It could terminate him before the 
expiration of the implied term only for "just 
cause." If the trial court determines that the 
hospital had just cause to terminate the contract 
with Dr. Hardy, the hospital did not breach the 
contract and Dr. Hardy is not entitled to damages. 
If the trial court determines that the hospital did not 
have just cause to terminate the contract with Dr. 
Hardy, then the hospital breached the contract and 
Dr. Hardy is entitled to damages calculated 
consistent with the reasonable employment duration 
term implied into the contract. See Bad Wound v 
Lakota Cmty. Homes, Inc., 1999 SD 165, \ 11, 
603 N.W.2d 723, 726. 
**43 Under the majority opinion's analysis, Dr. 
Hardy's damages, assuming the hospital is liable to 
Dr. Hardy for terminating him without just cause, 
would be speculative, at best, and undeterminable, 
at worst, absent a finite term of duration in the 
contract. See Benham v. World Airways, Inc., 432 
F.2d 359, 360, 361-62 (9th Cir.1970); Sterling 
Drug, lnc v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 
380, 386-87 (1988). It is for this reason that the 
law disfavors contracts of perpetual duration and 
why, when faced with contracts of indefinite 
duration, courts will imply a reasonable term of 
duration. If on remand the perpetual contract is 
held to be enforceable and the trial court determines 
that the hospital did not have just cause to terminate 
the contract, how would Dr. Hardy's damages be 
calculated? Would Dr. Hardy be entitled to all of 
his loss of earnings under the indefinite contract? 
In other words, would he be entitled to 
compensation under the contract from the date of 
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termination to the date of his death? To the date of 
his retirement? To the date of his inability to 
perform his job responsibilities, whenever that 
might be? Determining a reasonable term for the 
contract under the circumstances and implying it 
into the contract would avoid the possibility of 
speculative or undeterminable damages. 
*1177 **44 The majority opinion disagrees that 
imposition of a definite term is justified and argues 
that the trial court would face similar "challenges" 
in determining a reasonable term of duration under 
the circumstances as it would in determining Dr. 
Hardy's speculative damages. The approach 
advocated in this dissent would focus the trial 
court's attention and efforts on the discrete task of 
discerning a reasonable term for the contract under 
the circumstances, thus centering the inquiry on the 
parties' intentions, the nature of the parties' 
relationship, and the overall circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the contract at issue. 
See McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 
262. The majority opinion's suggestion for 
determining Dr. Hardy's potential damages would 
take the trial court's attention away from the 
contract itself and the context in which it was 
formulated and focus on myriad distant and less 
related factors, all of which remain at least to some 
extent speculative in nature. I would not send the 
trial court into the majority opinion's briar patch of 
thorny factors. In this case, [FN3] it would be far 
less complicated and less speculative for the trial 
court to determine Dr. Hardy's potential damages in 
relation to an implied reasonable term. 
FN3. The majority opinion also argues that 
under the dissent's analysis courts will 
"inevitably and routinely need to determine 
damages associated with a breach of an 
indefinite employment contract." This is 
incorrect. The vast majority of cases 
involving issues of termination under 
indefinite-length employment contracts 
will be governed by the "at-will" 
employment doctrine. In those instances, 
the issue of damages would not arise 
because the employment relationship 
would be terminable by either party for 
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any reason. The problematic issue of 
damages arises only in the very rare and 
unique case, such as the one at hand, where 
an expressed or implied "just cause" term 
is a part of the indefinite duration contract, 
thus removing the case from the 
application of the usual "at-will" 
employment doctrine rule. 
**45 I would remand to the trial court but with 
instructions consistent with this concurring opinion. 
**46 Justice HOWE concurs in Justice RUSSON's 
concurring and dissenting opinion. 
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Steven L. KEIL and Brody Chemical Company, 
Inc., Defendants, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees. 
No. 20000468. 
March 19, 2002. 
Rehearing Denied May 3, 2002. 
Company alleged misappropriation of trade secrets 
by its former water treatment chemical salesman 
and sought preliminary injunction to enjoin 
employee and his new employer from disclosing 
trade secrets. The Second District Court, 
Farmington Department, Rodney S. Page, J., 
granted the preliminary injunction. Salesman's 
petition for interlocutory appeal was granted. The 
Supreme Court, 974 P.2d 821, reversed. On 
remand, the District Court, Rodney S. Page, J., 
entered jury verdict in company's favor on both its 
intentional interference with business relations and 
misappropriation of trade secrets claims, awarding 
it $188,675 for damages in lost profits and unearned 
salary and benefits that had been paid to the 
salesman. Salesman and his new employer 
appealed, and the company cross-appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Russon, Associate C.J., held that: 
(1) salesman failed to meet his burden of 
marshaling all the evidence supporting jury's 
verdict, and thus, evidence would be assumed to 
have adequately supported finding that the 
company's price lists were misappropriated, and (2) 
the company was not limited to award of damages 
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[1] Appeal and Error €==>930(1) 
30k930(l) Most Cited Cases 
On appeal from a jury verdict, the Supreme Court 
will view the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to that 
verdict. 
[2] Appeal and Error €==>1079 
30k 1079 Most Cited Cases 
Water treatment chemical salesman's argument that 
jury's finding that his former employer's price lists 
were confidential was not supported by the 
evidence, because the salesman committed them to 
memory and his new employer could have obtained 
the prices by other means, as well as salesman's 
contention that the his actions could not have 
injured the employer, because its customer contracts 
were not adhesive or exclusive, were not adequately 
briefed and, therefore, would not be addressed on 
appeal before the Supreme Court. 
[3] Appeal and Error €=^757(3) 
30k757(3) Most Cited Cases 
[3] Appeal and Error €^937(1) 
30k937(l) Most Cited Cases 
Former water treatment chemical salesman failed to 
marshal all the evidence supporting jury's verdict, 
and thus, evidence would be assumed to have 
adequately supported finding that his former 
employer's price lists were misappropriated by him, 
where the salesman's supposed marshaling only 
constituted a reargument of the factual case 
presented below, in which evidence was construed 
in light most favorable to the salesman rather than 
his employer; although the salesman maintained he 
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"took no documents with him that set forth pricing" 
when he departed from his employer, and that 
pricing was not the "key" issue affecting employer's 
loss of business, president of the employer testified 
that the salesman never returned pricing sheets for a 
number of its clients that were in salesman's 
possession, and evidence was introduced at trial 
deeming pricing as "important." 
[4] Appeal and Error €=^893(1) 
30k893(l) Most Cited Cases 
[4] Appeal and Error €==>930(1) 
30k930(l) Most Cited Cases 
[4] Appeal and Error €^1001(1) 
30kl001(l) Most Cited Cases 
When an appellant contends that the evidence 
presented at trial is insufficient to support a jury's 
factual findings, the Supreme Court does not weigh 
the evidence de novo; rather, the Supreme Court 
will follow one standard of review, and will reverse 
only if, taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, the appellant 
demonstrates that the findings lack substantial 
evidentiary support, after the appellant has 
marshalled all the evidence supporting the verdict 
and then showed that such evidence cannot support 
the verdict. 
[5] Appeal and Error €=^937(1) 
30k937(l) Most Cited Cases 
When the appealing party does not meet its burden 
of marshaling all the evidence supporting the 
verdict, the Supreme Court will assume that the 
evidence adequately supported the findings, and the 
complaining party's assertion of insufficiency must 
therefore fail. 
[6] Damages €=>40(1) 
115k40(l) Most Cited Cases 
Former employer was not limited to award for 
damages based on the unjust enrichment of its 
former water treatment chemical salesman and his 
new employer from misappropriation of the former 
employer's pricing lists, but could recover its lost 
profits caused by defendants' conduct. U.C.A.1953, 
13-24-4(1). 
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[7] Statutes €=^188 
361kl88 Most Cited Cases 
When interpreting a legislative enactment, the 
Supreme Court looks first to the plain language of 
the act to determine its meaning. 
[8] Appeal and Error C=>1079 
30k 1079 Most Cited Cases 
Former employer's argument that it was entitled to 
double damages and attorney fees due to its former 
water treatment chemical salesman's malicious and 
willful misuse of the employer's trade secrets, and to 
additional damages derived from the employee's 
interference with one of its business accounts, was 
inadequately briefed and, thus, would not be 
addressed by the Supreme Court on appeal; 
employer did not offer even a single statutory 
citation, judicial decision, or procedural rule nor 
refer to even one location in the record to show that 
evidence existed in support of its claim. Rules 
App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9). 
[9] Appeal and Error €^756 
30k756 Most Cited Cases 
[9] Appeal and Error C=>761 
30k761 Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court will not become simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump 
the burden of argument and research. Rules 
App.Proc, Rule 24. 
*890 Joseph C. Rust, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
John T. Caine, Ogden, for Keil. 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Salt Lake City, for Brody 
Chemical. 
RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice. 
**1 Steven L. Keil and Brody Chemical Company 
appeal from a trial court judgment awarding Water 
& Energy Systems Technology, Inc., $188,675 in 
damages for its claims of (1) intentional 
interference with existing and prospective business 
relations and (2) misappropriation of trade secrets 
pursuant to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 13-24-1 to - 9 (1999). We affirm. 
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BACKGROUND 
[1] * *2 "On appeal from a jury verdict, we view 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to that 
verdict." Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 787 
(Utah 1994); see also Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & 
Fielding, 2001 UT 107, If 2, 37 P.3d 1130. 
**3 Steven Keil ("Keil") began working for Water 
& Energy Systems Technology, Inc. ("WEST"), as 
a water treatment chemical sales representative in 
1986. During his tenure at WEST, Keil spent the 
majority of his time managing and servicing certain 
of the company's industrial sales accounts, including 
those for Alliant Techsystems ("Alliant"), Cargill 
Flour Milling ("Cargill"), Magnesium Corporation 
of America ("MagCorp"), and Utah State University 
("USU"). As part of his duties related to these 
accounts, Keil had access to the formulae WEST 
used to create its chemicals, as well as to WEST'S 
confidential, customer-specific pricing lists for 
those chemicals. [FN1] 
FN1. WEST attempted to ensure the 
confidentiality of its customer-specific 
price lists in a number of ways. The 
company provided prices to its sales 
representatives only on a "need to know 
basis." Likewise, WEST instructed its 
sales personnel to always inform customers 
that any pricing information they received 
was confidential. Finally, all written 
disclosures of WEST prices to the 
company's customers was accompanied by 
language that read in substance, "This 
material is proprietary and confidential. 
We honor your commitment to maintain it 
as such." 
**4 Subsequently, in September 1997, 
representatives of Brody Chemical Company 
("BCC") approached Keil about the possibility of 
his leaving WEST to work for BCC. Keil initially 
declined this invitation, deciding instead to stay 
with WEST. After further discussions, however, 
Keil agreed in late 1997 to begin selling for BCC 
water treatment chemicals similar to those he was 
marketing for WEST. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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**5 In preparation for his departure from WEST, 
Keil began meeting with various employees of 
BCC, including the company's owner, Jon 
Liddiard. The purpose of these meetings was to 
ensure that BCC carried an inventory of treatment 
chemicals comparable to those marketed by WEST, 
and to establish a pricing scheme for the chemicals 
that would be "competitive" with WEST'S pricing. 
Accordingly, the discussions at Keil's meetings with 
BCC centered around the necessary 
"[fjormulations" for the chemicals, how and "where 
to obtain [the] raw materials" required by the 
formulae, and possible "pricing" for the ultimate 
products. Specifically, BCC and Keil worked to 
create products that would be "equivalent" to 
WEST'S but that would be sold for "ten percent 
less" than the confidential prices charged by WEST 
to each respective customer. 
**6 Following these preparatory meetings, on 
February 18, 1998, Keil drafted on BCC stationery 
six substantively identical letters to the various 
clients he had been servicing for WEST, including 
Alliant, Cargill, MagCorp, and USU. In the letters, 
Keil explained that he had begun working for BCC 
and that because of this change in employment, he 
could now offer "essentially the same" chemicals he 
had provided before but at "substantially lower" 
prices. In support of this contention, Keil's letters 
to Alliant, Cargill, and USU each included a table 
that juxtaposed the proposed prices of BCC's *891 
treatment chemicals with the prices of WEST'S 
"corresponding" chemicals. The prices listed for 
BCC's chemicals represented approximately a ten 
percent discount from WESTs prices. 
**7 Shortly thereafter, on March 2, 1998, Keil 
voluntarily terminated his employment with WEST. 
The next day, Keil began delivering the letters he 
had written to the clients he serviced while at 
WEST. Within two weeks of the delivery of these 
letters, Alliant, Cargill, and MagCorp all ceased 
ordering water treatment chemicals from WEST 
despite the fact that WEST had serviced each 
company continuously for the previous four years 
and WEST "had every expectation" of maintaining 
those relationships. Moreover, two of these 
companies, Alliant and Cargill, immediately began 
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purchasing their water treatment chemicals from 
BCC. Similarly, MagCorp reported to WEST that it 
was terminating their relationship based in part on 
"problems with [its service] representative," Keil. 
**8 On March 9, 1998, WEST sued BCC and Keil 
(collectively, "defendants") in the Second District 
Court for Davis County, alleging among other 
things that Keil had intentionally interfered with 
WEST's "existing and future business relationships 
for improper purposes," and had misappropriated 
WEST's confidential prices by sharing them with 
BCC in violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-24-1 to -9 (1999). On 
March 26, 1998, the district court granted WEST a 
preliminary injunction against BCC and Keil, which 
we reversed on interlocutory appeal in Water & 
Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 1999 UT 
16,974P.2d821("toz7/"). 
**9 Following our decision in Keil I, defendants 
moved for summary judgment, asserting in part that 
Keil had not misappropriated WEST's price lists as 
a matter of law. The district court, however, 
denied the motion on this issue in an order dated 
September 1, 1999. The court reasoned: 
There is sufficient evidence from which the trier 
of fact could conclude that the ... price lists of 
[WEST] were confidential.... [Therefore,] [t]here 
remains a question of fact as to the 
misappropriation of [WEST]'s price lists and as 
to whether [WESTJ's price lists were used by 
[BCC and Keil] in establishing [BCC]'s prices. 
Accordingly, the case proceeded to trial. 
**10 At trial, defendants again urged the district 
court to enter judgment in their favor, moving for a 
directed verdict at the conclusion of WESTs case in 
chief on a number of grounds, including (1) that 
insufficient evidence had been introduced to 
establish WEST's claim for misappropriation of its 
price lists, (2) that insufficient evidence had been 
introduced to substantiate WEST's claim for 
intentional interference with its business relations 
for improper purposes, and (3) that WEST had 
failed to prove Keil's actions caused the company 
damages in regard to its contractual relationship 
with USU. Concluding that the jury could 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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reasonably find in WEST's favor on the issue of 
misappropriation if it "chose to believe everything 
... presented by way of [WEST]'s case"~and that a 
jury finding of misappropriation would satisfy the 
challenged "improper purpose" element of WEST's 
intentional interference with business relations 
claim—the district court denied defendants' motion 
on these two issues but granted the motion on 
WEST's claim for damages related to its USU 
account. The court stated, "[On] the element of 
damage having to do with USU[,] the Court finds 
that there is insufficient evidence to go to the jury ... 
and therefore will allow [WEST to proceed] only 
[on] those issues relative to the claim from Alliant, 
from MagCorp, [and] from Cargill." 
**11 At the conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a 
verdict in WEST's favor on both its intentional 
interference with business relations and 
misappropriation of trade secrets claims, awarding 
the company $188,675 of damages in lost profits 
and unearned salary and benefits that had been paid 
to Keil. Specifically, the jury found that WEST's 
price lists were confidential; that Keil had 
misappropriated WEST'S price lists; that Keil 
intentionally interfered with WEST's business 
relationships with Alliant, Cargill, and MagCorp; 
that Keil's actions damaged WEST; and that Keil 
engaged in these actions as an agent of BCC. 
*892 **12 Subsequently, on March 10, 2000, 
defendants moved for a new trial and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, contending among 
other things that insufficient evidence had been 
introduced at trial to establish WEST's claim for 
misappropriation of its trade secrets, and that an 
incorrect standard for calculating damages had been 
used in the case. WEST responded, and on May 
31, 2000, the trial court denied defendants' 
motions. Finding that sufficient evidence had been 
introduced at trial to prove Keil had disclosed 
WEST's respective price lists for Alliant, Cargill, 
and MagCorp in an effort to transfer that business to 
BCC, the court ruled that the "damages awarded by 
the jury were fair and reasonable." Defendants 
now appeal the judgment of the trial court. 
ANALYSIS 
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[2] **13 On appeal, BCC and Keil raise two 
arguments: (1) that the trial court erred by failing to 
direct or set aside the jury verdict because, as 
defendants allege, WEST presented "insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict" for its claim 
of misappropriation of trade secrets; and (2) that 
the trial court erred by refusing to set aside the 
damages awarded to WEST as an improper 
assessment of damages under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act. [FN2] In addition, WEST 
cross-appeals, claiming that the trial court 
inappropriately disallowed the company from 
seeking additional damages beyond those ultimately 
awarded by the jury. We address each issue in turn. 
FN2. Apparently, defendants also argue 
that the jury's finding concerning the 
confidentiality of WEST'S price lists was 
not supported by the evidence because 
Keil committed them to memory and 
because BCC could have obtained the 
prices by asking WEST'S customers what 
they paid for their chemicals. Likewise, 
defendants contend that Keil's actions in 
this case could not have injured WEST 
because WEST'S contracts with Alliant, 
Cargill, and MagCorp "were not adhesion 
or exclusive contracts and [the companies] 
were free to purchase other products and 
services at any time." These arguments, 
however, fail for at least three 
reasons. First, defendants have not 
adequately briefed these contentions, and 
we therefore will not address them. E.g., 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988); Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9); see also 
infra ffl[ 20-21. In addition, defendants 
do not even attempt to meet their 
marshaling burden on these arguments, and 
thus, we assume that the record supports 
the jury's findings in favor of WEST on 
these issues. E.g., State v. Hopkins, 1999 
UT 98, f 16, 989 P.2d 1065; Young v. 
Young, 1999 UT 38, K 30, 979 P.2d 338. 
Finally, even a cursory review of the 
record reveals that ample evidence was 
presented at trial for the jury to find that 
WEST'S price lists were confidential and 
expected their employees to keep them as 
such, that water treatment chemical prices 
are treated as confidential and proprietary 
within the industry as a general practice, 
and that WEST reasonably expected to 
continue its relationships with Alliant, 
Cargill, and MagCorp despite the 
nonexclusive nature of their contracts. 
I. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
[3] **14 BCC and Keil first contend that the trial 
court erred by denying their motions for directed 
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict because WEST failed to present sufficient 
evidence to establish a misappropriation of WEST'S 
price lists. Specifically, defendants argue that the 
evidence presented at trial "did not purponderate 
[sic]" the jury's finding of either (1) Keil's 
disclosure of WEST'S price lists or (2) "a nexus 
between the any [sic] activity of Keil [and] damage 
to WEST." 
[4][5] **15 When an appellant contends that the 
evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support 
a jury's factual findings, "we do not weigh the 
evidence de novo." In re Estate of Bartell, 776 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Rather, we follow one 
standard of review: We reverse only if, taking the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, the appellant demonstrates that the 
findings lack substantial evidentiary support. Id; 
see also Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 
P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1994); Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 
839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992); Gustaveson v. 
Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982). 
Specifically, this standard obligates the appealing 
party to marshal all the evidence supporting the 
verdict and then show that such evidence "cannot 
support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 
14, 18 (Utah 1988); see also, e.g., Brewer v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, fl 
33-36, 31 P.3d 557; Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 
1361, 1363 (Utah 1996); *893 Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). 
Indeed, we employ this standard in light of our 
general deference toward the jury's role as 
fact-finder and our repeated recognition of trial 
courts' "advantaged position to evaluate the 
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evidence and determine the facts" Utah Med 
Prods, Inc v Searcy, 958 P2d 228, 232 (Utah 
1998), see also, eg, Willey v Willey, 951 P2d 
226, 230 (Utah 1997) Accordmgly, when the 
appealmg party does not meet its marshaling 
burden, we "assume that the evidence adequately 
supported the finding[s]," and the complaining 
party's assertion of insufficiency must therefore fail 
Young v Young, 1999 UT 38, \ 30, 979 P2d 338, 
see also, eg, State v Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, % 16, 
989 P2d 1065, Searcy, 958 P2d at 233, Interwest 
Constr v Palmer, 923 P2d 1350, 1360 (Utah 1996) 
, Hall v Process Instruments & Control, Inc, 890 
P2d 1024, 1028 (Utah 1995), Saunders v Sharp, 
806 P 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) 
**16 In this case, defendants' brief contains a 
lengthy section purporting to marshal the evidence 
m favor of the jury verdict However, although 
BCC and Keil do cite some evidence that supports 
the jury's findings, even a cursory review of the tiial 
record reveals that defendants "frequently omit[ ] 
crucial and incriminating evidence" that weighs m 
favor of the jury's verdict Aha Indus Ltd v Hurst, 
846 P2d 1282, 1287 (Utah 1993) For example, 
defendants admit that Keil repeatedly met with 
employees of BCC prior to his departure from 
WEST, but they fail to address what occurred at 
those meetings that BCC and Keil openly 
discussed prices in a jomt effort to develop a plan to 
offer chemicals equivalent to WEST'S at a ten 
percent discount from that company's prices 
Similarly, defendants assert that when he departed 
from WEST, Keil "took no documents with him that 
set forth pricing," even though WEST'S president 
specifically testified at trial that Keil never returned 
pricing sheets for a number of WEST'S clients, 
mcludmg Alhant and MagCorp, that were in his 
possession when he left WEST Further, defendants 
maintain that pricing was not the "key" issue 
affectmg WEST'S loss of business as a result of 
Keil's actions, despite the fact that evidence was 
introduced at trial deeming pricing 
"important", that Alhant, Cargill, and MagCorp all 
ceased purchasmg chemicals from WEST following 
BCC's offers to provide equivalent chemicals at a 
ten percent discount, and that following such offers 
Alhant and Cargill immediately began purchasmg 
© 2006 Thomson/West No 
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their water treatment chemicals from BCC Indeed, 
defendants' supposed marshalmg of the evidence m 
reality only constitutes a reargument of the factual 
case they presented below, with the evidence 
construed in a light most favorable to BCC and Keil 
rather than to WEST See In re Estate of Bartell, 
776 P 2d at 886 By its very nature, such a tactic 
does not carry defendants' "heavy" marshaling 
burden, and we consequently will not disturb the 
jury's findings rendered in favor of WEST Aha 
Indus, 846 P2d at 1286, see also Young, 1999 UT 
38 at f 30, 979 P2d 338, Searcy, 958 P2d at 232, 
In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P 2d at 886, Scharf v 
BMG Corp, 700 P2d 1068, 1069-70 (Utah 1985) 
[FN3] 
FN3 We further note that, under other 
conditions, the jury's finding m favor of 
WEST on the company's claim for 
intentional mlerference with business 
relations would constitute independent 
grounds for affirmance See Crookston v 
Fire Ins Exch, 817 P2d 789, 797-98 
(Utah 1991) However because the trial 
court explicitly hinged the viability of this 
claim on WEST'S misappropriation claim, 
we address defendants' insufficiency of the 
evidence argument on appeal regardless 
II MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
[6] **17 Defendants' second argument on appeal 
is that the trial court erred by refusing to set aside 
the damages awarded to WEST Specifically, 
defendants argue that rather than allowing WEST to 
recover its lost profits caused by Keil's disclosure of 
its price lists, the trial court should have limited 
WEST'S damages to the "benefit" BCC and Keil 
received as a result of misappropriation We 
disagree 
[7] **18 Section 13-24-4 of the Utah Code 
governs the amount of damages that may be 
awarded for the misappropriation of a trade secret 
This provision states that damages available under 
the Act 
*894 can include both the actual loss caused by 
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment 
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into 
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account in computing actual loss. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-4(1) (1999). When 
interpreting a legislative enactment, "we look first 
to the plain language of the act to determine its 
meaning." City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, \ 
36, 28 P.3d 697; see also, e.g., State ex rel. Div. of 
Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County, 
2002 UT 8, t 10, 44 P.3d 680; Associated Gen. 
Contractors v. Bd. Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 
112, K 27, 38 P.3d 291; Hall v. Utah State Dep't 
ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, f 15, 24 P.3d 958; Jensen 
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 
906 (Utah 1984). In this case, the plain language 
of section 13-24-4 is entirely antithetical to the 
position advanced by BCC and Keil. Rather than 
restricting damages in misappropriation cases to the 
windfall obtained by the defendant, section 13-24-4 
unambiguously states that such damages "can 
include both the actual loss caused by 
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused 
by misappropriation that is not taken into account in 
computing actual loss." Utah Code Ann. § 13-
24-4(1) (emphasis added). Indeed, this language 
specifically contemplates—in two separate 
places—that a successful plaintiff in a 
misappropriation case may obtain the losses it 
suffers due to the disclosure of its trade secret. See 
id. Accordingly, we reject defendants' argument 
that damages for the misappropriation of a trade 
secret must be restricted to the unjust enrichment 
such disclosure renders, and thus, hold that the trial 
court did not err in this case by allowing WEST to 
recover its lost profits caused by BCC and Keil. See 
id. 
III. ADDITIONAL DAMAGE CLAIMS 
[8] **19 Finally, WEST contends on cross-appeal 
that the trial court erred by disallowing the company 
from seeking additional damages beyond those 
ultimately awarded by the jury. Specifically, 
WEST asserts that it is "entitle[d]M to "double 
damages and attorney[ ] fees" for Keil's "malicious 
and willful ... misuse of WEST'S trade secrets," and 
to "additional damages [derived from] Keil's 
interference with WESTs USU account." In 
making this assertion, however, WEST fails to 
adequately set forth an argument as required by rule 
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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**20 This court has repeatedly held that appealing 
parties must " 'clearly define[ ]' " the issues 
presented on appeal " 'with pertinent authority 
cited.' " State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 Ill.App.3d 
1087, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981) 
). Likewise, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 
unequivocally requires, "[Appellant's brief] shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including ... 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on." Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Consequently, "[i]t is well established that a 
reviewing court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 304 (Utah 1998); see also, e.g., Ellis v. 
Swensen, 2000 UT 101, \ 17, 16 P.3d 1233; 
Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 7, 17 P.3d 
1122. 
[9] **21 In this case, WEST has entirely failed to 
adequately brief its assertion that it is "entitled" to 
additional damages. WEST does not offer even a 
single statutory citation, judicial decision, or 
procedural rule in support of its claim for further 
damages. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. 
Bd. Oil, Gas, & Mining, 2001 UT 112, \ 37, 38 
P.3d 291; State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, n. 5, 37 P.3d 
1073; Feather stone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, n. 
11, 34 P.3d 194. Indeed, WEST baldly asserts it is 
"clear from trial court testimony" that the company 
is due additional damages, but WEST fails to refer 
us to even one location in the record where such 
evidence exists. Moreover, WEST utterly neglects 
to discuss, let alone construe or apply, the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act's provisions on damages and 
attorney fees—statutory language that would 
certainly be determinative, if not dispositive, of 
whether WEST qualifies for the damages it seeks. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-24-4 to -5. Such an 
approach is neither adequate under the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure nor acceptable. 
Accordingly, because WEST has *895 not 
sufficiently presented its claim for additional 
damages, we will not address the argument. E.g., 
Ellis, 2000 UT 101 at f 17, 16 P.3d 1233; 
Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at | 7, 17 P.3d 1122; 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304. As we have all too often 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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[FN4] had occasion to explain, this court will not 
become " 'simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument 
and research.' " Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450 (quoting 
Opsahl, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d at 784). We 
once again refuse to accept that role. 
FN4. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 
2001 UT 112 at U 37 & n. 8, 38 P.3d 291 
(listing twenty-three cases in which a party 
inadequately briefed an argument); 
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 948 n. 9 
(Utah 1998) (giving examples of the 
"disconcertingly legion" number of 
inadequately briefed cases); see also 
Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, \ 42, 20 
P.3d 332; Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at f 7, 
17P.3d 1122. 
CONCLUSION 
**22 In view of the foregoing, we conclude that 
the trial court did not err by (1) refusing to set aside 
the jury's verdict based on defendants' claims of 
insufficiency of the evidence and inappropriately 
assessed damages or by (2) disallowing WEST from 
seeking additional damages beyond those awarded 
by the jury. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
of the trial court as entered below. 
**23 Chief Justice HOWE, Justice DURHAM, 
Justice DURRANT, and Justice WILKINS concur 
in Associate Chief Justice RUSSON'S opinion. 
48 P.3d 888, 443 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2002 UT 32 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Boyd A. WARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 18431. 
Aug. 16, 1984. 
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1986. 
Terminated city chief of police brought action 
seeking to be reinstated and recover damages. The 
Sixth District Court, Sevier County, Don V. Tibbs, 
J., granted city's motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, and chief appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, J., held that statute which deals with 
appointment of chief of police in third-class cities 
does not make removal of chief of police in such 
cities free from all judicial oversight, in light of 
statutes dealing with removal of chief of police 
from first and second class cities, which expressly 
make such removal free from judicial review, and 
thus, trial court had jurisdiction to review action of 
city counsel of third class city in firing chief of 
police. 
Order set aside and case remanded with directions. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Municipal Corporations €==>182 
268kl82 Most Cited Cases 
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-909 to 10-3-911, which 
respectively, require cities of first and second class 
to create police departments, vest board of 
commissioners with authority to prescribe 
administration of police department and to appoint 
head of department, and provide that chief of police 
department may be removed by board of 
commissioners without hearing or review by courts, 
by their references to authority of board of 
commissioners over police department, are limited 
to first and second class cities, in which board of 
commissioners exist; such statutes do not apply to 
police departments in third-class cities. 
[2] Statutes €=^212.6 
361k212.6 Most Cited Cases 
Statute is construed on assumption that each term is 
used advisedly and that intent of legislature is 
revealed in use of term in context and structure in 
which it is placed. 
[3] Municipal Corporations €=^182 
268k 182 Most Cited Cases 
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-918, which deals with 
appointment of chief of police in third-class cities, 
does not make removal of chief of police in such 
cities free from judicial oversight, in light of 
statutes dealing with removal of chief of police 
from first and second class cities, which expressly 
make such removal unreviewable, and thus, trial 
court had jurisdiction to review action of city 
counsel of third class city in firing chief of police. 
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-911. 
*265 George E. Brown, Jr., Midvale, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for defendants and 
respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiff Boyd A. Ward appeals from an order 
granting defendant Richfield City's motion to 
dismiss his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 
On April 2, 1981, Ward was terminated as chief of 
police of the city of Richfield, a third-class city, 
when the city council went into a closed meeting to 
consider "other business." According to a 
stipulation made by counsel for both sides, that 
action was entered in the minutes after the closed 
session concluded. On June 7, 1981, Ward brought 
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this action to be reinstated and to recover damages 
alleging that the closed meeting of the council had 
violated U.C.A., 1953, § 52-4-1, et seq., commonly 
known as the Open and Public Meetings Act. He 
also obtained a temporary restraining order against 
Richfield City, restraining it from taking any further 
action on the termination until the legality of its 
action could be decided by the district 
court. Nevertheless, on June 8 the council in an 
open meeting ratified its action of April 2. At a 
*266 hearing for a preliminary injunction, Richfield 
City made a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint 
for lack of jurisdiction. The court determined that 
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 1 0-3- 911, it had no 
jurisdiction to review the act of the city council in 
firing the chief of police and granted the motion. 
That order is the sole issue before us for review. 
Section 10-3-911 provides in pertinent part: 
The chief of the police or fire department of the 
cities may at any time be removed, without a trial, 
hearing or opportunity to be heard, by the board 
of commissioners whenever in its opinion the 
good of the service will be served thereby. Its 
action in removing the chief of either department 
shall be final and conclusive and shall not be 
received or called in question before any court. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Section 10-3-911 is preceded by § 10-3-909 
mandating cities of the first and second class to 
create police departments and by § 10-3-910 
vesting the board of commissioners with authority 
to prescribe the administration of the police 
departments by ordinance and to appoint the head 
of that department. Under § 10-l-104(2)(a), the 
governing body for cities of the first and second 
class is a city commission composed of a mayor and 
four or two commissioners, § 1 0-3-103 and 104. 
Under § 10-l-104(2)(b), the governing body for 
cities of the third class is the city council composed 
of a mayor and five councilmen, § 10-3-105. 
[1][2][3] It is readily apparent that §§ 10-3-909, 
910 and 911 with their references to the authority 
of the board of commissioners over police 
departments unmistakably refer to and are limited to 
first and second-class cities where boards of 
commissioners exist. These sections were not 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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intended by the Legislature to apply to police 
departments in third-class cities such as Richfield. 
Police departments in third-class cities and towns 
are dealt with separately in § 10-3-918, which 
provided at the time this case arose: 
In cities of the third class and in towns, the 
governing body may aippoint a chief of police or 
marshal who shall exercise and perform such 
duties as may be prescribed by the governing 
body. The chief of police or marshal shall be 
under the direction, control and supervision of the 
mayor. The chief of police or marshal may, with 
the consent of the mayor, appoint assistants to the 
chief of police or marshal. 
Conspicuously absent from this statute is the 
provision contained in § 10- 3-911 making the 
removal of a chief of police free from all judicial 
oversight. "It probably is not wholly inaccurate to 
suppose that ordinarily when people say one thing 
they do not mean something else." 2A C. Sands, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.01, as cited 
in Hansen v. Wilkinson, Utah, 658 P.2d 1216 (1983) 
. We construe a statute on the assumption that each 
term is used advisedly and that the intent of the 
Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the 
context and structure in which it is placed. 
Richfield City relies on several cases to bolster its 
argument that stare decisis supports a rinding of no 
jurisdiction. It also cites us to § 1 0-1-110 which 
directs that statutes such as § 10-3-911 which were 
enacted in 1977 as part of the "Utah Municipal 
Code" should be construed as the continuation of 
prior statutes so long as the provisions are the same 
or substantially the same. In Taylor v. Gunderson, 
107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944) we held that a 
town marshall of a third-class city could be 
removed without cause. However, the statute then in 
force (U.C.A., 1943, § 15-6-32) was repealed by the 
enactment of the 1977 Municipal Code and § 
10-3-911 is in no wise substantially the same. In 
Sheen v. Browning, 32 Utah 164, 89 P. 642 (1907) 
the statutes specifically made actions of the mayor 
and city council in removing heads of police and 
fire departments final and nonreviewable. Sec. 8, 
p. 46, Act 1899. In State v. Stavar, Utah, 578 P.2d 
847 (1978) we did not reach the issue presented in 
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the instant case. None of these cases is helpful 
here. 
*267 The order dismissing plaintiffs complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction was in error and is set aside. 
The case is remanded to the trial court with 
directions to allow plaintiff to proceed on the merits 
of his case. Costs are awarded to appellant. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate herein. 
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Richfield City has petitioned for rehearing pointing 
out that the court's opinion did not cite nor rely 
upon Jolley v. Lindon City, Utah, 684 P.2d 47 
(1984). We acknowledge our oversight. That 
case, too, involved the firing of the chief of police 
in a third class city. However, the contention there 
made by the appellant chief of police was that 
U.C.A., 1953, § 1 0-3-911 could not apply to him 
because he was discharged for investigating a city 
councilman in his official duties. The contention 
was not there made, as in the instant case, that 
section 10-3-911 does not in any instance apply to 
chiefs of police in third class cities. In a per 
curiam opinion, we held that since section 10-3-911 
contained no exceptions, it was inconsequential why 
the chief was dismissed. We also found lacking 
merit the appellant's contention that the city council 
had not formally dismissed him. Again, no 
contention was made that the city council lacked 
that statutory power. 
After careful consideration of the appellant's 
petition for rehearing, we deny it and overrule 
Jolley v. Lindon City, supra, insofar as our decision 
in that case conflicts with our opinion in the instant 
case. Furthermore, we have carefully examined 
Chapter 3 of Title 10 and have found that in each 
instance when the term "Board of Commissioners" 
is used, it refers only to the governing body of cities 
of the first and second class. We can find no 
instance in which that term was used to refer to the 
governing body of cities generally, including a city 
council in a third class city. In Chapter 3, the term 
"governing body" is consistently used (over 
seventy-five times) when reference is made to cities 
generally, that is, of all three classes. 
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., did not participate herein. 
716P.2d265 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.asDx?rs=WT .Wfi Ofi/frHpcti'nati^r^at^^^o A P. ZT/1 r i^r\r\/-
